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Toward an Understanding of Media Policy and Media Systems in Iraq: A
Foreword and Two Reports
Abstract
In the avalanche of analyses about what went wrong in Iraq, one area should be of particular interest to
communications scholars: the development of a media system in Iraq. The emerging media system
incorporates many significant strands: the conflict-related and post-conflict actions concerning media policy,
the considerable growth of faction-related and entrepreneurial broadcasters after the conflict, the efforts by
interests in the region (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and others) to affect the media environment,
interventions by the United States and other Western countries, and their complex and often inept media-
related reconstruction initiatives, the effort of non-government organizations (NGOs) to repeat or adopt
practices from other conflict zones.
There's a tendency in the communications studies literature to be concerned with particular U.S.-centric
frames of discussion: access by Western journalists to information, depiction of the United States on Al-
Jazeera and other satellite broadcasters, the combination of media and Islam as a mode of altering general
public attitudes. I focus here — as an introduction to the two accompanying papers — on the emerging
structure of media or media influences domestically in Iraq to understand the influence of the successor to
Saddam's state television, the relationship between external state-sponsored influences, and pluralism within,
and what consequence "media policy" or subsidy and private or party patronage has had on media institutions
there. Finally, it will become increasingly important to understand the relationship between these media
institutions and the actuality of continuing conflict and search for political solutions within Iraq.
This "Occasional Paper" includes two reports. The first is a paper written by Ibrahim Al-Marashi, one of the
few scholars systematically tracking media developments within Iraq. Dr. Al-Marashi was a Visiting Scholar at
the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania in 2006 and has, for the last year,
been an Open Society Institute (OSI) Policy Scholar at the Center for Policy Studies at Central European
University in Budapest. He has recently joined the faculty at Koç University in Istanbul. The second was
commissioned by the Republic of Iraq Communications and Media Commission (CMC), the agency
established first under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) then maintained by the Iraqi governing
authorities, and presented at a conference at UNESCO in January 2007. The report is the result of a contract
between the CMC and the Stanhope Centre for Communications Policy Research in London.
This book is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/59
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Foreword
Monroe Price *1
*  Director of the Center for Global and Communications Studies, Annenberg School for Communication, University of 
Pennsylvania and Professor of Law at the Benjamin N . Cardozo School of Law, New York City .  I want to express my 
gratitude	 to	Libby	Morgan	who	helped	 edit	 this	 Foreword	 and	 to	 Simon	Haselock	 and	Douglas	Griffin	who	made	
comments	on	various	drafts.
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   Foreword         
Iraq	and	the	Making	of	State	Media	Policy
In the avalanche of analyses about what went wrong in Iraq, one area should be of particular interest 
to communications scholars:  the development of a media system in Iraq . The emerging media system 
incorporates	many	 significant	 strands:	 	 the	 conflict-related	 and	 post-conflict	 actions	 concerning	media	
policy,	the	considerable	growth	of	faction-related	and	entrepreneurial	broadcasters	after	the	conflict,	the	
efforts	by	interests	in	the	region	(Iran,	Saudi	Arabia,	Lebanon	and	others)	to	affect	the	media	environment,	
interventions	by	the	United	States	and	other	Western	countries,	and	their	complex	and	often	inept	media-
related	reconstruction	initiatives,	the	effort	of	non-government	organizations	(NGOs)	to	repeat	or	adopt	
practices	from	other	conflict	zones.		
There’s a tendency in the communications studies literature to be concerned with particular U .S .-centric 
frames of discussion:  access by Western journalists to information, depiction of the United States on Al-
Jazeera and other satellite broadcasters, the combination of media and Islam as a mode of altering general 
public	 attitudes.	 	 I	 focus	here—as	 an	 introduction	 to	 the	 two	accompanying	papers—on	 the	 emerging	
structure	of	media	or	media	influences	domestically	in	Iraq	to	understand	the	influence	of	the	successor	
to	Saddam’s	state	television,	the	relationship	between	external	state-sponsored	influences,	and	pluralism	
within, and what consequence “media policy” or subsidy and private or party patronage has had on media 
institutions there .  Finally, it will become increasingly important to understand the relationship between 
these	media	institutions	and	the	actuality	of	continuing	conflict	and	search	for	political	solutions	within	
Iraq .
This	“Occasional	Paper”	includes	two	reports.	The	first	is	a	paper	written	by	Ibrahim	Al-Marashi,	one	of	
the few scholars systematically tracking media developments within Iraq .  Dr . Al-Marashi was a Visiting 
Scholar at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania in 2006 and has, for 
the last year, been an Open Society Institute (OSI) Policy Scholar at the Center for Policy Studies at Central 
European University in Budapest .  He has recently joined the faculty at Koç University in Istanbul .  The 
second was commissioned by the Republic of Iraq Communications and Media Commission (CMC),1 the 
agency	 established	first	under	 the	Coalition	Provisional	Authority	 (CPA)	 then	maintained	by	 the	 Iraqi	
governing authorities, and presented at a conference at UNESCO in January 2007 .  The report is the result 
of a contract between the CMC and the Stanhope Centre for Communications Policy Research in London .2 
1	 Alternately	referred	to	as	the	INCMC	or	NCMC	(http://www.ncmc-iraq.org/).
2  A few words about Stanhope would help .  Stanhope (www .stanhopecentre .org) is what might be called a virtual center 
for the conducting of policy research and training .  I founded Stanhope and have served as its chair .  One of its original 
functions	was	to	focus	on	media	in	conflict	zones	and	it	was	involved	in	a	study	with	the	Crisis	States	Research	Centre	at	
the London School of Economics (see “Why Templates for Media Development do not Work in Crisis States,” available 
at	http://www.crisisstates.com/download/publicity/FINAL.MEDIA.REPORT.PDF).		
	 	Stanhope	became	the	home	of	 the	Iraq	Media	Newsletter,	a	collection	of	materials	about	emerging	Iraq	media.	That	
material	is	archived	at	http://www.stanhopecentre.org/2007/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid
=9.			
  In 2002-2003, I helped prepare materials about media law and policy in the Middle East for Internews, the major 
media-related	NGO,	and	later	worked	with	them	in	preparing	a	conference—the	Athens	Conference	discussed	in	the	
Foreword—from	which	came	a	group,	financed	by	the	British	Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Office,	that	worked	(and	still	
works) in Iraq on these questions .  I advised them informally and even made a one-week trip to Baghdad in March 2004 . 
I	pretty	much	stayed	in	the	highly-protected	Green	Zone.		I	was	there	in	what	now	seems	like	a	bit	of	a	golden	era:	before	
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The	principal	 contributors	 to	 the	 fulfilling	of	 this	 contract	 and	 the	writing	of	 the	draft	 report	were,	 in	
addition	to	me,	Douglas	Griffin,	a	Fellow	of	the	Stanhope	Centre	and	subsequently	a	Director	of	Albany	
Associates,	and	Al-Marashi.		Siyamend	Othman,	the	Chief	Executive	Officer	of	the	CMC,	authorized	the	
study and determined the version published here .
I . 
My	 own	 involvement	 with	 Iraq	 media	 policy	 started	 through	 a	 request	 from	 Internews—the	 large	
international	media	NGO—to	 conduct	 a	 survey	 of	media	 laws	 and	policies	 in	 the	Arab	Middle	 East.3 
Ultimately this study became part of the input for a June 2003 conference in Athens that had the goal of 
providing	a	framework	for	post-conflict	media	policies	in	Iraq.		This	conference	was	important	for	several	
reasons, largely its link to the broader perspective of “democratization in the Middle East,” an alternate 
and	emerging	justification	for	the	Iraq	war.		The	Athens	meeting	sought	to	jump-start	a	different	kind	of	
rhetoric and direction for Iraq media from what was already emerging in an unguided and harsh post-
conflict	 environment.	 In	 those	 still	 optimistic	 times,	 goals	 for	post-conflict	 Iraq	 included	 the	flowering	
of instruments of communication, engendering speech, and providing a model for the region .  This was 
to be all about civil society and the roles that non-government organizations play .   Because the Athens 
conference was to emphasize media democratization in the region, it included representatives of various 
Arab	journalist	associations	as	well	as	government	officials.		Ironically,	or	perhaps	tragically,	it	was	hard	
to include indigenous Iraqi journalists, partly for security reasons, partly because of early concerns that 
they would be considered to be collaborating with the Occupier . One key participant at Athens was Simon 
Haselock,	who	became	significant	to	the	unfolding	story.	Haselock	is	a	retired	Royal	Marine	who	served	
as	spokesperson	for	the	Office	of	High	Representative	in	Bosnia	and	a	principal	architect	of	media	policy	
there,4 and then became Temporary Media Commissioner in Kosovo .  He was, perhaps, the person most 
experienced	(in	terms	of	post-conflict	contexts,	working	with	international	governmental	organizations	and	
thinking	about	media	development	and	its	relationship	to	conflict	zones).		In	Athens,	Haselock	took	charge	
of	drafting	a	background	paper	and	model	 law,	which	would	be	 the	underpinning	 for	his	 assignment	
from	the	British	Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Office	to	continue,	with	the	CPA,		the	work	of	structuring	
media policies and media entities in Baghdad .  Based on his work in Kosovo and Sarajevo, he believed that 
standards for broadcaster performance needed to be articulated, but there also had to be due process .  It 
was his view that one needed a mechanism with autonomy and a clear and impartial hearing and appeals 
process .
Much of what is contained in the two documents published here, especially the CMC report, depicts what 
has happened since Athens . It will be helpful, in reading the papers here published, to suggest some stages 
in the process: 
•	 The	period	of	preparation	for	the	invasion	and	preparation	for	the	government	that	would	
succeed that of Saddam Hussein
•	 The	stage	of	actual	war	and	the	selection	of	targets
Falluja, before the real bite of the insurgency, but at a time when safety was already a dominant and fearful concern .  Of 
course, nothing here has the blessing or involvement of the Media Development Group or other entities involved .  
3  For references to literature on participation, media and governance in the Arab Middle East, see Initiative on Good 
Governance	 for	 Development	 in	 the	 Arab	 Countries,	 http://www.arabgov-initiative.org/english/publications/index.
asp?tid=6.
4	 	Monroe	E.	Price,	“Information	Intervention:	Bosnia,	the	Dayton	Accords	and	the	Seizure	of	Broadcasting	Transmitters,”	
Cornell International Law Journal 33 (2000): 67 .
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•	 The	initial	post-war	period—during	the	period	of	United	States	Office	of	Reconstruction	and	
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and Jay Garner
•	 The	CPA	period	and	the	making	of	CPA	Orders	65	and	66,	establishing	the	regulator	and	
seeking to transform Iraq state media into a public service broadcaster
•	 The	increase	in	insurgency	and	the	handover	to	the	Interim	Iraqi	Government	and		Prime	
Minister Allawi
•	 Finally,	the	elections	and	successive	governments	and	the	rising	sectarian	conflict	or	emerging	
civil war
Each of these stages is marked by elements of an evolving media policy and new forms of media on 
the ground .   And throughout there were at least two areas of concern: a) the creation of a competitive 
broadcast	market	and	a	domestic	regulatory	agency—an	Iraqi	FCC—and	b)	the	transformation	of	Iraqi	state	
television . One involves shaping an administrative structure for licensing and regulation of content and 
the burgeoning of non-state media .  The other involves deciding what kind of institutions should emerge 
from the ashes of the former state monopoly .  As the following two reports indicate, the Saddam regime 
had a monopoly over media and imagery and satellite reception was barred .5  It is, however, misleading 
to	 think	of	 the	Saddam	period	as	wholly	without	voices,	political	differences,	 journalist	 capability	and	
infrastructure	or	sources	of	creativity	for	a	post-conflict	process.
As	 far	 as	 preplanning,	 we	 do	 not	 yet	 know	 specifically	 what	 was	 considered	 for	 post-conflict	 media	
efforts.		In	April	2005,	The Washington Post reported a RAND study more or less condemning the planning 
process	for	civil	administration	after	gaining	control	over	Iraq.6 The study concluded that stabilization and 
reconstruction	issues	“were	addressed	only	very	generally.”	Planning	for	the	invasion’s	aftermath	rested	
with the Defense Department rather than with the State Department or the National Security Council, and 
the report concluded, “Overall, this approach worked poorly .” The Pentagon lacked the expertise, funding 
authority and contacts with civilian aid organizations for the job . When the insurgency arose, the RAND 
report	concluded,	U.S.	authorities	failed	to	understand	its	nature	and	implications,	and	how	it	differed	
from past “wars of national liberation” or from a “classical guerrilla-type campaign .”  I have not seen the 
volumes prepared by the Iraq Planning Group, but the consensus is that they were probably inadequate 
and, at any rate, were more or less ignored by those implementing policy .  The overall expectation of what 
post-conflict	Iraq	would	be	like—what	it	would	mean	to	be	liberators—must	have	affected	media	policy	
planning	just	as	significantly	as	it	affected	the	entire	creation	of	a	civil	administration.		
United	States	and	other	military	policy	during	and	immediately	after	the	conflict	was	also	important.		There	
was not much ambivalence about how to deal with the Ministry of Information and Iraq broadcasting 
entities .  The Ministry of Information was abolished .  Was this like abolishing the Iraqi Army (now generally 
considered	an	ill-conceived	immediate	action	that	made	it	more	difficult	to	plan	in	the	aftermath	of	the	
invasion)?		This	question	has	not	been	sufficiently	analyzed	or	discussed,	partly	because	of	the	widely-
accepted notion that Ministries of Information are primarily tools of authoritarian regimes .   
During	the	invasion	itself,	there	were	slightly	conflicting	strategies	with	respect	to	facilities	and	bombing	
patterns:		one	goal	was	to	maintain	facilities	that	could	serve	as	the	basis	of	post-war	administration,	but	
another was to restrict Saddam’s ability to use broadcasting outlets for “command and control” functions 
5	 		An	August	2004	Freedom	House	special	report,	“Liberated	and	Occupied	Iraq,”	available	at	http://www.freedomhouse.
org/uploads/special_report/34.pdf,	provides	details	from	this	period.		
6	 		Bradley	Graham	&	Thomas	E.	Ricks,	“Pentagon	Blamed	for	Lack	of	Postwar	Planning	in	Iraq,”	The Washington Post, 
April 1, 2005: A03 .
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or to have a medium that would encourage resistance during the war .  The Coalition adopted the now-
customary approach of trying to put the existing stations out of service and then broadcast over their 
frequencies	through	a	Commander	Solo	aircraft	circling	over	Baghdad	and	the	rest	of	Iraq.		As	it	happened,	
many	domestic	Iraqi	terrestrial	transmitters	were	destroyed	in	the	April	2003	bombing	campaign.		I	have	
heard,	informally,	that	these	transmitters	made	easy	targets	and	increased	the	statistical	success	rate	for	
pilots, so that when the war ended, much of the infrastructure for transmission lay in ruins .
Two	other	immediate	facts	affected	the	capacity	to	develop	post-conflict	broadcasting.	One	was	the	vast	
post-war looting which led to the destruction of most major facilities, the trashing of video libraries, the 
laying waste of studios, the elimination of much that could be the basis of a broadcasting system .  There 
were no cameras, cameramen, video libraries, nor storehouse of knowledge .  Partly this was because of 
the	 second	 fact:	 the	process	of	de-Ba’athification,	 including	 the	 erasing	of	 the	Ministry	of	 Information.	
In	 the	 vacuum,	 there	were	 very	weak	 efforts	 to	 develop	 local	 capacity	 and	 too	much	 reliance	 on	U.S.	
personnel	and	expatriate	Iraqis.	Almost	immediately,	the	Coalition	launched	an	ineffective	service	called	
Toward Freedom, which  carried, among other things,  ABC or NBC Nightly News and a two-hour feed 
produced in the United Kingdom, sent by satellite to Washington for review, from there to Kuwait for post-
production,	and	finally	to	the	Commander	Solo	for	broadcast	to	Iraq.		
In May 2003, the U .S . Civil Administrator in Iraq, Retired Lt . Gen . Jay Garner, suggested his disappointment 
with the lack of progress made in establishing a television and radio broadcast system for Iraq . “We haven’t 
done	a	good	job…	I	want	TV	going	to	the	people,	with	a	soft	demeanour—programmes	they	want	to	see.”7 
A Radio Netherlands observer stated: 
Somebody needs to get a grip and set up an interim regulatory authority, otherwise it will be anarchy 
on the Iraqi airwaves . The regulators need to include people with technical, administrative and 
programming backgrounds as well as those who understand the political and ethnic complexities 
involved . You won’t create a democratic broadcasting system by allowing 20 or 30 groups of people 
with	different	agendas	to	have	a	station	each.	People	will	only	listen	to	the	ones	that	reflect	their	own	
views.	Nor	is	it	satisfactory	to	fill	the	airwaves	with	non-Iraqi	voices,	however	well-intentioned	these	
efforts	are.	It	would	make	much	more	sense	to	me	if	the	Iraqi	journalists	currently	working	for	Radio	
Sawa, Radio Free Iraq and other such stations were to go to Iraq and teach fellow Iraqis how to make 
good quality radio programmes . Then they would be making a real and lasting contribution to Iraqi 
society . Otherwise, instead of discussion and debate you’ll get a lot of people shouting into the ether, 
to	very	little	positive	effect.8  
Very	little	of	this	order	happened.	
In the post-war chaos, there were areas of self-help, some protean broadcasters that emerged spontaneously, 
versions	of	what	might	be	 called	pirate	 radio	or	 slightly	better.	 	Groups,	 sometimes	 city	governments,	
sometimes	clusters	of	interest,	found	parts	of	transmitters	and	other	equipment	and	began	to	send	signals	
into	the	ether.	Undoubtedly,	in	this	moment,	entities	that	later	become	more	significant—as	indicated	in	
the	Al-Marashi	paper—began	media	operations.		This	chaos	had	its	creative	element,	and	perhaps	should	
have been encouraged . Some was tolerated, but at one point, the Administrator announced that all old 
equipment, property of the Ministry of Information, had automatically become property of the CPA; in 
a few instances, soldiers went out to reclaim equipment from rogue groups that were using pieces of 
7	 		“Iraqi	Leaders	Expected	Mid-May,”	BBC	News,	May	5,	2003,	http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3000845.stm.
8   World of Radio, DX Listening Digest, May 6, 2003, http://www.worldofradio.com/dxld3078.txt	(remarks	of	Andy	Sennitt,	
Strategic Adviser, Clandestineradio .com) .  
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old	 transmitters	 to	 launch	 their	enterprises.	 	Other	developments	 in	 the	vacuum	included	Al-Alam,	an	
Iranian	government	channel,	which	established	a	transmitter	near	the	Iraqi	border	and	beamed	a	signal	
that reached Baghdad .  For a while, it was said to be the most watched terrestrial signal in Iraq .  And, 
of course, people, starved for information, began to buy satellite dishes and watch Al-Jazeera and other 
satellite channels .
In	May	2003,	 the	first	 restrictive	move	against	a	 television	station	 took	place,	 illustrating	another	 little-
recognized aspect of emerging media policy .  In addition to the policy made in Baghdad by the Coalition, 
particular military commands had the authority to develop policy . The British had a media policy in Basra 
in the south of the country; the 101st Airborne had a media policy in the northwest . There the Army issued 
orders concerning Mosul’s only television station .  The directive came from the 101st Airborne Division’s 
commander,	 actually	one	of	 the	great	 and	distinguished	figures	of	 the	war,	Maj.	Gen.	David	Petraeus,	
who	in	early	2007	was	elevated	to	Commander	of	Multinational	Forces,	Iraq.	When	a	local	officer	raised	
questions about the Army’s dedication to free speech in postwar Iraq and refused to execute the order, she 
was relieved of duty .  Because of General Petraeus’ now key role in Iraq, and because the Mosul station 
raised such interesting questions, it is useful to refer to a contemporary account of events by Walter Pincus 
in The Washington Post, under the headline, U .S . General May Censor Iraqi TV Station’s Programs .9
The	action	was	interesting	particularly	because	of	part	of	the	justification:		concern	over	rebroadcasting	
the news channel Al-Jazeera .  Al-Jazeera had already become a bete noir for the Coalition, and even 
in these early months the characterization of Al-Jazeera was being set in bureaucratic stone .  In May 
2003	Ahmad	Chalabi,	the	oft-discredited	head	of	the	Iraqi	National	Congress	and	a	close	adviser	to	the	
Department	of	Defense,	said	that	“Al-Jazeera	is	completely	infiltrated	by	Iraqi	intelligence.”10
In addition to the interventions by the military by ORHA and then CPA and others, policy towards emerging 
media	was	also	made	through	large-scale	government	contract,	part	of	the	reconstruction	effort.		Future	
scholars should look at the actual contracts entered into by the Department of Defense to reboot the old Iraq 
state	conglomerate.		The	first	contractor	for	this	phase	was	Science	Applications	International	Corporation	
(SAIC),11 which in March 2003 was given the task of reshaping the Iraq State Television channel into the 
Iraqi Media Network (IMN) .  This was a more than $80 million contract that would run for approximately 
a	year.		As	it	turned	out,	the	operation	of	the	contract	was	pretty	much	a	disaster.12  By December 2003, it 
became clear that an alternate contractor would have to be found .  A complex process of announcement and 
9  “Control over the content of a television station in Mosul has become a sensitive issue for the commanding 
general of the 101st Airborne Division who is running that part of northern Iraq .  The station, which broadcasts 
as	 many	 as	 five	 hours	 a	 night	 to	 the	 city	 of	 1.8	 million,	 lost	 its	 cameras	 to	 looters	 and	 was	 forced	 to	 turn	
to	 outside	 programming	 sources	 to	 fill	 its	 broadcasts.	 	 That	 content	 now	 ranges	 from	 Arab-language	 Al-
Jazeera news reports, talks and speeches by local personalities and interviews with the newly elected mayor 
to U .S . military announcements about avoiding unexploded shells or arranging plans for the wheat harvest . 
	 Fearing	that	local	politicians	and	returning	exiles	have	bullied	their	way	onto	the	air,	often	to	promote	themselves	
and sometimes to incite violence, the 101st commander, Maj . Gen . David H . Petraeus, said yesterday in a telephone 
interview	from	his	Mosul	headquarters	that	he	is	considering	putting	a	U.S.	Army	officer	and	a	translator	in	the	station	
to monitor what goes on the air .   .  .  .  .“I want to be certain that nothing is shown that would incite violence in a city that 
was extremely tense when we took over two-and-one-half weeks ago, and which still has folks who are totally opposed 
to what we’re doing and are willing to do something about it,” Petraeus said .   .  .  .  .“Yes, what we are looking at is 
censorship,”	he	said,	“but	you	can	censor	something	that	is	intended	to	inflame	passions.”	
 Walter Pincus, “U .S . General May Censor Iraqi TV Station’s Programs,” The Washington Post, May 9, 2003: A24 .
10 “Chalabi: Iraq Agents Work at Al-Jazeera,” Associated Press, April 29, 2003 .
11  SAIC is a contractor that does a wide range of large-scale military contracts . It describes itself as “[a] leading systems, 
solutions	and	technical	services	company	.	.	.		[that]	offers	a	broad	range	of	expertise	in	defense	modernization	efforts,	
intelligence, homeland security, logistics and product support, health and life sciences, space and earth sciences and 
global	commercial	services.”		SAIC,	Corporate	Fact	Sheet,	http://www.saic.com/news/pdf/corporatefactsheet.pdf.	
12	 	An	account	of	the	SAIC	involvement	appears	in	Donald	L.	Bartlett	and	James	B.	Steele,	“Washington’s	$8	Billion	Shadow,”	
Vanity Fair, March 2007 .
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bidding led to the selection of Harris Corp ., as part of a consortium including the Lebanese Broadcasting 
Corporation	(LBC).			Administration	under	Harris	was	improved,	but	difficulties	of	security	and	purpose,	
and	conflict	over	management	philosophy,	plagued	its	fulfillment	of	the	contract	as	well.	 	 	The	contract	
terms	spelled	out	a	specific	number	of	channels,	the	amount	of	news	that	should	be	broadcast,	a	schedule	
for relative independence and a host of objectives . These objectives were as unobtainable and hard to 
implement as were those in the previous contract with SAIC .  In June 2003, Index on Censorship reported 
as follows:  
Contradictions	fly	everywhere.	Having	invested	$20	million	dollars	over	three	months	in	the	rebuilding	
of	Iraqi	state	TV	&	radio,	the	U.S.	officials	in	charge	of	the	[SAIC]	contract	began	balking	at	the	new	
network’s	news	output	 immediately	after	it	went	on	air.	 	Managers	were	told	to	drop	the	readings	
from the Koran, the ‘vox-pop’ man-in-the-street interviews (usually critical of the U .S . invasion) and 
even to run their content past the wife of a U .S .-friendly Iraqi Kurdish leader for a pre-broadcast 
check.”		The	first	director	resigned,	and	now	runs	a	talk	radio	station.13  
In those complex early months, the need for an improved “rule of law” approach also became clear .  On 
June	10,	2003,	Coalition	Order	14—an	“Order”	derived	from	the	President	as	Commander	and	the	Coalition	
as	Occupier—was	invoked.14		As	in	early	missteps	in	the	wake	of	conflict	in	Kosovo,	the	clumsy	invocation	
of	power	to	stifle	speech	generated	outrage	and	passion	against	those	engaged	in	the	suppression.		The	
Order’s	failure	to	provide	a	sufficient	process	for	determining	whether	there	was	an	actionable	violation,	
and the means of its execution, would become a ground for changing media policies .  The history of these 
developments is covered in the background provided in the CMC document that is published following 
this Foreword .  
For those engaged in helping to design policy, particularly the Media Development Team (MDT) established 
by	Haselock,	the	period	from	summer	2003	to	March	2004	was	grueling.		It	involved	bureaucratic	infighting	
over the shape of regulatory agency-to-be, as well as competing visions of broadcasting in Iraq, including 
the future of the Iraqi Media Network .  This could be capsulated into a drawn-out competition between 
a British perspective (established by the Media Development Team), primarily that of Haselock, and the 
views	of	 a	floating	group	of	people	who	were	part	of	 the	CPA,	operating	 in	one	of	 Saddam’s	palaces.	
Originally, Paul Bremer, Administrator of the CPA, had come to an informal understanding with Haselock, 
but as time went on, new voices came into the bureaucratic fray from Washington . Ultimately, despite 
complex maneuvering over frequency allocation, the MDT initiated an interim licensing system, seeking, 
broadly, to license all who were already using the airwaves (though consulting with the Iraqi Governing 
13	 	Rohan	Jayasekera,	“US	Military	Hesitates	over	Free	Speech,”	Index	on	Censorship,	Nov.	6,	2003,	http://www.indexonline.
org/en/news/articles/2003/2/gives-with-one-hand-takes-away-with-the-othe.shtml.
14   The Freedom House report summarizes related developments: 
  Order 14 gave Ambassador Bremer the sole authority to close media organizations; the only process set up 
for		media	organizations	to	protest	a	closure	by	the	CPA	was	a	written	appeal	with	evidence	to	that	same	
CPA Administrator, Ambassador Bremer .
	 	CPA	 officials	 said	 that	 the	 main	 objective	 of	 the	 order	 was	 to	 enhance	 civil	 stability	 and	 prevent	
irresponsible	 journalists	 from	 inflaming	an	already	volatile	 and	 tenuous	 situation.	Critics	of	 the	order	
expressed concerns that it could open the door to arbitrary and unnecessary censorship .CPA Order 14 
was cited to justify the closure or temporary ban of a number of newspapers and media outlets . One of 
the earliest instances of its implementation came in July 2003, when U .S . troops and Iraqi police raided 
the	 Baghdad	 offices	 of	 the	 Al-Mustaqila	 newspaper	 and	 detained	 the	 newspaper’s	 manager,	 Abdul	
Sattar	 Shalan.	CPA	officials	 said	 that	Al-Mustaqila	had	published	 an	 article	proclaiming	 the	killing	of	
spies who cooperate with the United States to be a religious duty, echoing messages issued by armed  
groups	who	had	been	conducting	attacks	against	Coalition	forces.
  “Liberated and Occupied Iraq: New Beginnings and Challenges for Press Freedom,” Freedom House (2004),	 http://
www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/special_report/34.pdf.
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Council) .  Among the (fairly uninteresting) issues were the following:  Should the regulatory agency be 
converged (i.e . have jurisdiction over telecommunications as well as broadcasting) or over broadcasting 
alone?		Should	there	be	a	powerful	director	general,	or	should	power	reside	in	the	Commission?			Should	
the	Iraqi	Media	Network	become	privatized	and	licensed?		
Both the United Kingdom and the United States saw broadcasting and media policy through the prism 
of their own experiences . ‘Models’	or	ideologies	were	influential,	though	chaos	and	personality	conflicts	
were	at	 least	as	powerful	 in	getting	 in	 the	way	of	shaping	policies	 to	specific	needs . The United States 
seemed to emphasize independent players; the United Kingdom seemed to foresee a strong public service 
version	of	Iraqi’s	state	broadcaster,	though	this	is	a	bit	too	reductionist.		There	were	few	means	of	fitting	
broadcasting policy to the political realities in Iraq, such as the Kurdish autonomy issue . (For good and 
sufficient	reasons,	complex	solutions	such	as	the	Dutch	pillarized	or	Lebanese	confessional	approach,	with	
assured	representation	in	media	control	for	specific	groups	in	society,	were	rejected).	
The	 difficulties	 faced	 by	 non	 governmental	 organizations	 during	 the	 period	 were	 highly	 significant.	
Athens had been the acme point for NGO involvement, but key NGOs decided, either for valid security 
reasons or because of fundamental disagreement with the war, to reduce their expected operations, to 
function largely outside of Iraq, or to avoid involvement at all .  Some might have become more engaged 
if the State Department and USAID had been in charge of media development .  But these NGOs had an 
antipathy to working with the Department of Defense .  This was an important characteristic of planning 
and implementation in comparison to Bosnia and Kosovo, in which NGOs played a far more active role . 
NGOs bring civil society into the picture, they make the bureaucracy more responsive, they bring more 
perspectives	 to	bear,	 and	 they	help	 increase	 the	 legitimacy	of	 the	 result.	 	 Little	of	 this	 occurred	 in	 the	
elaboration of the process in Iraq .
Also	significant	was	the	virtual	absence	of	Iraqis	from	large	parts	of	the	process	of	planning.		Partly	this	was	
because	of	the	security	situation;	the	participants	hardly	went	out	of	the	Green	Zone.		The	Iraqi	Governing	
Council, or IGC, as it was then denominated, largely appointed or selected by the CPA, lacked legitimacy . 
More than that, the IGC was preoccupied with other questions (its own survival and succession) and did 
not have a great enthusiasm for the details of the architecture of broadcasting (of course, there always 
is	 interest	 in	who	will	 get	 valuable	 frequencies).	 	 There	was	 an	 exception:	 	 a	Media	Committee	 in	 the	
IGC	which	was	very	active	and	approved	all	the	interim	licenses.		The	Committee	was	chaired	by	Samir	
Sumiadi Shaker, later Ambassador to the United States .  He mediated between the MDT and members of 
the	Committee	who	desired	a	much	more	censorial	approach.		
Out	of	this	process	came	Order	65	and	Order	66	(in	which	the	Media	Committee	had	a	hand	as	well).		The	
Order	65	structure—for	the	Communications	and	Media	Commission—provided	for	nine	commissioners,	
with	power	lodged	largely	in	the	hands	of	a	Chief	Executive	Officer.	 	Very	little	was	provided	in	terms	
of	 specific	depiction	of	content	standards,	 leaving	much	 to	 the	development	of	Codes	of	behavior	 that	
would be self-regulatory or imposed by the CMC .  Through a system of stakeholder participation, Order 
65 sought to establish a “self-regulatory” and regulatory distinction between print and broadcasting; 
it borrowed from Kosovo the idea of a hearings board and an independent appeals board, but made it 
purely	Iraqi	as	opposed	to	inserting	an	international	judge.		But	because	of	the	continued	conflict,	absence	
of	 a	 civil	 society,	 and	problems	of	 legitimacy	of	 the	Occupation,	 a	new	 factor	of	 significance	 arose:	 	 It	
was	hard	to	staff	these	bodies.	 	 It	was	hard	to	find	the	requisite	number	of	appropriate	commissioners	
and governors for the Commission and the public service entity simultaneously created under Order 66, 
which established the governing entity for the “public service broadcaster .”   Iraq lacked an abundance of 
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candidates	satisfactory	to	constituencies	(and	to	the	Coalition)	for	the	key	positions,	and	it	was	difficult	to	
achieve political consensus .  This continues to plague the process until this day .
The	period	after	the	issuance	of	the	Orders,	in	March	2004,	had	a	number	of	characteristics,	including	the	
difficulty	of	establishing	the	administration	of	the	regulatory	agency	and	the	administration	of	 licenses	
issued earlier to validate broadcasters who were already on the air, as well as the question of revisiting 
frequency	allocation	and	assignment.		But	just	after	the	issuance	of	Order	65,	after	Falluja,	after	the	period	
of kidnappings and videos of beheadings, in the wake of Najaf and the actions of Muqtada al Sadr, the CPA 
closed	two	papers	under	Order	14.		This	was	a	significant	turning	point.	It	meant	that	side	by	side	with	the	
regulatory agency, the CPA still saw the regulation of broadcasting as a military necessity .   For the Media 
Development Team, the consequences of “arbitrary” newspaper closings demonstrated the urgency of 
introducing	due	process	but	also	the	difficulty	of	assuring	adherence,	either	by	military	or	civil	authorities,	
to	the	rule	of	law.		The	closing	reflected,	as	well,	the	deep	ambivalence	in	the	CPA	between	a	policy	of	“no	
regulation”	and	one	of	hard-hitting	military	necessity.		Debates	over	Al-Jazeera,	which	had	begun	in	this	
period,	reflected	this	ambivalence.
A critical event was the almost sudden dissolution of the CPA and the handover of authority to the Iraqi 
Interim	Government	(IIG)	and	Prime	Minister	Allawi.	Soon	after	the	handover,	signs	appeared	that	the	
predictable was occurring:  the assertion of authority by an authoritarian government, a breaking down 
of the “autonomy” that the Orders sought to capture .  As the IIG developed over time, there appeared 
an entity called the Higher Media Council (HMC) .  Iyad Allawi had apparently asked Ibrahim Al-Janabi, 
an old friend, to be his media adviser .  In July 2004, Al-Janabi sought power over both the commissions 
established under Order 65 and 66 .   The status of the members appointed by the CPA seemed to be in 
jeopardy .15			In	November	2004,	the	HMC	warned	news	organizations	to	reflect	the	government’s	positions	
in	their	reporting	on	that	month’s	U.S.-led	attack	in	Falluja	or	face	unspecified	action,	invoking	a	60-day	
state of emergency declared by Iraq’s U .S .-backed interim government ahead of the assault on the city . 
There were some quiet remonstrations by the U .K . government and the U .S . government concerning the 
role	of	 the	HMC.	 	 	A	difficult	question	arose,	however:	which	was	more	consistent	with	emerging	self-
governance	aspirations—to	have	somewhat	thuggish	Iraqi	control	asserted	by	an	HMC	appointed	by	a	
“democratic government” or to have autonomy and independence for an agency that was largely the 
creature	of	the	CPA?	
The problem of the defense contractor and Al-Iraqiyya (the name given to the evolved Iraqi Media Network’s 
television channel) persisted . On November 18, 2004, Jalal Al-Mashta, who had been appointed as general 
director of Al-Iraqiyya in May 2004, resigned, claiming he had no control over the channel’s management 
and that the budget was being wasted on buying costly foreign programs while salaries were not being paid . 
15	 	By	 June	2005,	 there	appeared	to	be	some	clarification	of	 the	 issue.	The	Stanhope	Iraq	Media	Developments	blog,	an	
adaptation	of	the	earlier	Iraq	Media	Newsletter,	noted:
  There has been a loose resolution of the issue of a Higher Media Council and its relationship to the National 
Communications and Media Commission and the Iraqi Media Network . The reconstituted Council will 
serve, and is serving, as a senior advisory group that assists in developing policy for the government, that 
evaluates and assesses performance, that charts new directions, and that helps to identify opportunities . 
How this will work out in practice depends on the strength of the NCMC and the IMN . The NCMC, with 
Siyamend Othman as CEO, has recruited a deputy, held training sessions for journalists in preparation for 
the election, and has been preparing tenders for national channels . . . .
	 http://www.stanhopecentre.org/blogs/iraqmedia/archives/ncmc/index.html.
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II .
The narrative of media policy making in Iraq is about many things .  It is about the relationship between 
force	and	law,	the	complexity	of	building	institutions	in	the	midst	of	conflict,	and	issues	of	legitimacy	and	
authority .  Because these discussions are about media institutions, the story is also about mythmaking 
and storytelling .  The narrative of media policy-making concerns ideas of “freedom of the media” and 
realization	of	“rights”	in	the	midst	of	bitter,	tough,	angry	combat.		As	a	result,	the	story	concerns	that	most	
important of issues, the relationship of words on the page and law in practice .  The account of media policy 
in Iraq is about humans and their capabilities in an environment where the mere statement of law does not 
mean its absorption into reality .
The	notion	of	media	assistance	developed	in	the	post-Soviet	transitions,	where	there	was	special	attention	
to Russia and Central and Eastern Europe .   Because of relatively peaceful handovers, in these countries 
there was a functioning state or a path to a functioning state .  The question was how media could help 
create a public sphere and consolidate progress toward democratic values .  But since the late 1990’s or 
even before, other contexts have come to the fore .  Failing states or weak states, or states where media 
dominates	over	 the	 state,	have	 risen	 to	 the	 forefront	of	public	attention.	 In	 some	post-conflict	 states	at	
the early stages of development, media policy is designed to contribute to stability, help create a national 
identity, and represent minorities, all as part of state building .   To draw broad strokes, Iraq presents, in 
its immensity, a third category for media development, where there is the destruction of the state and the 
painful, incomplete process towards its reconstruction . The story of media assistance or intervention in 
Iraq	became,	in	its	implementation,	different	from	the	Occupation	model	of	post-war	Germany	and	Japan	
(with the media development story there), but what emerged in the stead of those historic models is still 
very much an unsatisfactory blur .
In	preparing	this	Foreword,	I	came	across	some	of	my	notes	of	the	period.		They	express	a	kind	of	qualified	
optimism	(perhaps	insufficiently	qualified),	and	I	look	upon	them	nostalgically:	“The	nature	and	control	
of the media following a peaceful or forceful change of regime in Iraq will signify the scope and character 
of the new political reality . What goes on the air in place of Iraqi state television and radio will symbolize a 
change in power and the end of Ba’ath Party control, while giving a transitional government the ability to 
communicate with the entire population .”  I noted some recommendations:
A .  “Plan for post-regime stability .  In the immediate wake of change, there should be a plan, 
easy to implement, that underscores political stability, assists in the delivery of services and 
provides a framework for moving forward .   
•	 To	implement	this,	it	would	be	important	to	have	a	reservoir	of	skilled	journalists,	
managers and on-camera personalities who can immediately be brought into 
play .   These can be drawn from existing professionals in Iraq, from those involved 
in satellite broadcasting and skilled personnel now working for international 
broadcasters . An analysis of such a skill bank should immediately be put 
together . 
•	 A	mechanism	should	be	established	for	a	link	between	the	U.S.	military	or	allied	
forces and the civil administration responsible for post-regime change media 
strategy .
B .   Develop a policy for regional satellite broadcasters .   Because the region is characterized by the 
presence of multiple satellite broadcasters, it should be determined, in advance, how these 
will	be	deployed	or	permitted.		Will	there	be	a	policy	concerning	distribution	of	satellite	
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dishes, or the assembly of bouquet of channel services to be delivered by satellite and 
reflecting	various	sectarian	needs?			
C .   Provide specific training program for interim broadcasting environment immediately following 
regime change.
D .  Provide analysis and criticism of available post-conflict models:  
•	 Bosnia-Hercegovina:		pluralistic	national	public	service	broadcaster	and	sectoral	
specific	entity	broadcasters,	supplemented	by	independent	stations
•	 Afghanistan:		management	in	hands	of	Ministry	of	Information
•	 Russia:		modification	of	existing	state	broadcasters	coupled	with	growing	private	
sector
•	 Central	Asia:		reliance,	in	the	short	term,	on	state	broadcaster	during	immediate	
post transition period
•	 Germany,	 Japan:	 “denazification”	model	 and	 imposition	 of	 Occupation	media	
system 
•	 Carter-Sagalayev	 Commission	 on	 Radio	 and	 Television	 Policy,	 established	 in	
1990: put together group of professional Iraqis and Americans on an advisory 
Commission on Radio and Television Policy that would recommend approaches 
to a) licensing policy, b) transition for state broadcaster; c) election related policies; 
d) content rules; e) funding possibilities .”
Like	any	collection	of	notes,	this	can	be	looked	upon	as	reflections	of	unrealizable	hopes	or	a	misunderstanding	
of	what	was	about	to	occur:		the	mixed	goals,	flawed	human	resources	and	indescribable	limitations	that	
would suddenly loom into being .    As Al-Marashi’s paper suggests, a complex media system has emerged . 
The connection between that system and the regulatory and planning inputs (described in the CMC paper) 
are far from clear or linear .
This loose collection of thoughts may be helpful in reading the two reports published with this Foreword . 
But I should add one more point:  I approach this discussion with a particular view of how to think about 
aspects	of	media	intervention—purposeful	entry	into	a	market	by	public	as	well	as	private	players	to	affect	
structures,	policies	and	public	opinion.	 	A	more	limited	definition	would	confine	media	intervention	to	
capture	a	deliberate	effort	by	one	state	(or	a	combination	of	states)	to	affect	the	way	in	which	images	are	
produced	and	circulated	 in	a	specified	area.	 	 	 	My	partly	 idiosyncratic,	partly	obvious	model,	adapted	
from a book I published a few years ago called Media and Sovereignty,16  suggests the following:  that a 
fundamental of traditional media policy is that there was a “bubble of identity” coterminous with the 
boundaries of the state, with the state seeking to regulate images within the bubble, and restricting what 
images	can	come	into	the	bubble	from	outside.			I	argued	for	a	shift	in	thinking	to	reflect	a	shift	in	realities:	
understanding that the media in one state (let’s call it, infelicitously, the “target state”), is the product not 
only of the state’s own actions but of others, sometimes neighbors, sometimes powerful global actors .  India 
tries	to	influence	the	media	space	of	Pakistan,	the	United	States	seeks	to	influence	the	media	space	of	Cuba.	
War is the clearest occasion for such intervention .  In general, states use force, technology, law, negotiation 
and	subsidy,	among	other	things,	to	alter	the	flow	of	images	and	messages	in	a	target	state.		They	may	act	
16   Monroe E . Price, Media and Sovereignty: The Global Information Revolution and its Challenge to State Power (Cambridge, 
Mass .: MIT Press, 2002) .
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unilaterally or with others, and sometimes they seek the consent of the target .  Iraq is a laboratory for these 
kinds of interactions with the United States, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and 
others seeming to have a stake in the emerging mix of images . 
What	are	the	goals	of	these	intervenors?		Why	does	one	society	wish	to	affect	the	flow	of	imagery	in	another	
state?		It	may	be	altruistic	or	instrumental	or	both.	It	may	be	to	increase	markets;	it	may	be	to	reinforce	
regional alliances .  It may be to produce stability or instability .  It may be to further a more democratic 
regime.					Media	intervention	often	includes	“media	assistance,”	which	I	would	describe	as	support,	usually	
financial	or	expert,	in	creating	the	“enabling	environment”17—the	legal	framework,	technical	infrastructure,	
production	system—in	a	target	society.		In	this	way,	media	intervention	and	media	assistance	can	mean	
involvement in the actual distribution of content or in the shaping of the political economy of the media . 
The CMC paper published here is an example of the product of media assistance, though in this case it was 
funded by the CMC itself .  This process of media intervention and media assistance can be studied in a 
wide variety of places and contexts .  In the 1940’s, this process could be labeled an element of propaganda . 
In	the	1950’s	and	after,	it	was	an	essential	part	of	the	Cold	War.		In	the	1990’s	it	was	a	strong	element	of	
the post-Soviet transitions .  But these were warm-ups for the media interventions in Bosnia-Hercegovina, 
in Kosovo and in Iraq .  So severe a series of interventions by public and private parties as in Iraq lays the 
process bare .  Iraq represents a pathology of media intervention, and, as with any pathology, its study 
helps in dealing with more healthy organisms . 
17   Peter Krug and Monroe E . Price, “The Enabling Environment for Free and Independent Media,” Cardozo Law School, 
Public Law Research Paper  No.27 (2000) . 
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Part	One:	The	Iraqi	Broadcasting	Sector	and	the	
Regulatory	Environment	in	which	it	Exists
This study was commissioned by the Communications and Media Commission of Iraq (CMC) as part of its 
efforts	to	stimulate	debate	on	ways	to	improve	the	broadcasting	sector	in	Iraq.		The	most	immediate	goal	of	
this document is to describe the current regulatory framework in Iraq and to make policy recommendations 
for change for use by the CMC, Iraqi policy makers and international and local donors and implementing 
organizations.		This	draft	was	presented	at	a	conference	on	Iraqi	media	funded	by	the	CMC	and	co-hosted	
by	UNESCO	and	UNDP,	with	the	support	of	Official	Development	Assistance	of	Japan	and	the	European	
Union .  This conference took place at UNESCO headquarters in Paris in January 2007 .  
A future goal of the study will be to provide a snapshot of the Iraqi broadcasting sector as it is today .  A 
more comprehensive version of this study addressing this aim is being prepared and is to be published 
by	the	CMC	at	a	 later	date.	 	The	subsequent	draft	will	 take	into	consideration	comments	submitted	on	
this	draft.		It	is	important	to	note	that	the	CMC’s	commissioning	and	publication	of	this	report	does	not	
mean it endorses its content or its recommendations .  It remains a working document pending further 
discussions .  
The CMC would like to express its gratitude to the Stanhope Centre for undertaking this important study 
in very challenging circumstances .
I . Introduction
This	is	a	key	moment	(though	in	the	complexities	of	recent	Iraqi	history,	almost	all	moments	are	significant)	
to	evaluate	the	developing	media	environment	in	Iraq.		With	the	possibilities	so	finely	balanced	between	
the	potential	for	a	comprehensive	political	settlement	and	the	danger	of	enhanced	conflict,	the	role	of	the	
media	will	increasingly	be	a	matter	for	public	debate.		Indeed,	one	major	question	for	the	future	will	be	
how	a	national	political	settlement	affects	media	structures	and	media	regulation.		
This	is	only	one	of	many	challenges	facing	the	Iraqi	media	sector	as	it	expands	after	more	than	thirty	years	
of state control and censorship .  The proliferation of numerous media outlets is a positive development . 
At	the	moment,	however,	a	significant	number	of	the	new	media	are	controlled	by	religious	and	ethnic	
parties, or powerful religious, political and business leaders who utilize a network of television and 
radio stations and newspapers, essentially their own “media empires,” to advocate particular agendas . 
This	is	a	somewhat	different	model	for	political	development	from	a	system	that	emphasizes	objective,	
“independent” voices and broad and general interests .   
This report is primarily designed to give policy advice to the Communications and Media Commission of 
Iraq	(CMC),	but	it	is	also	necessary	to	take	note	of	the	ongoing	violence	that	seriously	affects	the	state	of	the	
media.		Just	recently,	gunmen	invaded	the	office	of	Al-Shabbiya	and	killed	eleven	of	its	staff,	including	its	
founder, on the eve of its commencement of programming .  Violence is its own form of regulation, and, in 
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a	context	like	Iraq,	who	constitutes	the	“regulator”	in	this	sense,	and	what	relationship	exists	to	official	and	
semi-official	figures	is	murky	at	best.		At	a	time	when	journalists	and	broadcasters	are	threatened,	where	
insecurity	may	predominate,	the	nuances	of	official	regulation	may	seem	distant	and	almost	insignificant.	
Yet, even in the midst of instability, the search for the stable proceeds .  Institutions, with mandates, exist, 
and the manner in which an emerging government relates to the rule of law will be of great importance .  
A prerequisite for the advance toward a stable democracy in Iraq is the emergence of a professional and 
independent media that are able to impart reliable information and foster national debates from a variety 
of viewpoints, inclusive of Iraq’s diverse ethnic and sectarian communities .  In a country relatively new to 
independent	media,	there	are	many	areas	where	suggestions	can	be	made	for	improvements,	and	this	draft	
report seeks to make policy recommendations for the CMC and other stakeholders .  
*     *     *     *     *
It	is	within	this	setting—which	is	very	briefly	set	forth	here,	providing	only	a	glimpse	of	a	number	of	the	
many	complexities	that	define	and	confront	Iraq	and	Iraqi	media	today—that	the	challenges	to	the	CMC,	
and the policy recommendations made here, should be viewed .
II . Brief Introduction to Iraqi Broadcast Media 
Iraqi broadcast media have evolved tremendously since the Ba’athist period . Elements of the Iraqi media 
provide venues for Iraqi citizens to call in and vent their problems and opinions of the nation’s political 
and socio-economic development .  The media are beginning to serve as a means of furthering participation 
by civil society .  Iraqi stations, including the publicly-funded Al-Iraqiyya, serve a Fourth Estate role of 
challenging the government for its shortcomings, though the extent this function is performed varies 
among channels and from time to time .  Most channels have social advocacy programs to demonstrate the 
plight of Iraqi citizens and how the government can alleviate their situation .  The Iraqi media increasingly 
criticize the government and address issues such as corruption in the government or how various ministries 
should do more to alleviate poverty and unemployment .  Entertainment is emerging on various channels, 
particularly programs that use humor to help relieve the stresses of Iraq’s post 2003 war society, and 
serves as an outlet to criticize the situation and the government itself for the nation’s maladies . Indeed, the 
diversity of opinion in the Iraq media is a positive sign since the fall of the Ba’ath, when there were only 
five	state-owned	dailies	and	a	single	government	channel.
The Iraqi media landscape is currently dominated by particular ethno-sectarian and political factions or 
media personalities .  Powerful media are coalescing around ethno-political groups in Iraq who have print, 
radio and TV media at their disposal .  Iraqi Kurdish, Turkmen, Arab Sunni and Arab Shi’a factions all have 
their own means of communicating to their ethno-sectarian constituencies in Iraq and abroad in the Iraqi 
diaspora.		Other	independent	media	with	no	ethno-sectarian	affiliation	do	exist,	but	do	not	have	access	to	the	
funds,	or	the	physical	protections,	that	political	parties	can	provide.		The	problem	of	sectarianism	reflected	
in	the	Iraqi	media	poses	a	challenge	for	other	Iraqi	media	outlets	which	seek	to	reflect	the	developments	in	
Iraqi society according to international journalistic standards .
This fragmentation along sectarian, ethnic and ideological lines is not problematic in and of itself; indeed, 
it	could	be	seen	to	reflect	the	pluralism	viewed	as	desirable	in	most	media	landscapes.		It	is	clear,	however,	
that Iraq’s politicians and sectarian groups continue to view the media as a tactical tool, one duty-bound 
to support the government, the parties or the groups that sponsor them . Sectarian divisions are potentially 
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worrisome in a society with increased incidence of violence along ethnic and religious lines, and Iraq 
seems	to	be	heading	down	this	road	more	swiftly	every	day.	Care	will	have	to	be	taken	in	discouraging	
Iraq’s diverse and representative broadcasters from contributing to this situation .
While freedom of the press is a feature of the industry in Iraq, this freedom has been utilized in ways 
that	 stretch	 an	 implicit	 compact	 that	 suggests	 internal	 standards	 for	professionalism.	 	Media	 affiliated	
with political groups do not necessarily practice the principles of free press stated or adopted within their 
organizations .  The current situation has various implications for the nascent Iraqi media and whether the 
media can foster a national Iraqi public sphere . 
Various ethno-sectarian media outlets could prove problematic . In terms of quality of journalism, critical 
and analytic reporting are developing in Iraq, yet at the same time, other media outlets serve as the 
“stenographers of power,” which at this juncture have reserved their use of the “language of hate,” but 
are in a position to employ it in the future .  Such an arrangement can only further the gap between Iraq’s 
communities, developing identities along ethno-sectarian lines, and weakening any kind of national 
belonging .  If the security situation were to worsen, the political factions would be in the position to use 
the	media	as	mouthpieces	to	exacerbate	the	conflict.		So	far,	these	factions	have	used	their	media	to	stress	
unity	among	Iraq’s	communities,	but	they	nevertheless	have	the	potential	to	instigate	conflict	with	these	
means if it suits their interests .  
As for the independent media, journalists face the challenge of reporting on other parties critically .  Those 
journalists	 face	difficulties	getting	information	from	politicians	who	are	more	 inclined	to	give	access	to	
their	own	media	affiliated	with	their	own	organizations.		Journalists	who	are	too	critical	of	other	factions	
often	have	been	subjected	to	blackmail	and	death	threats,	if	not	death	itself.
It is obvious from reading current headlines that being a journalist in Iraq is one of the most dangerous 
professions	 in	the	world	today.	 	A	recent	report	of	The	Committee	to	Protect	 Journalists	states	 that	129	
media workers have been killed since the war began in 2003; more than 80 percent of these fatalities were 
locals .1   According to a September 6, 2006 New York Times editorial, “journalists in Iraq face death threats 
from all sides .”2		The	most	significant	threat	comes	from	the	insurgency	and	religious	extremists.		In	early	
August	2006,	two	Iraqi	journalists	were	killed	by	militants.		More	recently,	the	office	of	the	daily	newspaper,	
Al-Sabah, was torn apart by a bomb killing at least two people and wounding twenty .  In October 2006, 
gunmen	invaded	the	office	of	Al-Shabbiya	and	killed	eleven	of	 its	staff	the	night	before	it	was	to	begin	
programming.		Journalists	also	face	attacks	by	the	Iraqi	police	and	other	authorities,	as	well	as	additional	
hardships, including low salaries and lack of training .
Although journalist safety and conditions are not the focus of this report, these topics must be addressed 
whenever the issue of Iraqi media is discussed .  We, therefore, asked the International Federation of 
Journalists	 (IFJ)—an	 international	association	of	 journalists	committed	 to	promoting	 journalists’	unions	
and	protecting	the	safety	and	well-being	of	journalists	worldwide	(www.ifj.org)—to	submit	a	background	
paper on these issues .  This paper provides an important perspective, that of journalists (print journalists in 
particular),	working	in	the	difficult	and	dangerous	environment	of	Iraq.		Issues	discussed	in	the	paper	include	
existing	journalists’	unions	and	efforts	to	organize	them,	the	state	of	professionalism,	special	issues	faced	
by women, and self-regulation .  The paper sets forth a number of conclusions and recommendations .
1	 	“Attacks	on	 the	Press	 in	2006:	Middle	East	and	North	Africa,”	Committee	 to	Protect	 Journalists,	http://www.cpj.org/
attacks06/mideast06/iraq06.html.
2 Ali Fadhil, “Iraq’s Endangered Journalists,” The New York Times, September 6, 2006: A19 .
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III . Regulatory Framework for Media in Iraq
A . Background
Until 2003, the media in Iraq was subject to draconian state control .  The government and the state Ba’ath 
Party tightly controlled and owned all news agencies and broadcast media, and the sole mission of the 
Iraqi News Agency and the Iraqi press was to relay state propaganda .  Systematic suppression of any 
alternative voices was the norm and all indigenous media was the preserve of the state .  Iraq’s press and 
broadcasters were controlled through the Ministry of Information, essentially allowing the Ba’ath party 
to	dominate	the	media	landscape.	 	 In	the	aftermath	of	the	2003	Iraq	War,	 the	restrictions	placed	by	the	
Ba’ath on public discourse literally disappeared overnight and a plethora of newspapers, radio stations, 
and television networks emerged from the bonds of Saddam’s Iraq, free to debate and criticize the fate of 
their nation .  
Laws enacted during that era broadly restricted expression and punished violations harshly .  There was no 
regulation	of	the	media	independent	of	the	government,	and	no	legal	protections	for	the	profession.		After	
the fall of the regime, the regulatory framework had to be built from scratch .
In June 2003, approximately eighty experts, journalists and freedom of expression advocates from around 
the world, including Iraq and other countries in the region, met in Athens, Greece to discuss how to 
encourage the development of a free, impartial, professional and independent media in Iraq .  The conference 
adopted a framework document for reform known as the Athens Framework, which was widely endorsed 
by leading international media development organizations, UNESCO and the European Union .  This 
framework document proposed establishing an independent broadcasting regulator and public service 
broadcaster and set forth a template for legislation and regulation .
B . Communications and Media Commission
1 . Establishment,	Legal	Framework,	Mandate	and	Structure
The	initial	law	that	established	the	CMC	was	drafted	after	a	long	consultative	process	that	lasted	for	nearly	
six months and included a wide range of independent international and Iraqi experts .  This law, which 
draws on international conventions and current best practice, was issued by the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) as Order 65 on March 20, 2004 .3	 After	 further	 consultations	 with	 civil	 society	 and	
telecommunications	and	media	professionals,	the	CMC’s	first	three	Commissioners	and	its	Chief	Executive	
Officer	 (CEO)	 were	 appointed	 a	 month	 later,	 with	 the	 remaining	 six	 Commissioners	 appointed	 and	
Chairperson elected just prior to the handover from the CPA to the Interim Iraqi Government at the end of 
June 2004 .  The Commissioners were all chosen on the basis of their political independence, professional 
expertise and broad public representation . 
Order 65 gives the CMC exclusive authority to license and regulate telecommunications, broadcasting and 
information	services	in	Iraq	and	provides	that	the	CMC	is	an	administratively	and	financially	independent	
3  Generally speaking, only the aspects of Order 65 relevant to broadcasting and other media (and not telecommunications) 
will be discussed in this report .
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agency, subject to limited oversight by the Iraqi parliament .  The CMC receives its funding from fees paid 
by	licensees.		All	funds	in	excess	of	the	CMC’s	approved	budget,	and	all	fines	received	by	the	CMC,	are	to	
be transferred to the Iraqi national treasury .
Pursuant to Order 65, the CMC acts through its CEO and is supervised by a nine-member Board of 
Commissioners who are to meet once a month .  The Board is to provide strategic guidance on operational 
matters	 and	adopt	 the	CMC’s	 codes,	 rules,	 regulations	 and	other	 substantive	documents.	 	 In	 addition,	
the Board is to receive and adopt the CMC’s operating budget, which is to be presented to parliament for 
formal	approval.		Six	members	of	the	Board	must	be	present	and	vote	for	quorum	rules	to	be	satisfied.		At	
the	time	of	the	drafting	of	this	report,	three	of	the	original	nine	members	no	longer	serve	on	the	Board,	
which means that the Board has exactly the number of Commissioners required to take formal action . 
New Board members are nominated by the Prime Minister and approved by a majority of the parliament . 
Conflict	of	interest	rules	apply	to	all	Board	members	and	the	CEO,	and	no	one	may	be	a	political	party	
official	or	hold	public	office.	
Order 65 requires that the CMC enact rules, regulations and codes applicable to its operations and those of 
the industries that it regulates, and establishes the framework for a procedure for enforcing them .  Under 
that process, the CMC is responsible for investigating any potential wrongdoing, determining whether 
a violation has occurred, and imposing any sanctions .  Serious cases are referred to the CMC’s Hearings 
Panel, which can convene an open hearing and recommend a ruling and sanctions to the CMC .  The 
Hearings	Panel	is	a	five-member	specialized	panel	of	lawyers	and	other	relevant	professionals	who	are	
appointed by the CMC’s Board .  Less serious cases may be decided by the CMC’s CEO .  
Decisions of the CMC’s CEO or Hearings Panel may be appealed to a three-member specialized panel 
known as the Appeals Board .  One member of the Appeals Board must be a judge, and the other two must 
be lawyers or other relevant professionals .   Members of the initial Appeals Board are to be appointed by 
the Prime Minister .  Subsequent new members are to be appointed by the Minister of Justice .  Evidentiary 
sessions and decisions of the Appeals Board are generally open to the public .  To encourage independence 
from the CMC, members are to be remunerated by the Ministry of Justice .
Order 65 also:
•	 Requires	the	CMC	to	encourage	freedom	of	expression	and	professionalism	of	the	press	by	
working with the Iraqi press community to develop a code of ethics for the press and, in 
consultation with the industry and relevant professional journalists’ associations, developing 
a system to implement the code through self-regulation;
•	 States	that	the	written	press	shall	not	require	a	license	to	operate	within	Iraq;
•	 Charges	 the	 CMC	 with	 planning,	 managing,	 allocating	 and	 assigning	 radio-frequency	
spectrum and publishing a radio-frequency usage plan for Iraq;
•	 Charges	the	CMC	with	establishing	and	maintaining	a	license	fee	system	for	both	broadcasting	
and telecommunications;
•	 Sets	forth	the	sanctions	that	the	CMC	can	impose	and	requires	that	they	be	proportionate	to	
the	offense	committed;	and
•	 Requires	that	the	CMC	propose	a	law	to	replace	Order	65.		The	CMC	has	prepared	a	draft	to	
submit	to	the	national	legislature	(see	Part	Two,	Section	II.A.1	for	comments	on	this	draft).
2.	 Rules,	Regulations	and	Codes
The CMC has promulgated a number of rules, regulations and codes, including the following:
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• Rules of Procedure (which expand upon the enforcement process set forth in Order 65);
• Licensing Rules;
•	 Spectrum	Regulations;
•	 Interim	Broadcasting	Programme	Code	of	Practice;
•	 Code	for	Media	During	Elections;
•	 Guidelines	on	Accuracy	and	Balance;
•	 Guidelines	on	Incitement;
•	 Guidelines	for	Reporting	Sensational	Events;	and
•	 Guidelines	on	Equitable	Access.
Due	to	security	issues,	most	of	these	documents	were	issued	on	a	temporary	or	interim	basis	without	first	
fully consulting the industry .
Order	65	expressly	requires	that	the	CMC	issue	codes	of	practice	in	two	media-specific	areas:	broadcasting	
responsibility and media activities during elections .  In July 2004, the CMC enacted an Interim Broadcasting 
Programme Code of Practice that establishes minimal content restrictions for broadcasters .  These 
restrictions	include	prohibitions	on	inciting	violence	or	public	disorder,	transmitting	terrorist	messages,	
and knowingly airing false material .
In December 2004, prior to the commencement of the campaign period for the January 2005 elections, the 
CMC issued a Code for Media During Elections, which establishes special rules governing media coverage 
during	campaign	periods	officially	announced	by	the	Independent	Electoral	Commission	of	Iraq	(IECI).	
The Code purports to respect international best practices and was developed in consultation with Iraqi 
media outlets, the IECI and international organizations and experts .  It requires broadcasters to provide 
equitable access to political parties, to show balance in news programming, and to air voter education 
information requested by the IECI .  The Code contains additional requirements for Iraq’s publicly funded 
media of the Iraqi Media Network and places minimal requirements upon all media outlets, such as a media 
silence period 48 hours before polling, rules on paid political advertising and prohibitions on incitement 
to violence .
Under the CMC’s Rules of Procedure, complaints against media outlets for violating CMC code generally 
can be initiated by the CMC itself, any member of the public (including media companies), or by the 
government and are to be resolved through the process described in Section III .B .1 .  Pursuant to an 
understanding between the CMC and IECI, complaints against political parties and candidates concerning 
their misuse of media during elections are to be administered by the IECI .
Both the Interim Broadcasting Programme Code of Practice and the Code on Media During Elections were 
widely published in Iraqi newspapers when they were issued, and press releases about the codes were 
issued	to	international	and	local	press.		In	order	to	give	the	public	and	media	a	better	idea	of	how	the	codes	
would be applied, the CMC issued four sets of guidelines further explaining them (referenced above) . 
These guidelines were published in Iraqi newspapers as well .  Both codes and the guidelines also appear 
on the CMC’s website (www .ncmc-iraq .org) .
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3.	 Licensing
a. Pre-CMC
After	the	fall	of	the	previous	regime,	the	CPA	took	over	the	licensing	of	broadcasters,	and	apparently	many	
mistakes were made early on in this process .  For instance, broadcasters were reportedly asked to submit 
sizable non-returnable application fees, whether they received a license or not .  In addition, the mechanism 
through which the CPA initially collected and recorded fees was ad hoc, cash-based and ignored common 
financial	controls.		Moreover,	some	broadcasters	received	licenses	without	supplying	even	the	most	basic	
information	about	their	operations,	funding,	staffing	and	program	schedules.	
This process seemed to be driven by the notion that the best way to promote free media would be to give 
anyone that applied the opportunity to broadcast .  While this is a reasonable aim, it led to chaos in the 
frequency	spectrum.		The	airwaves	filled	up	rapidly,	especially	in	Baghdad	and	other	heavily-populated	
cities,	leading	to	a	situation	where	a	large	number	of	broadcasters	conflicted	with	each	other.		Faced	with	
interference, some broadcasters moved to a ‘clearer’ frequency or channel thus interfering with frequency 
spectrum assigned to others and further contributing to disorder .
In the early part of 2004, leading up to the establishment of the CMC, the Media Development Advisory 
Team	 (MDAT)	 funded	 by	 the	 United	 Kingdom’s	 Foreign	 and	 Commonwealth	 Office	 took	 control	 of	
broadcast licensing, and contractors employed by the U .S . State Department and USAID began focusing 
on telecommunications issues .  The MDAT compiled a database of broadcasters, designed an application 
form and produced a new license, all based on international models .  The new license included terms and 
conditions holding broadcasters accountable for violating license terms .
b. Licensing under the CMC
After	the	CMC	was	established	in	June	2004,	it	adopted	a	multi-phase	licensing	scheme.		During	Phase	
One, the CMC would incorporate the system developed by the MDAT into its interim license procedures, 
would	continue	to	license	those	on	air	based	on	minimal	criteria	and	filter	out	applicants	deemed	to	be	
unsuitable	for	technical	and	financial	reasons,	and	would	use	the	licensing	process	as	a	way	to	gather	as	
much information about broadcasters for use in developing its permanent license policy .
Under this interim regime, broadcasters generally were granted short-term provisional licenses valid for 
six months .  These initial licenses have been renewed and extended since they originally expired .  In late 
2005, the CMC issued a blanket statement stating that all broadcasters operating under a CMC license 
could continue to operate beyond the date of expiration .  This decision was designed to give the CMC more 
time to take full stock of the broadcasting sector, consult with the industry and decide what actions to take 
in any future licensing policy .
The	CMC	has	apparently	taken	considerable	strides	in	staffing	its	licensing	department.		However,	the	task	
of	contacting	and	processing	all	broadcasters	across	Iraq	has	proven	to	be	an	extremely	difficult	one.		As	a	
result, a number of broadcasters remain unlicensed, and thus are illegally on the air .
The Kurdish media have yet to come under the regulatory umbrella of the CMC .  Contrary to legal 
requirements of Order 65, broadcasters in the Kurdish Region are not, in practice, licensed by the CMC, 
but rather through the regional authority .  Unlike in the rest of Iraq, newspapers in the Kurdish Region are 
also required to have a license .
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The CMC plans to continue Phase One through some time in 2007 .  It then plans to move on to Phase 
Two,	in	which	it	will	(a)	develop	a	more	detailed	body	of	regulations	that	address	specific	problems	of	
broadcasting in Iraq and (b) issue long term licenses to qualifying stations based on competitive criteria .
The CMC’s stated goals in licensing are as follows:
•	 Investigating	 further	 licensing	 and	 regulatory	 requirements	 for	 religious	 and	 political	
broadcast stations;
•	 Working	with	authorities	in	the	Kurdish	Region	to	encourage	cooperation	and	inclusion	in	
the national regulatory framework;
•	 Taking	action	against	unlicensed	broadcasters	to	bring	them	under	regulatory	control	of	the	
CMC or to close down their operations;
•	 Supporting	the	creation	of	a	fair	and	legal	commercial	media	market;
•	 Stamping	out	copyright	theft	and	piracy;
•	 Clearing	the	current	high	level	of	interference	between	broadcasters;
•	 Setting	standards	for	advertising	on	radio	and	television;
•	 Allowing	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 national	 commercial	 networks	 through	 a	 competitive	
tender;
•	 Increasing	 professional	 and	 technical	 assistance	 to	 guide	 stations	 in	 proper	 operating	
techniques that minimize interference, providing a minimum technical standard that may be 
used	in	the	licensing	process	to	exclude	unqualified	stations;	and	
•	 Considering	fair	and	equitable	license	fee	structures	for	long-term	licensing.
4.	 Frequency	Planning
The	CMC	spent	considerable	energy	during	its	initial	months	in	a	jurisdictional	conflict	with	the	Ministry	
of Communications for the right to allocate radio frequency spectrum and license telecommunications 
operators, despite the fact that Order 65 clearly gives such authority to the CMC .  Eventually spectrum 
allocation was brought into the purview of the CMC .  Partially as a result of this struggle, there is frequent 
interference	among	stations	 (most	of	which	 is	not	officially	 reported	 to	 the	CMC).	 	For	example,	 some	
licensed	 broadcasters	 have	moved	 frequencies	 without	 permission,	 causing	 a	 knock-on	 effect	 as	 they	
interfere with other broadcasters who are then, in turn, forced to move .  For instance, for a period of time 
Radio Monte Carlo was broadcasting without a license on or near frequencies authorized for six licensed 
broadcasters, thus forcing these six stations to move to other frequencies .  Other technical interference 
problems	are	 the	 result	of	 stations	using	sub-standard	equipment	or	operating	 transmitters	 incorrectly	
due to a lack of technical know-how .  Moreover, the fact that certain stations have taken on the character 
of	regional	networks—not	through	a	competitive	process	based	on	quality	or	audience	appeal,	but	rather	
through	political	connections	or	by	commandeering	more	frequencies	without	applying	for	a	license—has	
contributed further to improper frequency crowding and interference .
5 . Elections
In connection with the issuance of its Code for Media During Elections in December 2004, the CMC 
commissioned	the	production	of	a	thirty-minute	film	explaining	standards	for	elections	coverage	and	the	
importance	of	adhering	to	them.		The	film	addressed	such	themes	as	fair	reporting,	rumors	and	falsification,	
and	incitement	to	violence.		The	film	also	included	interviews	with	international	experts	in	elections	and	
campaign coverage, the aim being to bring international expertise to audiences in Iraq, something that 
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would	have	been	very	difficult	otherwise	given	the	security	situation	prior	to	elections.		The	CMC	screened	
the	film	at	a	number	of	conferences	for	Iraqi	broadcasters	prior	to	the	start	of	the	campaign	period,	and	
at the joint press conference with the IECI where it presented the Code for Media During Elections .  An 
edited	version	of	the	film	was	produced	for	screening	by	Iraqi	television	stations.
For both the January and December 2005 elections, the CMC’s Monitoring and Research Department 
monitored major media sources to assess the quantity and quality of the coverage of candidates and parties 
and general adherence to the Code for Media During Elections .  The CMC focused primarily on television, 
both terrestrial and satellite, but monitored some radio and print media as well .  In doing so, the CMC 
looked at the space or time given to the presentation of the parties and relevant political personalities, the 
manner	in	which	they	were	portrayed,	and	the	degree	to	which	bias	was	reflected	in	coverage.		Television	
monitoring focused on prime-time news programs and special editions of election-related programs and 
political commentary .  In addition, an assessment was made of gender balance in election-related stories . 
Findings and conclusions were published by the CMC .
Significant	effort	has	gone	into	building	the	capacity	of	the	CMC’s	Monitoring	and	Research	Department,	
which	includes	a	number	of	staff	members	and	is	headed	by	a	lawyer.		For	example,	prior	to	the	January	
2005	elections,	members	of	the	department	attended	a	week-long	training	in	media	monitoring	organized	
by the BBC World Service Trust in London .  This course covered the development of manuals, templates 
and check-lists for monitoring broadcasters’ output as it related to the election campaign and the CMC 
Code for Media During Elections .  During that visit, the team also met with professionals experienced with 
broadcasting	regulation	in	the	UK.		In	addition,	prior	to	the	December	2005	elections,	the	team	attended	a	
week-long training course in Amman where they developed a training methodology and strategy .  This was 
followed up a few weeks later with more training where the team viewed recorded examples of elections 
coverage and discussed how they might be treated under the CMC Code .  
6.	 Enforcement
The CMC has not received or initiated any complaints under the Interim Broadcasting Programme Code of 
Practice or the Code on Media During Elections since their promulgation .  To date, the CMC has focused 
largely on monitoring broadcaster compliance, such as during the 2005 elections .  In addition, it has sent 
letters	to	a	number	of	broadcasters	for	broadcasting	on	the	wrong	frequency	and	broadcasting	without	
a	 license.	 	 Enforcement	 beyond	 sending	 such	 correspondence	 has	 been	 difficult,	 however,	 especially	
given	other	pressing	security	challenges.		Even	international	broadcasters	have	been	flouting	the	CMC’s	
licensing rules and ignoring its correspondence .  For example, for some time, despite numerous contacts 
from the CMC, the BBC failed to broadcast on its assigned frequencies, and Radio Monte Carlo continued 
to broadcast without a license .
7.	 Consultation
The CMC has taken positive steps toward consulting the broadcasters it regulates, gradually increasing 
its	profile	and	becoming	more	accessible	to	broadcasters	over	the	past	 two	years.	 	 In	 its	 initial	months,	
its consultation activities were limited primarily to holding press conferences, addressing broadcasters 
at conferences hosted by others, and issuing occasional press releases .  Over the past couple of years, the 
CMC has become more interactive with the industry by, for example, hosting a conference for broadcasters 
in Baghdad in June 2005 and a major international conference in Paris in January 2007 with the cooperation 
of UNESCO and UNDP . These conferences have brought together broadcasters, newspaper editors, Iraqi 
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policy makers and international experts to discuss a number of themes concerning Iraqi media and 
needs for its development .  Moreover,	the	CMC	has	made	efforts	to	develop	and	train	its	public	relations	
department and now publishes a magazine for wide distribution, Tawasool, that discusses important issues 
in Iraqi media .  The CMC has also planned roundtables where broadcasters will be invited to discuss such 
key policy issues as license fees; the categorization of broadcasters into religious, political and community 
stations; plans for long-term licensing and fee structures; and codes of practice .  
8.	 Overall	Regulatory	Effectiveness
As	 the	 discussion	 above	 shows,	 the	 CMC	 has	 not	 succeeded	 fully	 in	 fulfilling	 all	 of	 its	 goals	 and	
responsibilities	as	a	national	regulator	of	broadcasting.		Attacks	by	various	political	entities	and	the	Ministry	
of Communications have required the CMC to spend considerable time and energy defending its existence 
and	its	remit	under	the	law.		Additionally,	security	concerns	have	meant	that	efforts	to	consult	with	the	
industry	have	suffered.		Furthermore,	due	to	lack	of	qualified	staff	and	capacity,	the	CMC	has	often	been	
overwhelmed	and	unable	to	respond	as	effectively	as	required,	particularly	when	faced	with	competing	
issues and events in telecommunications and broadcasting at the same time .  It is very possible that the 
CMC, through the long process of developing capacity, may be forgoing the opportunity to demonstrate 
what	an	 independent	agency	 can	do,	 even	 in	difficult	 circumstances,	 to	provide	 legitimate	 regulations	
(especially	in	a	conflict	environment)	and	administer	them	with	due	process.		It	is	these	deficiencies	that	
Part	Two	of	this	draft	report	aims	to	address.
C . Iraqi Media Network
The	Iraqi	Media	Network	(IMN)	was	the	consequence	of	one	of	the	most	significant	events	in	the	development	
of the Iraqi media, the dismantling of the Iraqi Ministry of Information and the transformation of its assets 
into public service media .  The IMN now includes two terrestrial TV channels and the Al-Iraqiyya satellite 
channel, which make up the Al-Iraqiyya network, two radio stations, and Al-Sabah, its newspaper .
1.	 Establishment,	Legal	Framework,	Structure	and	Mandate
As	with	the	CMC,	the	initial	law	establishing	the	IMN,	Order	66,	was	drawn	up	after	a	long	consultative	
process and was issued by the CPA on March 20, 2004 .  It also draws largely on international conventions 
and current best practice .
Pursuant to Order 66, the IMN is supervised by a nine-member Board of Governors and is managed by a 
Director General .  The Board is charged with protecting the interests of the public and ensuring that the 
IMN is meeting its public service remit, i.e., that it is entertaining, informing and educating the diverse and 
various	populations	in	Iraq.		The	Board	is	also	obligated	to	serve	as	a	buffer	from	government	influence.	
Board members must be nominated by the Prime Minister and approved by two-thirds of Parliament .  A 
three-member	Financial	Committee	advises	the	Board	on	financial	issues	and	must	approve	all	expenditures	
in	excess	of	150	million	dinar	(USD$118,000).		Conflict	of	interest	rules	apply	to	all	Board	and	Financial	
Committee	members	and	the	Director	General,	and	none	may	be	a	political	party	official	or	hold	public	
office.		Order	66	also	states	that	the	IMN	may	receive	funds	from	any	source,	including	Iraqi	government	
and international grants, advertisers, subscription fees, and taxes .
Order 66 stipulates that IMN broadcasters air programs in the variety of languages spoken in Iraq, including 
Arabic,	Kurdish,	Assyrian	and	Turkmen.		It	requires	certain	specific	types	of	programming,	such	as:
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•	 Programs	that	entertain,	inform	and	educate;
•	 Programs	of	news	and	current	affairs;
•	 Coverage	of	sporting,	religious	and	cultural	activities;
•	 Children’s	programming;
•	 Coverage	of	national	government	activities,	as	determined	by	the	responsible	editor;
•	 Indigenous	Iraqi	production;
•	 Programming	that	facilitates	and	encourages	citizen	participation	in	democratic	processes;
•	 Programming	and	a	programming	structure	that	reflects	the	diversity	of	Iraqi	society;	and	
•	 Programming	 that	 encourages	 understanding	 of	 issues	 of	 gender,	 age,	 disability,	 race,	
religion, membership in a political group or membership of a minority community in Iraqi 
society .
 
Order 66 also generally requires that the IMN do the following:
•	 Inform	the	public	on	all	political,	economic,	social,	health,	cultural,	educational,	scientific,	
religious, ecological, sporting and other developments, events and phenomena in the country 
and abroad, as well as ensure open and free discussion on all issues of public interest;
•	 Foster,	encourage,	and	develop	all	forms	of	domestic	audio-visual	creativity	that	contribute	
to the development of Iraqi culture, art and entertainment, and to the international 
representation of the Iraqi cultural identity;
•	 Broadcast	programs	intended	for	members	of	the	Iraqi	community	outside	Iraq;
•	 Inform	and	educate	the	citizens	in	all	aspects	of	the	preservation	of	cultural	heritage;
•	 Inform	and	educate	the	citizens	in	all	aspects	of	the	protection	of	environment,	as	well	as	
promote the right of all to a healthy environment; and 
•	 Foster	and	encourage	the	development	of	civil	society	and	the	rule	of	law.
 
The IMN is also required under the law to encourage respect for and promote fundamental human rights 
and freedoms, including freedom of expression, democratic values and institutions, and the culture of 
public dialogue; and respect and encourage public understanding of political and religious pluralism .  It 
also	must	treat	impartially	all	political,	economic,	social,	health,	cultural,	educational,	scientific,	ecological	
and other issues, and not advocate the positions or interests of any particular political, religious, commercial 
or	other	party.	In	doing	so,	the	IMN	must	ensure	the	public	is	aware	of	different	points	of	view	in	order	to	
create informed public opinion . 
Order	66	further	requires	that	six	members	of	the	Board	be	present	and	vote	for	quorum	rules	to	be	satisfied.	
At	the	time	of	the	drafting	of	this	report,	there	are	four	vacancies	on	the	Board,	which	means	that	the	Board	
does not have the requisite number to take decisions .4  From discussions with senior IMN representatives, 
it	is	apparent	that	this	paralysis	of	the	Board	is	significantly	preventing	the	Board	from	dispensing	funds	
and	making	key	decisions,	thus	allowing	political	officials	to	influence	the	station	and	preventing	adequate	
management oversight .
4	 	It	is	rumoured	that	the	Prime	Minister	may	have	appointed	individuals	to	fill	these	vacancies	in	February	2007.		Under	
Order 65, however, these appointments will not be valid until approved by the Parliament .  Such approval had yet not 
occurred by the time of the publication of this report .
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2.	 Rules,	Regulations	and	Codes
Apparently due to a lack of quorum within the Board of Governors, the IMN has not yet issued any 
internal rules addressing the Board’s procedure or the IMN’s management or operations .  It reportedly 
published an internal journalistic code of ethics prior to the December 2005 elections .
D.	Other	Legal	Provisions	Affecting	Expression	and	Media
1.	 Constitution
In a number of ways, the version of the Iraqi Constitution approved in October 2005 is a positive step 
forward for freedom of expression and independent regulation .  In particular, it names the CMC as one of 
the independent federal commissions, thus preserving its existence, and states that the CMC is under the 
purview	of	the	parliament,	rather	than	the	government.		It	also	includes	basic	guarantees—“in	a	way	that	
does	not	violate	public	order	and	morality”—of	“freedom	of	expression	using	all	means	[and]	freedom	of	
press, printing, advertisement, media and publication .”
2.	 Iraqi	Penal	Code
The	CMC	has	conducted	a	review	of	Iraqi	legislation	in	effect	prior	to	the	June	2004	handover	to	the	Interim	
Iraqi Government and has determined where such laws violate international standards for freedom of 
expression .  For example, a number of provisions in Iraq’s Penal Code of 1969 punish speech that incites 
violence or public disorder with life imprisonment . Additionally, paragraph 226 of the Penal Code punishes 
any	person	who	“publicly	insults”	government	institutions	or	officials	with	imprisonment	of	up	to	seven	
years .  Paragraphs 433 and 434 of the Penal Code address defamation and insult respectively, and state that 
these	offenses	are	punishable	by	detention	of	up	to	one	year.		Under	paragraph	433,	truth	appears	to	be	a	
defense	to	any	prosecution	for	defamation	of	a	public	official,	but	what	constitutes	“truth”	has	apparently	
been	construed	very	narrowly	by	Iraqi	courts.		In	all	cases,	terms	used	to	define	prohibited	acts	and	speech	
are	broad	and	vague.		Paragraphs	226,	433	and	434	of	the	Penal	Code	are	attached	at	Appendix	A.
Today,	three	years	after	the	fall	of	Saddam,	journalists	are	reportedly	increasingly	becoming	the	targets	of	
government enforcement of the Penal Code provisions punishing defamation and insult .  For example, 
a September 2006 New York Times article5 reported that three journalists from a small newspaper in 
southeastern	Iraq	are	being	tried,	under	Article	226,	for	accusing	local	officials	of	corruption.		Similarly,	
journalists	working	 for	 three	different	media	outlets	 (not	mentioned	by	name	due	 to	 fears	of	 reprisal)	
claim that the government has threatened spurious cases against them under paragraphs 433 and 434 .  In 
the Kurdish Region, Suleimaniyah Court recently sentenced a writer for the Hawlati newspaper, Twana 
Osman,	to	six	months	in	prison	and	fined	the	newspaper	75,000	dinar	(USD$59)	following	the	publication	
of an article stating that the Kurdish Regional Government’s Prime Minister had two telephone company 
employees	fired	for	cutting	his	phone	service	after	he	failed	to	pay	his	bill.		It	is	understood,	however,	that	
the sentence may have been cancelled and government representatives have promised to advocate for the 
decriminalization of defamation following pressure from public opinion .
5	 	Paul	von	Zielbauer,	“Iraqi	Journalists	Add	Laws	to	Their	List	Of	War’s	Dangers,”	The New York Times, September 29, 2006: 
A12 .
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3.	 CPA	Order	14
The	introduction	of	repressive	laws	continued	during	the	days	of	the	CPA,	which	attempted	to	curb	speech	
inciting violence or disorder by enacting Order 14 .  This order allowed the imposition of severe sanctions, 
including	up	to	one	year	in	prison	or	fines	of	up	to	USD$1,000.		Most	notoriously	it	was	used	to	close	the	
newspaper Al-Hawza, mouthpiece of the Sadrist movement, which some say was the catalyst for much of 
the violence that followed .
From the viewpoint of international law and best practices, Order 14 is problematic for a number of reasons, 
including the following:
•	 It	fails	to	define	“incitement”	so	that	it	meets	generally-accepted	international	standards;
•	 It	allows	the	government	to	impose	sanctions	directly	on	the	media;
•	 It	 does	 not	 establish	 fair	 enforcement	 procedures	 or	 guarantee	 adequate	 due	 process	
protections; and 
•	 It	includes	the	sanction	of	imprisonment.
The CPA subsequently enacted Order 100 to give the Prime Minister, post-handover, the authority to 
enforce Order 14 and impose sanctions directly against the media .  Under Order 100, the Prime Minister 
may	refer	a	matter	to	the	CMC	for	the	imposition	of	additional	sanctions,	which	may	include	revocation	of	
a	license.		Although	this	law	has	not	been	enforced	since	the	days	of	the	CPA,	the	fact	that	it	is	still	in	effect	
may be leading to self-censorship among journalists .
IV . Human and Institutional Capacity Building
In 2006, a panel of Iraqi journalists told the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) that 
there are few substantial local training opportunities for young and mid-career journalists .  Many Iraqi 
nongovernmental organizations focused on the media are reportedly mismanaged and plagued with 
cronyism and corruption .  The IREX panel explained that although there are journalism courses at the 
College of Mass Communications of Baghdad University and elsewhere in the country, the faculty’s 
curriculum	and	equipment	have	not	been	significantly	updated	since	the	end	of	government	control	of	
the media, and they are struggling to meet the new needs of students preparing for a rapidly changing 
media sector .  Moreover, Baghdad University reportedly has no facilities to train working journalists, as 
communications facilities and faculty are accessible only by journalism and communications students .
There is at least one active local Iraqi media training institution, known as the Iraqi Journalists’ Rights 
Defense	Association	(IJRDA).		IJRDA	was	established	in	2005	with	the	goal	of	raising	awareness	among	
Iraqi	journalists.		It	has	more	than	six	offices	throughout	Iraq.		IJRDA	operates	mainly	as	a	local	voice	to	
protect journalists and support their goals and occasionally organizes training events for journalists .  The 
IJRDA	does	not	reveal	its	funding	sources.
In	the	absence	of	sufficient	viable	local	training	facilities,	international	organizations	from	places	such	as	
the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Denmark and the Czech Republic, as well as the U .S . and 
UK governments and intergovernmental organizations such as UNESCO and UNDP, have provided Iraq 
with media experts and resources .  Some have developed training programs for Iraqi journalists, the vast 
majority of which are conducted in neighboring countries .  The training experience of journalists at Aswat 
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Al-Iraq,	an	independent	Iraqi	news	outlet,	might	be	seen	as	typical.		According	to	its	editor-in-chief,	Zuhair	
Jezairy, the outlet is funded by the UNDP in cooperation with Reuters Foundation .  Journalists working for 
him have been involved with many training courses sponsored by international organizations, including 
courses run by Reuters in Amman, Jordan and Beirut; a program run by the Canadian Réseau Liberté 
in Beirut; and a program run by the Danish NGO International Media Support (IMS) in Iraq .  IMS has 
published	a	comprehensive	report	of	media	development	efforts	by	international	organizations	from	2003	
through June 2005 .  The report can be found on the IMS website’s Iraq page (www .i-m-s .dk) .
Other civil society organizations in the country are devoted to assisting journalists in other ways .  For 
example, the Journalistic Freedoms Observatory (JFO) (www .jfoiraq .org) claims to be a group of Iraqi 
journalists	who	identify,	monitor	and	fight	against	violations	of	press	freedoms	in	Iraq.		JFO	states	that	it	is	
ready to provide, free of charge, media lawyers and experts to defend journalists, and its website provides 
contact information for legal consultation .  The website also contains information about women in the 
media and a number of research papers .  The sources of JFO’s funding are unknown .
The	IFJ	background	paper	contains	additional	information	about	capacity-building	efforts	and	needs	for	
Iraqi journalists .
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Part	Two:	Policy	Recommendations
I . Introduction
As we conclude from Part One, the Iraqi broadcasting market has many of the surface characteristics that 
regulators and planners wish to achieve:  pluralism, lack of concentration, relative independence from the 
state, a regulatory framework designed to encourage independent media, and a regulator that refrains 
from	censorship.		But	there	are	definite	signs	of	complications.		As	Iraq	remains	a	zone	of	conflict	and	post-
conflict,	the	tendency	for	control	and	stability	is	great.		There	is	increasing	evidence	of	intervention	by	the	
government or at least threats of intervention .  With respect to some media, links are being made between 
insurgents	and	programming.		Because	of	the	uncertainty	concerning	the	overall	political	settlement,	how	
media will or should be regulated is not yet clear .
Neither	 the	 specific	 surface	 pluralism	 nor	 the	 actual	 complexity	 of	 the	 situation	 was	 planned	 or	 the	
consequence of a series of intended actions by the CPA, the successor governing authorities or the regulator . 
Now, there is an opportunity to consider consequences and their relationship to regulation .  In Part Two we 
turn to recommendations that might be considered by the CMC, Parliament, other Iraqi policy makers, and 
international and local donors and implementing organizations as ways to enhance and improve upon the 
way the broadcasting sector has developed thus far .
In making such recommendations, we are mindful of the following:
•	 A	regulatory	environment	that	encourages	pluralism,	experimentation,	innovation,	and	the	
existence of many voices should be encouraged;
•	 There	is	a	need	for	continued	monitoring	to	ensure	that	a	plural	media,	with	stations	identified	
with	interests,	does	not	become	a	vehicle	for	promoting	strife	and	conflict.	 	This	will	be	a	
priority if inter-sectarian violence continues to escalate;
•	 There	is	a	need	for	care,	both	in	terms	of	the	IMN	and	the	structure	of	the	private	broadcasting	
industry, to ensure that there is a sense of inclusion, so that all sectors feel that they are 
appropriately represented in the public sphere;
•	 Iraq	is	not	yet	a	vibrant	market	economy,	given	current	elements	of	conflict,	lack	of	security	
and uncertainty, but it is a society that could and should develop in a way that supports a 
strong consumer sector .  A media sector should emerge that can easily adjust to a growing 
commercial market;
•	 In	the	near	and	medium	term,	a	strong	public	service	broadcaster	is	necessary	to	reflect	societal	
choices	about	the	structure	of	Iraq,	to	reinforce	consensus,	and	to	help	to	define	and	reinforce	
an	 Iraqi	 national	 identity	 (as	 that	 is	 defined	 through	 constitutional	 and	 other	 processes).	
Such	a	public	service	broadcaster	should	reflect	traditional	international	standards	for	public	
service broadcasting, as tailored for the Iraqi context; and
•	 Some	 consequences	 for	 the	 regulatory	 structure	will	 arise	 in	 the	 political	 settlement	 that	
evolves among the many competing interests within Iraq .
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In order to encourage pluralism, to protect the broadcasting sector from ossifying into sectarianism, and 
to prepare for a more market-oriented economy, policy decisions and other actions could be taken in the 
following areas:
•	 The	legal	framework	governing	media	is	due	to	undergo	significant	changes;
•	 The	CMC	will	be	reviewing	changes	in	its	approach	to	regulating	the	broadcasting	sector;
•	 The	IMN	should	be	reviewed	to	determine	whether	it	is	fulfilling	its	public	service	obligations;	
and
•	 Other	media	development	efforts	might	be	considered	by	the	CMC,	other	Iraqi	policy	makers,	
and international donors and implementing organizations .
II . Legal Framework
A . Legislation
1.	 New	CMC	Law	Submitted	to	Parliament
A	draft	law	was	submitted	to	Parliament	by	the	CMC	earlier	this	year	to	replace	Order	65.		The	passage	of	
such a law is a necessary step in legitimacy:  Order 65, issued by the CPA, should be supplanted .  Having 
the	CMC	remit	codified	through	an	Iraqi	law	will	enhance	the	institution	in	the	eyes	of	the	government,	
the public and the industries the CMC regulates .  There is no indication of when this law will be debated . 
Parliament	went	into	recess	on	August	15	until	after	Ramadan,	and,	at	the	time	of	the	writing	of	this	report,	
there are a large number of other laws likely to be considered before the law on the CMC .  Stanhope has 
reviewed	the	draft,	and	believes	that	the	following	comments	should	be	considered	as	the	law	is	debated	
and perhaps revised in Parliament:
•	 It	should	be	made	clear	that	the	CMC	has	sole	and	exclusive	authority	over	licensing	and	
regulating telecommunications and broadcasting throughout all of Iraq;
•	 The	law	should	make	clear	that	any	regulations,	rules	or	codes	passed	by	the	CMC	pursuant	
to Order 65 and licenses issued under Order 65 will remain in force until superseded by the 
CMC;
•	 It	may	be	helpful	to	clarify	the	role	of	government	(and	perhaps	specifically	the	Ministry	of	
Communications) regarding the CMC and broadcasting policy;
•	 If	the	CMC	is	to	retain	some	authority	over	non-broadcast	media	(which	is	normally	not	the	
case for independent regulators under international best practices), it should be made clear 
that its authority over print media and Internet extends only to developing and protecting 
these industries, rather than licensing and regulating them .  It should be explicit that no 
licenses shall be required to practice journalism or to own or operate a print publication or to 
set up a website;
•	 All	appointments	to	the	CMC	board	and	other	bodies	should	be	approved	by	a	majority	of	
Parliament .  It is critical that no one branch of the government has excessive control over the 
CMC;
•	 Attention	should	therefore	be	given	to	the	nomination	process	and	the	approval	process.		For	
example, one could nominate twice as many members as are needed and rank the choices, 
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with Parliament going down the list until the requisite number is chosen .  In such a scenario, 
to	fill	three	vacancies,	one	would	nominate	six	names.		If	any	of	the	first	three	on	the	list	were	
rejected, the next name on the list would be proposed until three were approved .  It may be 
advisable for the law to require that Parliament approve the requisite number from the list 
(rather than allow it to reject more than half of the names altogether) in order to prevent a 
delay in the appointment process;
•	 If	the	law	sets	forth	quorum	requirements,	it	should	require	that	quorum	be	satisfied	with	
a minimum number of Board members (somewhere near two-thirds of the total number 
of possible members is considered best practice), rather than merely a majority of Board 
members .  Otherwise, if there were only a very small number of Board members at any 
given time (if members have resigned and not yet been replaced, for example), two or three 
individuals	would	have	significant	power;
•	 Care	should	be	taken	not	to	require	too	much	management	by	the	Board.	 	The	legislation	
should	recognize	that	significant	authority	should	be	delegated	to	CMC	staff.		For	example,	
it may be advisable to give the CEO the authority to issue some licenses, at least of a certain 
scale, without Board approval, within guidelines established by the Board (which should 
include	 procedures	 requiring	 the	 review	 and	 approval	 of	 certain	 CMC	 staff,	 including	
the legal and licensing departments, before a license can be issued) .  One option would 
be	 to	define	 clearly	 the	Board’s	 powers	 and	 to	 keep	 them	appropriately	 supervisory	 and	
then state that the CEO has all powers not reserved to the Board .  Powers appropriately 
reserved to the Board could include establishing and overseeing licensing guidelines and 
procedures; approving codes, rules and regulations; approving the budget and annual plan 
and	submitting	them	to	Parliament	for	approval;	appointing	and	removing	members	of	the	
inquiry	and	complaints	committee;	appointing	and	removing	the	CEO;	and	supervising	the	
CEO’s performance generally .  The value of delegation, however, must be balanced against 
the need for having a check on the CEO’s authority and the need for providing the CEO with 
political cover, particularly in the dangerous environment of Iraq;
•	 The	Appeals	Board	should	be	appointed	through	an	external	process	(perhaps	involving	the	
Ministry of Justice or a group of judges), rather than by the CMC Board, in order to preserve 
the Appeals Board’s independence;
•	 Decisions	by	the	Appeals	Board	should	be	able	to	be	appealed	to	Iraqi	courts.		We	understand	
that	making	the	CMC	the	final	arbiter	 in	media	disputes	was	an	affirmative	policy	choice	
based on the realization that (a) current Iraqi criminal law lacks appropriate due process 
guarantees	and	(b)	Iraqi	courts	have	little	familiarity	with	the	principles	of	human	rights	in	
general,	and	freedom	of	expression	in	particular,	and	that	as	yet,	they	often	do	not	act	fairly	
and independently .  Assessing the extent to which this is correct and determining how the 
judicial system might be reformed is beyond the scope of this report .  We do note, however, 
that	 authorizing	 the	CMC	 to	act	 as	final	 arbiter	 and	make	quasi-judicial	decisions	would	
almost certainly be seen to violate the Iraqi Constitution, namely Articles 94, 95 and 100 
which,	respectively,	provide:		“decisions	of	the	Federal	Supreme	Court	are	final	and	binding	
for all authorities,” “the establishment of special or extraordinary courts is prohibited,” and, 
most	significantly,	“it	is	prohibited	to	stipulate	in	the	law	the	immunity	from	appeal	for	any	
administrative action or decision”;
•	 Penalties	 should	 be	 reasonable	 and	 proportionate	 to	 the	 offense,	 and	 should	 escalate	 in	
severity	(e.g.,	a	violator	should	be	given	sufficient	warning	before	moving	on	to	more	severe	
penalties, and revocation should be used only as a last resort) .  It may be advisable to include 
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the penalty of seizure of equipment and closure as a remedy for persistent unlicensed 
broadcasters;
•	 A	right	of	reply	should	be	considered	as	a	potential	remedy	where	there	are	complaints	of	
insult	or	particular	kinds	of	defamation,	and	should	reflect	international	best	practices	as	set	
forth in Part Two, Section III .F .1 .f below .
•	 The	law	should	require	the	CMC	to	consult	with	the	industries	it	regulates	before	issuing	
rules, regulations or codes of practice applicable to them, and should specify that the CMC 
must consult with the industry to agree upon and adopt public rule making procedures that 
will guide the process; and
•	 The	CMC	should	be	required	 to	keep	accurate,	publicly	available	 records	and	maintain	a	
website where it publishes announcements, rules and decisions .
 
2 . Repressive	Laws	Still	in	Effect
Certain Saddam-era legislation impairing the right to freedom of expression and CPA Order 14, some 
of which are discussed in more detail above in Part One, Sections III .C .1 and 2, should be repealed 
(particularly where imposing such excessive punishments as imprisonment) and replaced with laws of 
general	application	(meaning	that	they	apply	to	all	and	do	not	single	out	media	specifically),	in	line	with	
international standards prohibiting defamation, incitement, and hate speech .
Such incitement to violence legislation should, among other things:
•	 Narrowly	define	what	constitutes	incitement	to	violence;
•	 Punish	only	speech	that	carries	a	clear	and	immediate	risk	of	incitement;
•	 Punish	only	intentional	or	reasonably	foreseeable	incitement;
•	 Provide	that	an	independent	arbiter,	e.g.,	the	courts	(and	not	the	government),	administer	
complaints in accordance with rules of due process; 
•	 Not	include	imprisonment	as	a	punishment;	and
•	 Limit	imposition	of	severe	sanctions	to	cases	of	serious	or	repeated	violations.
Defamation legislation should be as follows:
•	 It	should	clearly	define	what	constitutes	defamation;
•	 Liability	should	be	found	only	where	a	false	statement	of	fact	has	been	disseminated	causing	
injury to the reputation of the individual or entity bringing the claim, and the alleged defamer 
was at least negligent .
•	 Liability	for	defamation	should	not	be	found	where	the	statement	was	(a)	true,	(b)	the	result	
of a good faith mistake, (c) clearly an opinion, (d) an accurate account of a government 
statement,	or	(e)	not	discovered	within	a	certain	period	of	time	of	sufficient	length,	such	as	
three years;
•	 Public	 figures	 and	 publicly-funded	 organizations	 should	 be	 required	 to	 prove	 that	 the	
alleged defamer acted with intent rather than mere negligence .  This is in recognition of the 
principle that, in order to promote transparency, governments should be subject to greater 
scrutiny by the media than ordinary members of the public .  It also takes into consideration 
the	fact	that	the	government	and	public	figures	are	less	likely	than	ordinary	citizens	to	need	
to	resort	to	defamation	claims	to	protect	their	reputations;	rather,	they	often	have	or	could	
easily	command	the	attention	of	the	media	and	thus	could	attempt	to	correct	misstatements	
directly in the newspapers and on the airwaves; and
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•	 In	accordance	with	 international	principles,	remedies	for	defamation	should	be	 limited	to	
the following:  (a) a requirement that a correction to the false statement be published; (b) 
compensation	 for	 actual	damages,	defined	as	provable	financial	 losses	 resulting	 from	 the	
defamatory statement; and (c) compensation for non-monetary damage to reputation in 
serious cases .
B . Constitution
As is mentioned above in Part One, the Constitution approved in October 2005 is a positive step forward for 
freedom of expression and independent regulation because it contains general protections for expression 
and the media and because it refers to the CMC by name, thus making its survival more likely .  However, 
the provision giving federal authorities jurisdiction over radio frequency spectrum could be more tightly 
drafted	to	ensure	that	broadcasting	and	telecommunications	are	licensed	and	regulated	at	the	federal,	rather	
than regional, level .  Article 110 of the Iraqi Constitution currently states that “[t]he federal government shall 
have	exclusive	authorities	in	the	following	matters,”	and	specifies	one	such	authority	in	point	6	to	be,	“[r]
egulating the policies of broadcast frequencies and mail .”  We would recommend replacing such language 
in point 6 with “establishing policies of radio frequency spectrum and mail .”  We would also recommend 
adding	immediately	thereafter	in	point	6	the	following:		“The	Communications	and	Media	Commission	
shall have exclusive authority to license and regulate broadcasting and telecommunications in Iraq .”  This 
change would make clear that these functions will continue to be performed by an independent body, and 
namely the CMC, and cannot be usurped by the government or any other authority .  
Together, these changes would preserve the concept of independent converged regulation at the federal 
level,	which	has	significant	advantages,	including	the	following:
•	 Independent	Regulation.		It	has	been	well	established	that	independent	regulation	encourages	
both	better	 services	 and	 increased	 investment.	 	 The	World	Bank,	 for	 example,	makes	 the	
existence of an independent telecommunications regulator one of its core prerequisites for 
investment .  Communications companies will be more likely to invest in Iraq, and provide 
high-quality services, if the regulatory framework is objective, consistent, and free from 
direct political control .
•	 Converged	Regulator.		Audio-visual	programming	has	traditionally	been	delivered	through	
conventional terrestrial broadcasting networks, and more recently by satellite, but new 
technology has broken these monopolies, and programs can now be delivered through 
a variety of systems such as cable, the Internet and 3G mobile phones .  In a number of 
developed countries, the blurring of the distinction between media and telecommunications 
technologies	has	led	to	the	convergence	of	regulation	in	the	communications	field.		Iraq	has	
had the opportunity to establish converged regulation from the outset and thus leapfrog 
countries where existing separate broadcasting and telecommunications regulators must be 
merged.		The	CMC	is	designed	to	provide	an	efficient	one-stop	shop—one	agency	with	one	
public	rule-making	process—for	the	various	communications	sectors	that	share	similar	legal,	
technical and economic characteristics .
•	 Federal	Level.	 	 It	 is	 far	more	efficient	 to	have	one	central	national	regulator	 licensing	and	
regulating communications services, rather than requiring service providers to comply with 
a	number	of	different	and	potentially	 conflicting	 regional	 regulatory	 regimes	and	 forcing	
them to patch together multiple regional licenses to provide adequate coverage .  Radio 
frequencies that operators use to transmit their services do not end at regional borders, 
and neither should licenses that grant permission to use them .  In recognition of this, the 
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International Telecommunications Union will deal only with national telecommunications 
regulators and refuses to acknowledge regional or local agencies .
 
Although	we	recognize	the	value	of	recommending	only	confined	changes	to	the	Constitution,	we	have	
summarized other changes that might be suggested if more expansive protections of freedom of expression 
and media were sought (see Appendix B) .
III . Communications and Media Commission of Iraq
The legal basis for the CMC appears to be well established, and our discussions with policy-makers indicate 
that, generally speaking, there is broad support among the various branches of government for the concept 
of independent media regulation .  However, as discussed above, the CMC needs to improve its capacity 
and	visibility	in	order	to	better	serve	the	public	and	the	broadcasters	it	regulates.		Accordingly,	CMC	goals	
could include:
•	 Safeguarding	its	legal	basis	and	political	support;
•	 Strengthening	its	operations	(staffing,	training,	strategy);
•	 Increasing	 its	 efforts	 at	 communication	 and	 consultation	with	 the	 industries	 it	 regulates,	
including	developing	processes	 to	 improve	compliance.	 	Compliance	will	not	be	effective	
until the CMC has developed workable relationships with the sectors it regulates, to include 
training of broadcasters on regulatory requirements;
•	 Focusing	more	on	technology	and	transmission	issues;
•	 Making	incremental	and	realistic	proposals	for	the	reshaping	of	the	media	and	communications	
landscape, concentrating operationally on doing what can be achieved within the limitations 
of Iraq today;
•	 Improving	 its	 regulatory	 and	 monitoring	 framework	 and	 bolstering	 enforcement	
capabilities;
•	 Building	relationships	and	sharing	information	with	regulators	elsewhere,	particularly	those	
working in environments facing similar challenges; and
•	 Perhaps	increasing	its	support	for	media	development	efforts	to	fill	voids	normally	addressed	
by other institutions and other aspects of society .
A.	 Legal	Basis	and	Political	Support
The CMC could safeguard its legal basis by continuing to advocate for the passage of Iraqi legislation and 
constitutional amendments, as discussed above in Part Two, Sections II .A and II .B .  It could encourage 
political support by doing any or all of the following:
•	 The	Constitution	makes	clear	that	Parliament	(the	Council	of	Representatives)	has	oversight	
over	the	CMC.		The	CMC	could	reach	out	to	relevant	parliamentary	committees,	such	as	the	
Committee	for	Culture,	Media	and	Tourism,	to	strengthen	relations	with	them	and	streamline	
interaction between the CMC and Parliament;
•	 Many	of	the	CMC’s	difficulties	in	its	initial	months	were	due	to	constant	attacks	from	various	
officials	outside	the	CMC.		Often,	these	attacks	were	not	borne	out	of	an	intentional	desire	
to repress the media, but rather from a misunderstanding of the fundamental principles of 
freedom of expression and independent regulation .  In order to diminish the likelihood of 
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similar problems in the future, the CMC could engage Parliament and other Iraqi policy 
makers in dialogue on media practices by, for example, hosting roundtables on important 
policy issues, or even inviting members of parliament and the government to hear speakers 
on international best practices; and
•	 One	aspect	of	how	the	CMC	is	regarded	at	home,	though	by	far	not	the	most	important,	is	
how it is regarded abroad .  Although the CMC will want to be careful not to play exclusively 
to international audiences while ignoring the constituency and public that pay its bills, it 
could increase its visibility, ensure its continued existence across governments, obtain 
valuable support and advice and improve the image of Iraq abroad by continuing to bolster 
its international status and connections .  The CMC can do this by joining more international 
organizations,	attending	international	forums	and	engaging	international	press.
B.	 Operations
1.	 Governance	and	Staffing
a. Appointing Three Members to the CMC Board
Although the Board of Commissioners of the CMC must have nine members, it now includes only six . 
Until new Iraqi legislation is passed on this subject, the appointment process in Order 65 must be followed . 
It requires that the Prime Minister nominate three individuals and submit this list of nominees for approval 
by a majority of Parliament .  These individuals:
•	 Must	have	senior-level	experience	in	either	legal	affairs,	management,	business,	regulation,	
engineering, telecommunications, broadcasting, or journalism and must be of impeccable 
character;
•	 Must	not	hold	any	executive,	legislative	or	judicial	position	at	any	level	of	government	and	
may	not	be	an	official	of	any	political	party;	and
•	 Must	 not	 have	 any	 financial	 or	 business	 relationship	 with	 any	 broadcaster	 or	 private	
telecommunications company .
Having a fully constituted board will make it easier to hold meetings with the requisite quorum of six 
board members, thus facilitating the decisions that the CMC has ahead of it in coming months .  It would 
be best to make this nomination and appointment process open by publishing an advertisement seeking 
applicants	and	keeping	the	vetting	and	selection	process	transparent,	rather	than	allowing	it	to	appear	that	
commissioners are chosen based on behind-the-scenes political deals .  One way would be for an independent 
panel of interviewers, including perhaps someone from the regulator, to interview applicants and select 
nominees (which could be, as discussed above in Part Two, Section II .A .1, twice the number needed) . 
There could be room in the process for government representatives to nominate their own names for the 
list, but ideally they would be required to go through the same interview process as other applicants .
b. Appointing the CMC Appeals Board
Order 65 requires that the Prime Minister make the initial appointments to the CMC’s three-member 
Appeals Board, and these appointments have never been made .  Appointment of the Appeals Board would 
complete the institutional structure through which the CMC administers proceedings, including those 
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involving complaints against the media for violating CMC codes of conduct .  Order 65 requires that the 
Appeals	Board	be	composed	of	(1)	a	judge,	(2)	an	attorney	with	communications	regulatory	experience,	and	
(3)	an	individual	with	professional	or	business	experience	in	the	legal	profession	or	another	relevant	field.	
The	pool	of	potential	attorneys	in	Iraq	with	experience	in	communications	regulation	is	extremely	small.	
Any subsequent law establishing such requirements should take this into account, perhaps requiring only 
experience	 in	one	of	 the	 following	fields:	communications,	competition	or	public	 law.	 	 If,	 for	whatever	
reason,	Order	65	 is	 to	 remain	 in	effect	 for	 some	 time,	 it	 should	be	amended	 to	account	 for	 this.	 	For	a	
discussion	of	the	potential	unconstitutionality	of	mandating	the	Appeals	Board	to	issue	final,	unappealable	
decisions, see Part Two, Section II .A .1 above .
c. Staffing
Operationally,	with	its	CEO	and	lower-level	staff	in	place,	what	the	CMC	needs	now	is	to	find	mid-level	
management,	improve	organizational	effectiveness,	and	train	everyone	across	the	board	how	to	work	in	
an independent regulatory agency .  Within the context of Iraq, where the idea of independent regulation is 
completely	new,	this	is	not	an	easy	task.		Providing	comprehensive	staffing	and	organizational	advice	is	well	
beyond	the	scope	of	this	report,	and	would	require	significant	and	long-term	assistance	from	experienced	
advisors.		We	have,	however,	observed	that	the	CMC	could	benefit	from	assistance	with	the	following:	
•	 Developing	and	implementing	a	management	plan	setting	forth	goals	and	budgets	for	the	
next	fiscal	year;
•	 Determining	staffing	requirements	to	fill	departments;
•	 Developing	strategies	for	and	recruiting	individuals	for	key	posts,	such	as	a	deputy	CEO	and	
heads of each of department;
•	 Defining	 clearly	 how	 responsibilities	 are	 to	 be	 delegated	 from	 senior	 management	 to	
department	heads,	and	from	department	heads	to	staff,	so	that	individuals	in	each	position	
understand the types of decisions they can make on their own;
•	 Designing,	developing	and	implementing	a	comprehensive	training	program	for	all	levels	of	
staff;
•	 Developing	the	CMC’s	planning	and	budgeting	capabilities;
•	 Enhancing	internal	communications;
•	 Defining	and	creating	appropriate	mechanisms	for	effective	interdepartmental	cooperation,	
and encouraging working in teams and matrix reporting; and
•	 Developing	communications	and	public	information	staff	and	strategies.		This	communications	
strategy	and	plan	should	incorporate	the	outreach	and	consulting	efforts	discussed	below	in	
Part	Two,	Section	III.C.		Ideally,	the	CMC’s	public	relations	staff	would	have	responsibility	for	
developing	and	managing	such	efforts.
C.	 Consultation	and	Compliance	Training
The	 CMC	 should	 continue	 moving	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 increased	 consultation—further	 increasing	 its	
profile,	sharing	information,	and	facilitating	access	by	broadcasters	and	the	public—by	building	on	its	past	
consultation	efforts	(discussed	in	Part	One,	Section	III.B.5).		The	CMC	might	do	the	following	to	achieve	
this:
•	 Publish	notes	and	guidelines	on	specific	compliance	issues;
•	 Organize	training	workshops	for	broadcasters;
•	 Hold	regular	roundtables	of	broadcasters;
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•	 Set	up	a	helpline	for	broadcasters	with	compliance	questions;
•	 Develop	an	advisory	board	on	broadcasting	issues,	and	perhaps	working	groups	on	specific	
issues, comprised of those in the industry, policy makers and experts;
•	 Expand	its	public	relations	department,	perhaps	with	the	help	of	expert	consultants	or	the	
advice of other independent regulators, and use this department to reach out to the public 
and the CMC’s constituency;
•	 Hold	more	frequent	press	events;
•	 Improve	 its	website	 by,	 among	other	 things,	 posting	more	documentation	 and	making	 it	
more interactive;
•	 Open	offices	in	areas	other	than	Baghdad;
•	 Hold	forums	where	input	can	be	sought	from	the	general	public	and	special	interest	groups	
(e .g ., those devoted to disabled persons, women, children, and consumer issues);
•	 Set	up	and	advertise	an	anonymous	complaints	mechanism	for	the	general	public;
•	 Start	a	newsgroup	providing	frequent	email	blasts	of	important	information;	and
•	 Facilitate	the	development	of	a	professional	association	of	broadcasters	as	discussed	in	Part	
Two, Section V .A .3 .
D.	Assessing	the	Media	Landscape	and	Developing	Licensing	Policy
As is discussed in Part One of this report, two of the most striking characteristics of Iraqi broadcasting 
are (a) the heavy concentration of media owned by political parties and religious groups, and (b) that 
the	distribution	of	this	ownership	among	different	groups	appears	generally	to	reflect	the	demographics	
of the Iraqi population .  The CMC will need substantial time to consider how or whether to address the 
concentration of religious and political broadcasting .  Complex issues include the nature of Iraqi media 
pluralism and the relationship between terrestrial and satellite delivered channels .  The situation may change 
as the commercial broadcast market strengthens and the identity of the IMN becomes more established .  In 
the meantime, the pluralism of Iraq’s media scene could serve as a promising means of providing competing 
input	into	national	and	regional	debate.		In	a	context	of	potential	civil	conflict,	however,	the	danger	exists	
that	media	pluralism	may	lead	to	 intensified	potential	 for	violent	destabilization,	and	the	CMC	should	
continue to monitor sectarian media closely .
In the short term, terrestrial and satellite appear to be the most important technologies for transmission 
that the CMC must regulate .  Cable and Internet broadcasting require land-based infrastructure (cable and 
broadband) that is expensive and easily sabotaged .  Internet requires cheap broadband, the development of 
which may be unlikely due to more pressing infrastructure needs of the country .  As a result of topography 
and cost, terrestrial broadcasting will be the most widely available form of broadcasting in Iraq for the 
foreseeable future .
1.	 Terrestrial	Licensing	and	Frequency	Allocation	Policy
a. Short-Term Possibilities 
In recognition of the fact that fully assessing the media landscape will take some time, the CMC could 
decide to leave more far reaching decisions until later and adopt one or more of the following options for 
licensing terrestrial stations in the short term:
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 i. Technical Issues with Frequency Spectrum
Clean Up the Frequency Spectrum Across the Country
In the short term, the CMC should map the frequency spectrum and determine who is licensed, who is 
operating on the correct frequency, and who is prevented from doing so because another broadcaster is 
illegally broadcasting on its assigned frequency .  As part of this process, the CMC could:
•	 Develop	a	national	frequency	plan	that	includes	broadcasting,	telecommunications	and	other	
spectrum;
•	 Perform	analysis	of	existing	frequency	allocation;
•	 Interact	with	military	and	security	forces	and	assess	spectrum	requirements;
•	 Develop	a	set	of	future	projects	and	spectrum	needs;
•	 Develop	databases	and	records	for	updating	spectrum	allocations;
•	 Participate	in	international	spectrum	coordination	and	ITU	conferences;
•	 Develop	standards	for	signal	quality;
•	 Commission	or	conduct	any	other	necessary	research	or	engineering	studies;	and
•	 Consider	the	application	of	new	technologies,	including	digital	terrestrial,	in	terms	of	use	of	
spectrum, and study proposals for shared spectrum approaches .
Work with Authorities in the Kurdish Regional Government to Standardize  
Technical Requirements and Licensing Terms and Conditions and De-Conflict Frequency Spectrum
With the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) stressing independence and assertion of regulatory authority 
even in such sectors as oil exploration, the power of the CMC will likely continue to be contested there 
with respect to communications policy .  The CMC is more likely to gain authority in the region through 
soft	diplomacy,	by	holding	periodic	consultative	round	tables	and	perhaps	through	media	development	
efforts	in	the	region	like	those	discussed	in	Part	Two,	Section	III.H	below.		The	federal	regulator	should,	
consistent with its general approach to light regulation and registration-type licensing, ensure that stations 
broadcasting within the KRG hold a license from the CMC .  Additionally, as the CMC is able to improve 
its	capacity	and	better	serve	its	constituency	outside	of	the	KRG,	broadcasters	in	the	region	may	recognize	
the value of coming into the CMC’s fold and do so voluntarily .
In the short term, the CMC could focus on developing common standards between the two licensing 
regimes,	rather	than	attempting	to	wrestle	licensing	functions	away	from	authorities	in	the	KRG.		In	coming	
months and years, it may not be so important that the CMC does not license broadcasters broadcasting 
exclusively in the KRG, so long as the same technical and other terms and conditions apply and the CMC 
can	de-conflict	the	spectrum	technically.		A	compromise	could	be	to	obtain	agreement	from	KRG	authorities	
to allow the CMC to intervene technically (regarding spectrum, channels, quality of signal, engineering 
support) and to incorporate language similar to that in CMC licenses into their own local licenses .  This not 
only would lead to a smoother technical interface between regions and require that all Iraqis have access to 
broadcasting above a certain quality threshold, but also would facilitate eventual incorporation of the KRG 
licensing and regulation regime into that of the CMC, and thus make it more likely to happen sometime in 
the future .  An agreement for allocation of licensing authority or cross-licensing would be constructive .
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 ii.  Short-Term Licensing Policy
Issue a Moratorium on Licensing New Stations, While  
Bringing All Currently Broadcasting Stations into the System
We would strongly recommend that the CMC make the determination that, at least in the short-term, 
its	primary	goal	be	to	bring	only	stations	currently	broadcasting	into	the	system	in	order	to	find	out	as	
much as possible about who is on the air today .  Accordingly, it should issue a moratorium on licensing 
stations not yet on the air, while continuing to work to license those already on the air .  The goal of such 
a moratorium would be to prevent further chaos on the frequency spectrum and focus on gathering 
information on current broadcasters to use in determining its future licensing policy .  This moratorium 
could be established by drawing a line in the sand as of date X, say, three months’ time, which is properly 
publicized in advance .  If unlicensed stations could prove they were broadcasting on that date, they could 
apply	for	a	license.		If	not,	they	would	have	to	wait	until	the	moratorium	is	lifted	to	apply.
Continue with an All-Inclusive Licensing Policy
Alternatively, the CMC could continue to grant short-term temporary licenses to all applicants who meet a 
certain minimum criteria and comply with CMC codes of conduct and technical requirements .  Consistent 
with the emergence of a market in which “external pluralism” exists (i.e . a large number of channels 
reflecting	 different	 ownerships	 and	 viewpoints),	 the	 CMC	 could	 encourage	 applicants	 in	 areas	where	
additional viewpoints should be represented .  It is, however, vital that the CMC’s licensing department 
liaises properly with the monitoring and other departments to ensure that even temporary licenses are 
not granted to those who will abuse the airwaves .  While licensing new stations, the CMC could reserve 
spectrum for future commercial, educational and community broadcasters .
b. Long-Term Possibilities
 i. Long-Term Licensing Policy
In the long term, the CMC will have to advise whether and how to address ownership by various entities, 
including foreign investors, political parties (or entities controlled by political parties) and religious 
entities .  Practice in terms of ownership distinctions varies greatly internationally .  The political system will 
undoubtedly decide whether having such an array of stations is desirable and consistent with the growth 
of democratic processes in Iraq .  Some possibilities (varying in degrees of aggressiveness) are as follows:
•	 Have	a	policy	of	external	pluralism,	i.e.,	use	the	licensing	policy	to	ensure	that	most	views	are	
represented	and/or	that	broadcasters	as	a	whole	mirror	society;
•	 Have	a	policy	 that	no	new	 licenses	will	be	awarded	 to	political	or	 religious	broadcasters,	
though that will have the perverse consequence of favoring some such groups over others 
and driving new groups to broadcasting without a license;
•	 Monitor	 and	 regulate	 existing	 religious	 and/or	 political	 broadcasters	 if	 their	 existence	 is	
thought overly to bias the political system or heavily skew public discourse .  Here it would 
be useful to consider the varied practice and experience in many other countries;
•	 Treat	religious	and	political	broadcasters	like	public	service	broadcasters,	by	holding	them	
to certain public service requirements .  This approach was taken in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
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where the national regulator went so far as to require each such broadcaster to appoint a 
board broadly representing the various identities of the population receiving the signal, with 
the composition of each board subject to the regulator’s approval;
•	 Restrict	religious	and	political	broadcasters	to	a	lower	level	of	transmitter	power;	or
•	 Restrict	only	political	(and	not	religious)	broadcasters	in	any	of	the	ways	described	above.
The CMC could also consider other options and issues for the long term:
•	 How	to	develop	competitive	criteria	on	which	to	award	licenses	based	on	purpose,	audience,	
experience,	character,	technical	capabilities,	business	plan	and	financial	resources;
•	 Whether	 to	 introduce	 program	 criteria	 into	 licenses,	 e.g.	 public	 service	 obligations	 (see	
discussion at Part Two, Section III .F .1 .b below;
•	 Whether	and	how	to	develop	a	separate	class	of	community	broadcasting;
•	 Whether	and	how	to	license	based	on	public	auction,	where	applicants	would	need	to	meet	
only minimum requirements and licenses would be awarded to the highest bidder;
•	 Whether	and	how	to	license	based	on	economic	sustainability,	refusing	to	allow	new	entrants	
into markets deemed saturated;
•	 Whether	it	would	be	feasible	to	issue	a	nationwide	terrestrial	commercial	license;	and
•	 Practical	issues	such	as	the	duration	of	the	licenses	(research	shows	that	eight	to	fifteen	years	
seems to be the norm), fees and fee structures, and application procedures .
 ii. Fees
The	CMC	currently	has	no	long-term	policy	or	schedule	in	place	setting	forth	the	fees	charged	to	licensees.	
Only	a	small	administrative	fee	is	in	place.		Coming	up	with	a	comprehensive	policy	could	be	left	for	the	
long-term, once the CMC has had the opportunity to conduct necessary research and consult with the 
industry .  However, a basic license and administrative fee schedule should be sorted out as quickly as 
possible .
License Fees
In almost every country that licenses its terrestrial broadcasters, the licensee pays the regulatory authority 
a recurring fee .  This fee usually goes towards the costs of regulation, although in some countries it is paid 
to the government who then funds the regulator directly out of the state budget .  Research shows that there 
are	many	different	examples	of	fee	structures	around	the	world,	but	that	they	can	broadly	be	summarized	
as basing fees on one of the following:
•	 Option	One:		Use	of	spectrum	as	a	factor	of	the	power	and	output	of	transmitters;
•	 Option	Two:		The	coverage	area	determined	through	audience	reach;	or
•	 Option	Three:		Percentage	of	gross	annual	turnover	of	the	licensee.
 
Generally speaking, in mature regulatory environments, Option Three is the most favored method (i.e., 
Ofcom of the United Kingdom, the CRTC of Canada, and the FCC of the United States) .  Research shows 
that regulators generally charge anywhere from 2 .5 percent to 4 .5 percent of gross annual turnover .  For 
instance, ComReg in Ireland charges 3 .5 percent .
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In	 emerging	 democracies	 where	 little	 is	 known	 about	 the	 operations	 of	 broadcasters	 other	 than	 the	
information that they include in their applications (which is generally taken at face value by the regulator), 
the	favored	choice	is	Option	Two.		This	is	primarily	because	the	use	of	ATDI	or	similar	software	coupled	
with census information provides the regulator with a “best reasonable guess .”  This generally goes 
unchallenged,	as	broadcasters	 tend	to	use	 the	same	sort	of	software	 to	calculate	 their	own	reach.	 	This	
method is used by a number of European nations, and the Bosnian regulator’s recent transformation to it 
has been considered successful .
Option	One	proves	especially	accurate	where	topography	is	relatively	flat	(such	as	in	Iraq)	and	transmitter	
reach can be easily compared .  However, even then, it has drawbacks .  For example, a small broadcasting 
operation in a large city reaching a massive audience and a rural operator reaching a smaller audience 
would	be	charged	the	same	fee	if	using	transmitters	of	similar	power.		Nonetheless,	this	type	of	calculation	
has been used in some countries as an interim measure where population numbers and gross annual 
turnover	figures	are	hard	to	come	by	or	wholly	inaccurate.
The CMC should keep in mind that however it determines its fees, the fee schedule should be fair, simple, 
flexible	and	reliable.		In	addition,	international	best	practices	dictate	that	fees	should	reflect	the	underlying	
cost of administering regulation and no more, and that they should be relevant to operators’ activities .  In 
all	cases,	the	regulator	must	consult	widely	with	the	industry	and	stakeholders	to	find	the	best	and	most	
relevant option to suit the needs of the market .
Administrative Fees
In addition to recurring license fees, regulators ordinarily charge a small fee for administering applications 
and other tasks, including substantive changes in license conditions initiated by the licensee and renewals . 
Such	fees	should	be	minimal	and	proportionate	to	the	amount	of	administrative	effort	required	to	service	
licenses .
 iii. Community Broadcasting
Community broadcasting (especially community radio) can be an important part of the broadcasting 
landscape	due	to	its	unique	ability	to	serve	small	groups	that	benefit	from	having	a	medium	for	sharing	
ideas,	but	are	unlikely	to	attract	advertising	or	sponsorship.		Often	regulators	give	community	broadcasters	
a discount on license fees or waive them altogether .  Communities served are sometimes limited to a 
particular	 geographic	 area	 (such	 as	 a	 village	 or	 a	 group	 of	 villages),	 and	 often	 in	 these	 situations	 the	
community itself owns and manages the station .  Such stations can be absolutely critical for facilitating 
participation in local level governance .  Other times, communities comprise special interest groups (such 
as women or minorities) that are typically underserved by other types of media .  It is too early for the CMC 
to develop a comprehensive policy on community broadcasting (especially considering that this policy 
should	depend	largely	on	how	the	IMN	fulfills	its	public	service	remit	in	the	future),	so	this	is	something	to	
consider for the long term .  However, if the CMC decides to continue issuing licenses to new broadcasters 
rather than impose a moratorium, it would be prudent to reserve a limited band of frequency spectrum for 
this type of broadcasting .
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2.	 Satellite	Broadcasting	Licensing	Policy
In terms of policy development, the CMC must come to grips with the high useage of satellite-delivered 
broadcast	 signals	 as	 compared	 to	 programs	 delivered	 terrestrially.	 	 There	 are	 difficult	 questions	 of	
jurisdiction and power especially where channel providers are located outside Iraq and use satellites based 
outside the state .  Some considerations include:
•	 Technical	rules	for	quality;
•	 Potential	 establishment	 of	 Iraq-specific	 platform,	which	might	 have	 compulsory	 carriage	
of local terrestrial stations, including the IMN, for free or a set fee in order to protect the 
ability	 of	 local	 stations	 to	 attract	 advertising	 revenues	 and	provide	 consumers	with	 local	
information;
•	 Extent	to	which	satellite	broadcasters	are	regulated	or	can	be	urged	voluntarily	to	comply	
with CMC rules for content, e .g ., compliance with codes of conduct and elections rules; and
•	 Copyright,	redistribution	and	program	exclusivity	issues.
E.	 Technology	and	Transmission
The CMC should be a center for the improvement of the technology of broadcasting in Iraq .  It could, for 
example:
•	 Consider	the	feasibility	of	transitioning	to	digital	terrestrial	broadcasting,	perhaps	through	a	
phased	transition	starting	first	in	saturated	areas	such	as	Baghdad,	as	was	done	in	Germany	
where	Berlin	was	the	first	to	change;
•	 Consider	 an	 Iraq-specific	direct-to-home	 satellite	 platform	 to	 facilitate	universal	 coverage	
and potential phasing out of some terrestrial analogue spectrum use;
•	 Determine	other	modes	for	the	delivery	of	multi-channel	video	including	telecommunications,	
Internet streaming and cable; and
•	 Conduct	research	and	consult	with	the	industry	on	other	new	technologies.
F.	 Regulation	and	Compliance
As	the	CMC	becomes	more	sophisticated	and	better	staffed,	it	may	want	to	consider	more	how	the	increase	
in	information	offerings	from	a	variety	of	sources	alters	its	capacity	as	a	regulator	and	shifts	its	role	to	other	
modes of serving Iraqi society .
1.	 Regulatory	Modifications
As most of the CMC’s regulations, rules, codes and license terms and conditions were established on a 
temporary and short-term basis and without public consultation, all should be reviewed and revised with 
the input of the public and the broadcasting industry through an open and interactive consultative process . 
Some	specific	regulatory	modifications	that	might	be	considered	are	introduced	briefly	below.		Any	changes	
adopted	by	the	CMC	should	be	made	in	consultation	with	the	industry	and	perhaps	after	obtaining	more	
comprehensive expert advice .  Issues discussed below in subsections a through e could also be considered 
for broadcast legislation, depending on how responsibility for determining them is apportioned between 
Parliament and the CMC .
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a. Local and Independent Production
The	establishment	of	local	and	independent	production	has	many	benefits.		For	example,	increased	local	
production	would	allow	Iraqis	to	see	more	programming	made	by	Iraqis	specifically	for	Iraqis,	and	would	
bring	all	of	the	economic	benefits	associated	with	the	development	of	any	industry,	including	increased	
employment and tax revenues .  Increased independent production, i .e ., that produced by an individual 
or company who is independent of any particular broadcaster, would help to ensure that programming 
overall	reflects	a	wide	variety	of	views	and	perspectives.		The	CMC	could	encourage	local	and	independent	
production of programming by including a clause in license terms and conditions requiring that stations use 
their	“best	efforts”	to	air	certain	percentages	of	content	from	local	producers	and	independent	producers.
b. Public Service Requirements for Commercial Broadcasters
Public service requirements are sometimes included in commercial broadcasting licenses .  For example, 
commercial	broadcasters	are	often	required	to	broadcast	public	service	messages	in	times	of	emergency.	
Additionally, some regimes require that a certain percentage of commercial broadcasters’ programming 
(perhaps	five	 to	 ten	percent)	 be	devoted	 to	 certain	 types	 of	 programming	deemed	 to	 be	 in	 the	public	
interest	such	as,	 for	example:	news	and	current	affairs	programming;	cultural	programming;	children’s	
programming; programming for underserved parts of the population, including, for example, women, 
the	 disabled,	 and	 specific	 ethnic	 groups;	 programming	 in	 minority	 languages;	 and	 voter	 education	
information .  In some countries, there have been proposals for the establishment of a public service fund 
that would be available to all private broadcasters who wish to bid to perform public service obligations . 
Where frequency spectrum is no longer seen to be scarce, or where alternate modes of reaching the public 
in an unregulated fashion appear to be readily available, placing public service obligations into license 
conditions seems increasingly unlikely to work .
c. Monopoly and Cross-Media Ownership
With a country the size of Iraq, an initial wave of competition seems critical for the ultimate success of a 
diverse media landscape .  One way of encouraging pluralism would be to restrict cross-media ownership 
(e .g ., restricting an owner to just one outlet in each type of media, meaning an entity could own one television 
station, one radio station and one newspaper) .  It also may be a good idea to limit the number of broadcast 
licenses one entity can own, particularly small markets .  It likely is too early to address competition law 
in	 Iraq,	but	having	effective	competition	 legislation	can	serve	as	a	complement	and	backstop	 to	media	
concentration rules .
d. Copyright
Iraqi copyright legislation, namely Copyright Law No . 3 of 1971, was amended by CPA Order 82 on 
April 29, 2004, primarily to update it and bring it more in line with international standards .  The law as 
amended expressly includes “works prepared for radio and television .”  The CMC’s Interim Broadcasting 
Programme	Code	of	Practice	refers	specifically	to	this	legislation,	as	amended,	and	requires	broadcasters	
to adhere to it and also to comply with “generally accepted international conventions and standards for 
intellectual	property	protection.”		As	having	an	effective	legal	regime	for	protecting	intellectual	property	
rights	is	a	prerequisite	for	the	building	of	a	mature	media	industry	and	attracting	foreign	investment,	the	
legal framework for copyrights should be reviewed to ensure that copyrights are adequately protected . 
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It would thus be advisable to provide more expansive protections of copyrights in CMC licenses and to 
develop a code on copyright in consultation with broadcasters to address any shortcomings in the current 
legal framework .  Also, the CMC should address copyright compliance in the workshops discussed in Part 
Two, Section III .F .2 below .
e. Foreign Ownership and International Broadcasters
In the initial round of licensing, recognition was given to broadcast proposals and channels funded, 
sponsored and operated by foreign governments, particularly members of the Coalition .  These stations 
can play an important role in supplying news and information and also, in some cases, establishing a 
standard for broadcasting quality .  If the CMC maintains a “light hand” approach to licensing, there is no 
reason that these licenses should be less favorably viewed than any others .  On the other hand, the CMC 
should take care that the distribution of licenses does not appear to favor government-based international 
broadcasters	over	others,	unless	it	can	state	a	society-based	justification	for	doing	so.		The	CMC,	together	
with sponsors of these broadcasters, might wish to conduct its own study of viewing habits, arrangements 
with	FM	broadcasters,	 spectrum	use	 and	public	 attitudes	 towards	 these	 channels	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 future	
planning .
If ownership by non-Iraqi persons and entities were to be limited for some reason, however, it would be 
beneficial	to	allow	foreign	ownership	of	at	least	a	minority	percentage	of	individual	media	outlets	in	order	
to encourage foreign direct investment in the industry and the infusion of know-how that such investment 
brings .  The United States, for example, allows foreign persons to own up to 25 percent of any individual 
station .
f. Interim Broadcasting Programme Code of Practice
Generally speaking, the Interim Broadcasting Programme Code of Practice, which was issued immediately 
after	the	CMC	was	established	following	the	handover	from	the	CPA	to	the	Interim	Iraqi	Government,	
is	a	step	in	the	right	direction.	 	 It	makes	a	clear	attempt	to	comply	with	international	best	practices	for	
protecting freedom of expression, while at the same time preventing the types of speech that may be viewed 
as unacceptable or dangerous within the context of Iraq .  For example, its provisions punish incitement 
to violence (including advocating terrorism) and require special care in programming involving religious 
groups	and	for	individual	privacy.	 	It	also	requires	accuracy	and	fairness,	and	offers	aggrieved	persons	
a	right	of	reply.		The	Code	works	well	as	a	first	attempt	to	regulate	broadcast	content	without	excessive	
restrictions .  However, the Code could be improved upon in a number of ways, including the following:
•	 The	Code	should	be	elaborated	upon—perhaps	best	through	the	types	of	guidelines	discussed	
in	Part	Two,	Section	III.F.1.i	below—to	provide	better	guidance	to	broadcasters	on	acceptable	
programming standards, particularly where issues present too many ambiguities .  Such 
guidance could seek to clarify:
•	 Examples	 of	 material	 that	 is	 merely	 offensive	 or	 insulting	 but	 does	 not	 constitute	
incitement; 
•	 The	meaning	of	decency	and	civility;	
•	 That	public	discussion	and	debate	about	religion	is	permissible;	
•	 What	kinds	of	content	violate	an	individual’s	privacy	and	dignity;	
•	 A	delineation	between	acceptable	standards	for	adults	and	children;	and
•	 What	types	of	speech	will	violate	the	ban	on	statements	that	advocate	terrorism	and	divert	
police from their duties .
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•	 The	right	of	reply	provision	should	be	redrafted	to	reflect	 international	best	practices.	 	 In	
particular, the Code should set out clearly the narrow circumstances under which the right 
may be claimed and how it should be exercised .  The limitation on claiming a right of reply 
where	 other	 avenues	 of	 reaching	 the	 public	 are	 available	 should	 be	 clarified.	 	 The	Code	
should recognize that, where a correction has been given that redresses the harm done, no 
right of reply should be available .  Alternatively, consideration might be given to providing 
for an enforceable right of correction in the Code as an alternative to the right of reply .
As discussed above, any revisions to the Code should follow consultation with broadcasters .
g. Advertising
Currently, the CMC has no advertising rules and regulations in place .  As the advertising market develops, 
and	competition	for	advertising	revenues	increases,	 it	will	be	important	for	the	CMC	to	fulfill	 its	remit	
to	protect	the	public	interest	by	encouraging	better	self	regulation	or,	 if	necessary,	setting	standards	for	
advertising scheduling, amount, frequency and content .  The CMC should include these issues in future 
consultation with the industry and the public .
h. Elections
As is discussed above, the Code for Media During Elections was issued by the CMC immediately prior to 
the	first	election	and	has	not	been	revised	since.		Some	standards	in	the	Code	generated	a	lot	of	discussion	
among Iraqi broadcasters and international advisors when they were adopted, such as, for example, the 
Code’s allowance of paid political advertising by candidates and its requirement of “equitable access” 
(allowing more prominent parties and candidates more coverage) rather than “equal access” (requiring 
equal	time	for	each	party	or	candidate	regardless	of	their	significance	in	the	race)	for	candidates	in	broadcast	
media .  The Code also set standards for the printed press during elections, although the CMC has chosen 
not to regulate print media in other contexts, including with the Interim Broadcasting Programme Code of 
Practice .  The CMC should review the successes and failures of these policies and other provisions of the 
Code to see if and how they should be changed .  For example, the CMC should undertake a consultation 
to determine whether concepts of “equitable access” apply where there is strong pluralism in broadcast 
offerings.	 	 In	 addition,	 IMN-specific	 requirements	 (such	 as	 hosting	 debates	 and	 airing	 free	 slots	 for	
candidates)	should	be	reviewed	for	effectiveness.
The	CMC	should	increase	its	profile	during	future	elections.		In	the	past,	there	was	considerable	confusion	
as	 to	who—the	CMC	 or	 the	 Independent	 Electoral	 Commission	 of	 Iraq	 (IECI)—had	 responsibility	 for	
regulating media conduct during elections, despite the fact that Order 65 clearly gave such authority 
to	 the	CMC.	 	 Poorly-drafted	 IECI	 regulations	 and	 failure	 of	 the	 two	 agencies	 fully	 to	 coordinate	 their	
efforts	during	elections	contributed	to	this	confusion.		Accordingly,	the	CMC	should	do	the	following	in	
connection with future elections:
•	 Well	before	the	next	elections,	the	CMC	should	review	its	Code	for	Media	During	Elections	
and any related guidelines as discussed above, through a public consultation process, and 
make any necessary revisions;
•	 Well	before	the	next	elections,	the	CMC	should	begin	working	with	the	IECI	to	encourage	
it	to	pass	a	media	regulation	more	clearly	and	appropriately	defining	IECI	jurisdiction.		A	
model	for	such	regulation	is	attached	at	Appendix	C;
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•	 Closer	to	the	next	elections,	the	CMC	should	publish	its	Code	for	Media	During	Elections	
widely, perhaps holding a joint press conference with the IECI to announce and explain it 
immediately prior to the beginning of the campaign period .  As the IECI is always highly 
visible	around	the	time	of	elections,	such	coordination	will	increase	the	CMC’s	profile	before	
the public, the industries it regulates and the government; and
•	 During	elections,	the	CMC	should	strive	for	better	coordination	with	the	IECI	in	monitoring	
and enforcing potential violations .
i. Guidelines
The four sets of Guidelines issued by the CMC to complement its Interim Broadcast Programme Code 
of Practice and Code for Media During Elections should be reviewed to see if they adequately provide 
the detail, context and examples necessary to assist broadcasters in interpreting these codes .  It is our 
understanding that the CMC’s research and monitoring department watched and listened to a number 
of broadcasters throughout each of Iraq’s campaign periods and prepared detailed reports summarizing 
their	findings.		Real-life	examples	from	these	reports,	explaining	where	content	could	be	deemed	to	be	in	
violation of CMC codes, should be incorporated into the guidelines to give broadcaster guidance as to how 
the codes will be interpreted .  Perhaps the CMC’s research and monitoring department could be charged 
with developing guidelines for existing and new CMC codes .
j. Rules of Procedure
The	CMC’s	Rules	of	Procedure	were	drawn	up	in	its	first	days	of	operation,	and	thus	do	not	reflect	its	current	
organizational structure or the breadth of its functions .  For example, under both Order 65 (currently in 
effect)	and	new	legislation	that	the	CMC	has	proposed,	the	CMC’s	Appeals	Board	has	the	judicial	functions	
of	providing	a	determination	of	whether	a	violation	was	committed	and	sanctions	for	such	violations	of	its	
codes of conduct (for a discussion on the potential unconstitutionality of having Appeals Board decision 
be	final	and	unappealable	to	Iraqi	courts,	see	Part	Two,	Section	II.A.1).		As	such,	the	Rules	of	Procedure	
should contain basic protections provided to defendants in court, such as clear evidentiary rules, clarity 
on the standard of proof, the ability to call witnesses and examine witnesses brought against them, and 
the right to legal assistance if necessary .  Currently, the Rules fail to provide clear guidance as to how the 
CMC would itself bring claims against those violating its rules, and instead seem to anticipate only third 
parties bringing adverse actions .  Moreover, provisions in the Rules regarding general administration do 
not	appear	to	reflect	current	practices.		Moreover,	many	of	its	provisions	seem	to	apply	better	to	matters	
involving telecommunications rather than broadcasting issues .  Accordingly, the Rules should be reviewed 
and revised to provide clear procedures covering all aspects of the CMC’s operations .
2 . Compliance
The CMC could improve compliance by training broadcasters as to how to comply with its codes and 
regulations .  Broadcasters need to be told how the regulator expects them to behave, so that they know 
what is and what will not be considered acceptable .  Even in the United Kingdom, where broadcasting has 
been regulated for decades, broadcasters generally welcome initiatives by the regulator to give guidance 
and training on how to comply with its requirements .  Workshops could be organized for broadcasters, 
perhaps	with	significant	input	and	participation	of	the	research	and	monitoring	department,	particularly	if	
it	is	involved	in	drafting	guidelines.		Such	workshops	could	either	be	held	centrally	at	CMC	facilities	or	at	
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broadcasters’ premises .  In addition to improving compliance, this would be an excellent way for the CMC 
to	raise	its	profile	and	reputation	with	licensees.
3.	 Redirect	Monitoring	Efforts
The CMC should consider its statutory monitoring responsibilities to ensure that the sector as a whole 
contributes to tasks of informing and educating as well as entertaining and that the sector furthers Iraqi 
creativity .  Given the partiality of most broadcasters, the CMC might be advised to spend fewer resources 
monitoring individual services for impartiality, and more on assessing plurality and access issues across 
the	whole	sector,	asking	whether	any	significant	voices	are	being	unreasonably	excluded.
4.	 Increased	Enforcement
As	 the	CMC	becomes	more	 sophisticated,	finds	 itself	 in	 a	more	 stable	political	 situation,	 and	 is	 better	
staffed,	it	will	likely	want	to	review	its	enforcement	scope	and	implementation.		One	key	step	that	needs	
to be taken before the CMC can shape a convincing strategy is the further hiring and training of a legal 
department	that	can	draft	correspondence,	create	files,	gather	evidence,	interpret	CMC	rules	and	codes,	
apply international best practices, and eventually defend CMC positions in open hearings and court .  We 
understand	that	it	is	virtually	impossible	to	find	local	talent	with	the	training	and	experience	necessary	to	
perform these highly-skilled functions .  As such, developing a proper legal department will entail focused 
recruiting	efforts	and	extensive	training,	possibly	requiring	the	CMC	to	hire	international	consultants	or	
send	its	legal	staff	abroad	for	courses	or	mentoring	by	a	foreign	independent	regulator.		Perhaps	a	national	
institute	for	the	training	of	agency	staff	(such	as	that	set	forth	in	Part	Two,	Section	V.C.1)	could	assist	in	this	
capacity-building stage .
Once	the	CMC’s	legal	and	other	staff	are	in	place,	the	CMC	should	renew	enforcement	efforts	by	focusing	
on	clear	 incidents	 so	as	 to	give	meaning	 to	 the	 rule	of	 law.	 	 If	 rules	 remain	 in	place	with	no	attention	
to	enforcement,	the	rules	will	be	perceived	as	a	mockery.	 	The	CMC	could	first	identify	and	then	reach	
out to stations broadcasting without a license or on the wrong frequency .  Enforcing these more clear-
cut	cases	would	give	staff	the	experience	and	confidence	needed	to	enforce	more	sensitive	and	factually	
complicated rules .  A reasonable goal could be to have the legal department prepared to handle high-
profile	and	contentious	proceedings	by	the	time	of	the	next	Iraqi	elections.
G.	 Relationships	with	Other	Regulators
Among	the	best	advisors	that	the	CMC	could	have	are	other	independent	broadcast	regulators.		Attending	
forums	where	regulators	discuss	common	issues,	visiting	their	offices,	sending	staff	for	on-site	training,	
and	even	developing	informal	relationships	where	staff	can	call	or	e-mail	other	regulators	with	questions	
or	share	documents	and	other	information	could	prove	a	cost-effective	and	efficient	way	to	improve	the	
CMC’s operational capacity and obtain key policy advice .  This is particularly true of regulators operating 
in environments where similar challenges are faced, such as regulators in other parts of the Middle East or 
those	in	other	conflict	or	post-conflict	areas.
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H.	 Expanding	Media	Development	Efforts
It may be possible, and even desirable, for the CMC to take a far more active and direct role in media 
development—perhaps	by	supporting	a	number	of	the	initiatives	discussed	in	Part	Two,	Section	V	below.	
Even	though	the	CMC	is	first	and	foremost	a	regulator,	and	its	primary	responsibility	to	broadcasters	and	
the public is to master the nuts and bolts of licensing and regulating broadcasters, it has been charged 
under current law with some extra-regulatory functions touching upon media development .  Furthermore, 
it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 broadcasting	 and	 the	 Iraqi	 public	 as	 a	whole	would	 benefit	 if	 the	CMC	were	
successfully to push a stronger media development agenda and, as a result, create a generation of media 
professionals and advocates who can move the landscape in a more positive direction .
“Media	development”	in	this	context	could	mean	many	different	things.		It	could	mean	reinforcing	efforts	
at	professionalization,	 improved	programming,	 training	of	 station	management,	 or	better	 insights	 into	
technology .  It could mean improving the role Iraqi media play in the development of the Iraqi economy, by 
supporting broad-based education programs or interplay between broadcasting and the Internet .  It could 
mean	supporting	the	development	of	Iraqi	film	or	television	production	capability.
The CMC may be, even by default, the only organization in Iraq with the remit and budget to contribute to 
media development in any meaningful way .  Sustainable media initiatives involving locally run, long-term 
programs would be best conceptualized or even implemented by a local player intimately involved with 
the media such as the CMC .  Indeed, international implementers and donors have largely favored short-
term	projects	in	Iraq,	often	opting	for	one-time	training	programs	held	outside	of	Iraq	rather	than	long-term	
sustainable activities in the country .  Also, in the short term until the CMC can tackle the big, politically 
sensitive	issues	such	as	ownership	by	political	and	religious	groups,	initiating	media	development	efforts	
may	be	one	of	the	best	ways	that	it	can	contribute	affirmatively	and	significantly	to	the	development	of	a	
viable commercial broadcasting sector .
There	may,	however,	be	significant	hurdles	to	taking	this	approach.		First,	with	no	real	revenues	currently	
coming	 into	 the	CMC	 from	broadcasting	 license	 fees,	 any	money	 spent	on	media	development	 efforts	
from the CMC’s budget would have to come from telecommunications revenues .  Telecommunications 
providers are likely to question why their fees are going to fund media, and may call the CMC’s legitimacy 
and integrity into question .  Indeed, the European Union has strict guidelines on cross-subsidizing between 
sectors within the regulator .  For instance, in the overall budget considerations for a regulator, it is against 
EU guidelines for the usually high telecommunications sector fees to bolster normally lower broadcasting 
fees .  In other words, although broadcasting fees are generally lower, they must not be made so low that the 
telecoms operators are subsidizing the administration of the regulation of broadcasting .  The subsidization 
of	media	development	efforts	would	likely	be	viewed	as	even	more	suspect.		Although	there	are	no	similar	
cross-subsidization restrictions applicable in Iraq, telecommunications providers are likely to be aware 
of this principle, and violation of it could cause problems for the CMC in the future .  Second, if the CMC 
gets involved in too many extra-regulatory functions, it could be seen as losing its way, particularly given 
other	pressing	issues	such	as	sorting	out	the	frequency	spectrum	and	solving	its	own	staffing	and	capacity	
problems .
The CMC could choose to bypass or ignore these possible complications, as follows:
•	 The	 CMC	 could	 support	 and	 seek	 funding	 for	 (but	 not	 actually	 fund)	 special	 media	
development projects, working with universities, donors or NGOs within or outside Iraq;
•	 The	CMC	could	make	the	policy	decision	to	take	a	more	active	role	in	media	development	
and	even	use	its	revenues	for	these	efforts	notwithstanding	the	potential	problems,	perhaps	
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defining	a	limited	period	for	such	activities.		It	could	argue	that	this	is	not	the	EU:	in	Iraq,	
there	is	no	viable	advertising	market	and	commercial	sector	development	needs	significant	
assistance .  However, if this route is taken, the CMC should advocate that this function is set 
forth in new legislation on the CMC so that the legal basis for it is clear, and should be aware 
that	there	is	likely	to	be	significant	resistance	from	the	sectors	it	regulates;	or
•	 The	CMC	could	wait	until	there	are	sufficient	revenues	from	broadcasting	to	pay	for	such	
activities .  Again, this function should be expressed in legislation .
In any case where license fees are to be used to pay for extra-regulatory projects, those who pay the fees 
should be consulted .
IV . Public Service Broadcaster
A	successful	 and	 independent	 IMN	wholly	 fulfilling	 a	public	 service	 remit,	 providing	 all	 things	 to	 all	
Iraqis, is an ambitious goal .  Such a system would serve many needs including decreasing the need for a 
sectarian or party ownership of existing broadcasters, which can ultimately be divisive .  We are not yet 
at the day when the IMN is credited for  reporting that is truly balanced, when the IMN has independent 
and	guaranteed	revenue	streams,	and	when	it	is	thought	effectively	to	hold	the	government	accountable.	
It is currently not designed to resist direct and indirect political pressure .  A full analysis of whether 
and	how	the	 IMN	could	become	such	a	more	“ideal,”	efficient,	 independent,	publicly	accountable	and	
responsive public service broadcaster is beyond the scope of this report .  Perhaps the CMC, the IMN or the 
Iraqi government could commission a separate comprehensive needs assessment for the IMN .  However, 
below are a few issues that could be considered in such a paper, or by the CMC, the IMN or others in the 
meantime .
A.	 Fulfilling	its	Public	Service	Obligations
As is discussed above, the IMN, as Iraq’s publicly-funded media, has an obligation to inform, educate 
and	entertain	 Iraq’s	diverse	population	 in	a	 fair	and	balanced	way.	 	Current	 law	also	places	significant	
specific	programming	and	other	general	public	service	requirements	on	the	IMN.		It	would	be	advisable	
to review the law to determine whether these obligations make sense within the context of Iraq, and how 
new	legislation	might	define	the	role	of	the	IMN.
In	the	meantime,	the	IMN	could	be	reviewed	to	gauge	the	extent	to	which	it	is	fulfilling	the	obligations	
currently	required	by	Order	66.		Perhaps	one	way	to	ensure	that	the	IMN	is	attempting	to	reach	and	serve	
various	Iraqi	audiences	would	be	to	aim	for	internal	pluralism—the	inclusion	of	women	and	representatives	
of	Iraq’s	various	ethnic,	religious	and	political	groups—among	members	of	its	board	and	management	and	
among its reporters and on-air personalities .  The hope would be that this internal pluralism would then 
be	reflected	in	its	programming.		The	IMN	could	also	try	to	meet	these	goals	by	increasing	its	interaction	
with the public and improving its responsiveness to it in the following ways:
•	 Holding	regular	open	forums	in	various	markets	where	management	can	address	the	public	
and solicit input;
•	 Holding	roundtables	with	representatives	of	various	populations;
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•	 Consulting	 with	 existing	 citizens’	 groups	 (such	 as	 the	 Iraqis	 for	 Independent	 Public	
Broadcasting which monitored IMN programming during the December 2005 elections) and 
encouraging the creation of other similar groups;
•	 Conducting	audience	surveys,	as	discussed	in	Part	Two,	Section	V.A.1;	and
•	 Establishing	and	publicizing	a	hotline	and	email	address	where	the	public	can	contact	the	
IMN with complaints, praise or comments about programming .
B.	 Legislation	to	Replace	CPA	Order	66
As with the CMC and Order 65, much suspicion of the IMN and Order 66, which governs it, can be 
attributed	to	the	fact	that	Order	66	was	developed	and	imposed	by	the	CPA.		In	fact,	like	Order	65,	Order	66	
generally	reflects	international	best	practice.		Because	of	its	history,	however,	it	would	be	advantageous	to	
replace Order 66 with an Iraqi law once such a law can be properly addressed by Parliament (the language 
of Order 66 requires that it be replaced by an Iraqi law) .  A new law could address the following issues:
•	 The	types	of	programming	and	services	that	the	IMN	should	be	required	to	provide	to	the	
public .  (See the discussions of the IMN’s public service obligations in Part One, Section IV .B .1 
and Part Two, Section IV .A .)
•	 There	has	been	substantial	confusion	as	to	who—between	the	IMN	Board	of	Governors	and	
its	Financial	Committee—has	the	final	say	over	decisions	involving	expenditures	in	excess	of	
150 million Iraqi dinar (USD$118,000) .  New legislation could either clarify the relative roles 
of	these	bodies,	or	perhaps	do	away	with	the	Financial	Committee	altogether.		The	concept	of	
a	Financial	Committee	was	apparently	originally	introduced	not	so	much	as	a	requirement	
of good governance, but as a protection for investment by international donors (it included 
an international representative) .  Now that there is no international support for the IMN, 
the	 relevance	of	 the	 committee	 is	questionable.	 	 If	 the	Financial	Committee	 is	disbanded,	
however, it would be a shame to lose the experience and expertise of the two Iraqi members 
of	the	committee,	as	they	have	served	since	the	IMN	was	established,	and	thus	have	much-
needed experience and provide important continuity .  Perhaps one or both of them could 
advise the Board or eventually be appointed to it; and
•	 The	 requirement	 that	 one	 Board	 member	 be	 an	 international	 should	 be	 reconsidered,	
particularly now that there is no international funding .  There are alternative ways to stay in 
touch with international best practice, such as participation in informal and formal networks 
and	attendance	at	international	conferences	and	forums.
•	 It	may	be	 a	 good	 idea	 for	 the	 law	 to	prohibit	 the	 IMN	 from	 receiving	 advertisements	 or	
perhaps to limit the amount of advertisements that the IMN can air .  As the IMN is subsidized 
with public funds, important issues are raised about its potential to “crowd out” commercial 
competitors, especially in the market for advertising .  How to determine what actions by the 
public service broadcaster are “unfair” and which are not is inordinately complex .  Certainly, 
the advertising market is limited, particularly in Iraq, and any advertising revenues taken 
by the IMN could in theory have been used to support a commercial station .  Additionally, 
it would be advisable to require that the rate card for the public broadcaster, showing the 
amount it charges for advertisements, be made publicly available .  Such requirements could 
be	achieved	through	the	law	replacing	Order	66,	or,	alternatively,	the	CMC	could	attempt	to	
establish them through the license that the IMN is required to obtain from the CMC under 
current law .
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C.	 Board,	Management	and	Staff
1 . Board
For	months	now,	the	IMN’s	Board	of	Governors	has	had	only	five	members,	though	the	law	requires	it	to	
have nine .  As six members are necessary for quorum, the board has been unable to make decisions and 
supervise	management	effectively.	 	Having	additional	members	appointed	 to	 the	board	 is	perhaps	 the	
most critical issue facing the IMN .
Pursuant to Order 66, the Prime Minister must nominate four new members and submit this list of nominees 
for approval by a two-thirds vote of Parliament .  These individuals:
•	 Must	be	Iraqi	citizens,	except	for	one	member	who	must	be	a	non-Iraqi	with	international	
experience in broadcast regulation;
•	 Must	be	drawn	from	Iraqi	civil	society,	represent	a	cross-section	of	the	viewing	public,	and	
be individuals of impeccable character and reputation;
•	 May	not	hold	any	executive,	legislative	or	judicial	position,	whether	appointed	or	elected,	
at	any	level	of	government,	or	be	an	appointed,	elected	or	voluntary	official	of	any	political	
party during their term on the Board; and
•	 Must	not	be	involved	in	any	IMN	matter	that	will	affect	his	or	her	financial	interests	or	the	
financial	interests	of	certain	related	persons	or	entities.
2.	 Senior	Management
The	 effectiveness	 of	 senior	management	 could	be	 improved	by	hiring	 an	 executive	 or	 executives	with	
senior management experience, perhaps but not necessarily in media, either for key positions at the IMN 
or to shadow senior managers and provide consultancy advice .  Hiring someone at this level, particularly 
to	work	in	Iraq,	would	be	expensive,	but	would	likely	pay	off	over	the	long	term.
3.	 Staff
A common complaint heard from those in senior positions at the IMN is that it is impossible to retain 
quality	staff.		The	IMN	has	been	paying	its	staff	as	civil	servants,	and	thus	much	below	the	market	salary	
paid	 to	 those	 in	 the	commercial	 sector.	 	The	 IMN	has	 in	effect	been	serving	as	a	human	resource	pool	
and	training	ground,	as	its	hires	are	often	lured	away	to	commercial	stations	by	salaries	several	times	the	
amount paid by the IMN .
This is due in part to a misunderstanding that the IMN is required by law to tie its wages to the civil 
servant scheme .  In fact, to the contrary, Order 66 expressly excludes IMN employees from the system for 
civil servant remuneration .  The IMN could thus revise its salary structure to bring it more in line with the 
market at any time .  It would be a good idea to make clear in any future legislation governing the IMN that 
its employees are not salaried as civil servants .
D . Other Issues
•	 The	IMN	might	consider	privatizing	its	newspaper,	Al-Sabah,	in	order	to	focus	its	efforts	on	
broadcasting .
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•	 Having	 independent	 and	 guaranteed	 revenue	 streams	 is	 critical	 to	 maintaining	 the	
independence of any publicly-funded media .  The IMN should improve upon and clarify the 
way	it	is	financed,	how	it	is	to	receive	money	from	the	government,	the	budgeting	process	
and	the	funding	settlement	process.
•	 The	IMN	may	want	to	consider	expanding	the	development	and	management	of	its	terrestrial	
transmission network so that it could sell its transmission services to the whole broadcasting 
sector in Iraq .  It is understood that the IMN currently leases a portion of its network to 
another station, and it could lease its network more widely .  As the transmission towers 
currently used by the IMN are in optimal locations for the provision of national coverage, 
this	could	have	a	significant	and	positive	impact	on	the	entire	broadcasting	sector	as	well	as	
raise revenue for the IMN .
V.	Other	Efforts	to	Enhance	the	Media	Landscape
The	possible	efforts	discussed	below	could	be	initiatives	of	the	CMC	under	an	expanded	media	development	
remit as discussed above in Part Two, Section III .H, or could be taken on by the Iraqi government, other 
parts of Iraqi society including civil society organizations, or international implementing organizations 
and donors .
A.	 Commercial	Sector	Development
1.	 Audience	Surveys
Developing a vibrant commercial sector will depend largely upon the development of an advertising 
market to provide revenues independent from government, political parties and religious groups .  Each 
commercial broadcaster obviously wants to sell as many advertisements as possible while charging 
as much as advertisers are willing to pay for advertising time .  The advertiser’s goal is to buy time in 
programs whose audience contains as many people as possible in the demographics that buy the most of 
its products .  
Advertisers will want to buy more ads and pay more for them if they can be assured that the desired 
demographic	 is	being	reached.	 	Reliable	audience	 research—detailing	such	 factors	as	age,	 sex,	 income,	
household	size,	ethnicity,	religion,	and	geographic	location	of	people	watching	and	listening	to	programs—
helps advertisers choose where to spend their money .  Commercial broadcasters thus need to have this 
audience information in order to appropriately market themselves to potential advertisers .
There are very few, if any, Iraqi institutions conducting audience surveys for Iraqi broadcasters .  The CMC 
or others might encourage the development of audience research capacity in any of the following ways:
•	 Develop	the	capacity	of	a	department	of	the	CMC	to	start	conducting,	and	perhaps	selling,	
audience research .  Outside consultants could be hired for this capacity-building project;
•	 Encourage	the	development	of	such	local	capacity	elsewhere,	perhaps	at	Iraqi	universities	or	
companies that conduct similar research;
•	 Make	this	a	function	of	a	local	media	institute	(see	Part	Two,	Section	V.C.1);	and
 54 
  Policy Recommendations Concerning Broadcasting in Iraq         
•	 Hold	workshops	or	distribute	information	to	commercial	broadcasters	as	to	how	to	conduct	
simple but fairly reliable audience research in-house using such methods as diaries, phone 
interviews and postal surveys .
2.	 Fund	to	Support	Commercial	Stations
The	CMC	or	others	could	encourage	the	establishment	of	a	fund	to	provide	private	sources	of	financing	for	
commercial	broadcasters.		The	first	of	this	kind	was	set	up	as	the	Media	Development	Loan	Fund	(MDLF)	
in Prague (www .mdlf .org) to provide low-cost capital, in-depth training and long-term advice and support, 
including	assistance	with	management	training,	business	plans	and	accounting.		By	providing	financing	
and	capacity-building	as	a	package,	it	helps	news	outlets	committed	to	responsible	journalism	strengthen	
their operations and become commercially sustainable .  It does not give grants, but rather operates like a 
bank, making loans only where it expects them to be repaid .  As such, it has not yet approved the provision 
of loans in Iraq, where security and other risks are too great to meet its criteria .
MDLF has, however, assisted in the establishment of other funds based on the same model, and perhaps 
this	 is	something	that	could	be	replicated	for	Iraq.	 	Specifically,	MDLF	helped	create	 the	South	African	
Media Development Fund (SAMDEF) (www .samdef .com), which funds media entrepreneurs in the 
Southern African Development Community with resources from the Open Society Initiative of Southern 
Africa (OSISA) and Free Voice of the Netherlands .  Perhaps international donors and other sources with a 
particular interest in Iraqi media, who are willing to incur the additional risk associated with investment 
in	Iraq,	could	set	up	a	fund	and	develop	a	set	of	criteria	for	financing	new	commercial	media	enterprises.	
More on SAMDEF can be found at Appendix D .
3.	 Professional	Association	of	Broadcasters
The development of a professional association of broadcasters could be encouraged .  Having one group 
representing	the	interests	of	all	or	a	significant	group	of	broadcasters	would	improve	consultation	among	
broadcasters and the CMC and would also provide a forum where broadcasters could discuss common 
issues .  It would also help the industry to reach out with collective strength to other groups, including 
potential advertisers (such as multinational companies) and to the local, regional and national governments 
in Iraq .
The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) in the United States (www .nab .org) could serve as a 
model .  The NAB professes to do the following:
•	 Promote	and	protect	the	interests	of	radio	and	television	broadcasters	in	the	United	States	
and around the world;
•	 Serve	as	broadcasters’	voice	before	all	branches	of	the	U.S.	government;
•	 Liaise	with	international	broadcasters	and	associations;
•	 Keep	members	apprised	of	policy	issues,	technology	and	management	trends;
•	 Provide	bulletins	with	news	relevant	to	broadcasters,	industry	research	and	legal	expertise;
•	 Provide	 member	 stations	 resources,	 products	 and	 financial	 services	 to	 assist	 them	
commercially;
•	 Help	educate	policymakers	about	the	realities	of	radio	and	television;	and
•	 Hold	conventions	where	members	can	discuss	common	issues.
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4.	 Other	Efforts
Other	efforts	that	could	contribute	to	development	of	the	commercial	broadcasting	sector	might	include:
•	 Marketing	the	Iraqi	broadcasting	sector	to	Iraqi,	regional	and	international	venture	capitalists	
and other investors and companies that may have an interest in investing in Iraqi media;
•	 Sponsoring	trade	shows	in	order	to	bring	together,	for	example,	players	in	the	advertising	
market in various regions and cities, or commercial broadcasters and potential advertisers; 
and
•	 Holding	 management	 training	 and	 other	 workshops	 providing	 guidance	 as	 to	 how	
broadcasters	might,	for	example,	staff	stations	more	efficiently	and	effectively,	develop	viable	
business plans, and market themselves to potential advertisers .
B.	 Encourage	Iraqi	Production
In addition to the regulatory methods discussed in Part Two, Section III .F .1 .a above, the CMC or other 
policy makers or international donors or implementing organizations could consider other mechanisms 
that might jump-start the Iraqi programming production industry, such as the following:
•	 A	Content	Development	Fund,	conceptually	similar	to	the	Media	Loan	Development	Fund	
(discussed in Part Two, Section V .A .2 above), but providing loans or grants solely for the local 
production of programming, both for local consumption and for export;
•	 Increased	 bi-lateral	 co-production	 agreements	 between	 local	 and	 foreign	 production	
companies or local production companies and media companies abroad who want but cannot 
find	locally-produced	Iraqi	content;
•	 Direct	grants	for	independent	production;	and
•	 Sponsoring	 festivals	 or	 other	 competitions	 for	 original	 Iraqi	 programming	within	 Iraq	 or	
abroad .
C.	 Human	and	Institutional	Capacity	Building
1.	 Local	Comprehensive	Training	Institution—IMTI
There is a clear consensus among the Iraqi media and communications community that training and other 
professional support is needed at all levels .  Unfortunately, there are no home-grown institutions in Iraq 
capable of providing focused technical support .  A strong independent communications development 
institution—run	by	and	for	Iraqis—is	needed	to	provide	broad-based,	long-term	training,	resources	and	
capacity building programs for Iraq’s nascent media, broadcasting, telecommunications and regulatory 
institutions .
The CMC has developed a proposal for the establishment of an Iraqi Media and Telecommunications 
Training	 Institute	 (“IMTI”)	 in	 Baghdad	 with	 regional	 affiliates,	 and	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 broad-based	
support across all sectors of broadcasting and telecommunications for such an institute .  The IMTI would 
provide a forum for courses, debates and conferences about important issues .  It would have meeting 
rooms, computers and libraries .  It also would serve as a center for excellence and would strive to improve 
the professionalism of all aspects of the media by providing programs to improve technical skills and 
increase	awareness	of	ethical	responsibilities.	 	Goals	would	include	equipping	the	Iraqi	media	to	better	
convey	reliable	facts	and	support	responsible	debate	and	helping	the	media	to	better	reflect	the	country’s	
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ethnic,	religious	and	political	diversity.		The	IMTI	would	also	devote	efforts	to	conducting	research	that	
would be critical to the development of Iraqi media and communications policy .
Donors should consider funding the IMTI, and the CMC should continue to shop it around aggressively . 
It would provide a much more sustainable, locally-driven and responsive resource than the one-time 
journalist training programs that have been a primary focus of donors in Iraq over the past few years .  
2.	 Professional	Organizations
a. Journalists’ Associations
The IFJ report discusses the importance of strong journalists’ associations in improving not only 
professionalism and quality of reporting, but also the conditions journalists face .  
b. Broadcast Announcers’ Association
Iraqi broadcast announcers could start a professional association to address issues applying only in 
the broadcasting sector .  An example of such a group in another country is the Jordanian Announcers 
Association	(JAA),	which,	according	to	a	report	by	IREX,	was	formed	to	fill	a	void	in	representation	for	
broadcast professionals, who were ineligible to join press or artists’ associations .  JAA has developed into 
a	professional	society,	but	aspires	to	become	a	full-fledged	trade	union	for	broadcast	professionals.		JAA	
activities include training events, legal defense of journalists and support for developing professional 
training programs in local universities .
3.	 Other	Mechanisms
Human and institutional capacity building could also be furthered in the following ways:
•	 Encouraging	the	development	of	communications,	media	and	journalism	faculties	at	Iraqi	
universities .  University studio equipment could be provided or upgraded, and other training 
and technical support could be provided to modernize the faculty’s broadcast training 
program.	 	Universities	could	be	encouraged	to	set	up	student-run	radio	and/or	 television	
stations .  Exchange programs could be developed whereby Iraqi academics could spend time 
at universities abroad;
•	 Encouraging	 mid-career	 training	 to	 be	 provided	 at	 existing	 universities	 or	 otherwise.	
Instruction could include such topics as objective and balanced reporting; conducting 
investigative	reporting	and	research	in	hostile	environments	or	situations	where	it	is	difficult	
to obtain information (such as in countries without freedom of information legislation); 
covering	parliamentary,	judicial	and	other	government	processes;	and	sector-specific	training	
to	 encourage	 better	 reporting	 in	 areas	 such	 as	 economics,	 business	 and	 health.	 	 Specific	
training could be provided for editors and management;
•	 Encouraging	the	development	of	vocational	schools	to	provide	such	instruction;
•	 Translating	 and	 publishing	 books	 discussing	 relevant	 issues	 such	 as	 international	 best	
practices and technical know-how;
•	 Developing	a	series	of	training	videos	and	DVDs	for	easy	distribution	throughout	the	country;	
and
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•	 Sponsoring	Iraqis	 to	attend	programs	 in	communications	and	media	abroad	(such	as	 that	
run	by	the	Programme	for	Comparative	Media	Law	and	Policy	at	Oxford	University,	http://
pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/).
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Appendix	A:	 
Selections	From	the	Penal	Code	of	1969
Offences Affecting the Constitution
Paragraph 226 – Any person who publicly insults the National Assembly or the government or the courts 
or	 the	armed	forces	or	any	other	constitutional	body	or	 the	public	authorities	or	official	or	semiofficial	
agencies or departments is punishable by a term of imprisonment net exceeding 7 years or detention or a 
fine.
Defamation and Insult
Paragraph	433	-	(1)	Defamation	is	the	imputation	to	another	in	public	of	a	particular	matter	which	if	true,	
would expose such person to punishment or cause him to be scorned by society .
Any	person	who	defames	another	is	punishable	by	detention	plus	a	fine	or	by	one	of	those	penalties.	If	
such defamation is published in a newspaper or publication or other press medium it is considered an 
aggravating circumstance .
(2)	Such	person	is	not	permitted	to	establish	the	proof	of	his	imputation	unless	that	imputation	is	directed	
at	a	public	official	or	agent	or	public	deputy	or	he	is	carrying	out	an	act	in	the	public	interest	or	if	such	
imputation	is	connected	with	the	office	or	employment	of	the	aggrieved	person	but	if	he	establishes	the	
proof	of	all	imputations	made,	then	there	is	no	offence.
Paragraph 434 - Insult is the imputation to another of something dishonorable or disrespectful or the 
hurting	of	his	feelings	even	though	it	does	not	include	an	imputation	to	him	of	a	particular	matter.
Any	person	who	insults	another	is	punishable	by	a	period	of	detention	not	exceeding	1	year	plus	a	fine	not	
exceeding 100 dinar or by one of those penalties .
If such insult is published in a newspaper or publication or medium it is considered an aggravating 
circumstance .
Paragraph 435 - If the defamation or insult is directed at the victim in private or during a telephone 
conversation or if it is sent to the victim in writing or communicated to him by other means, the penalty 
will	be	a	period	of	detention	not	exceeding	6	months	plus	a	fine	not	exceeding	50	dinar	or	by	one	of	those	
penalties .
Paragraph	436	-	(1)	It	is	not	an	offence	if	a	complainant	or	his	representative	defames	or	insults	the	other	
party orally or in writing while defending his rights before a court, investigating . authority or other body 
as long as it is within the necessary limits of his defense .
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(2) There is no penalty for any person who has defamed or insulted another while in a state of anger 
following an unjust assault on him by such other person .
Disclosure of Confidential Information
Paragraph	437	 -	Any	person	who	by	 reason	of	his	office,	profession,	 trade	or	 the	field	of	nature	of	his	
work	is	privy	to	confidential	information	and	who	discloses	such	information	in	circumstances	other	than	
those prescribed by law or uses it to his advantage or to another’s advantage is punishable by a period of 
detention	not	exceeding	2	years	plus	a	fine	not	exceeding	200	dinar	or	by	one	of	those	penalties.	However,	
there is no penalty if he has been authorized to make such disclosure or if, by such disclosure, he intends 
to	report	a	felony	or	misdemeanor	or	prevent	the	commission	of	such	offence.
Paragraph 438 - The following persons are punishable by a period of detention not exceeding 1 year plus a 
fine	not	exceeding	100	dinar	or	by	one	of	those	penalties:
(1) Any person who publishes in any way a picture, remark or information in respect of the private or 
family	life	of	another,	even	though	such	information	is	true	and	such	publication	causes	him	offence.
(2) Any person other than those mentioned in Paragraph 328 who is privy to information contained in a 
letter,	telex	or	telephone	conversation	and	he	discloses	such	information	to	a	person	other	than	for	whom	
it is intended and such disclosure causes harm to another .
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Appendix	B:	 
Iraqi	Constitution: 
Freedom	of	Expression	and	Independence	of	Media
I.	 More	Extensive	Suggested	Modifications	to	Language
The following language could be introduced in the following areas .  
A.	 Freedom	of	Expression
(1) Every individual shall be guaranteed the right to freedom of expression .  This right may be subject only 
to such restrictions as are provided by law and are strictly necessary and proportionate in a democratic 
society for the protection of public order and ethics . 
This right shall include:
A .   Freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds and regardless of 
frontiers .
B .   Freedom of press, publication, media, announcement, distribution, academic and artistic 
activity,	and	scientific	research.
C .  Peaceful demonstration and freedom of assembly .
D .  The forming and joining of associations and political parties .
E .   The right to access any information held by or on behalf of a public body or body that 
undertakes a public function .  
(2) The Government1  shall respect media independence and shall not interfere with the editorial, managerial 
or personnel decisions of any media, including publicly funded media .  Neither the establishment of a 
media outlet nor the practice of journalism may be subject to prior permission .  Prior censorship shall not 
be allowed .
(3) Freedom of mail, correspondence, telegrams, telephonic and electronic communications are guaranteed . 
It is not permissible to monitor, bug, or expose them except for reasons of legal and security necessity and 
by judicial order .
1 The capitalized term “Government” refers to the executive authority .
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B.	 Communications	and	Media	Commission
The	 regulatory	 commission	 known	 as	 the	Communications	 and	Media	Commission	 is	 financially	 and	
administratively independent and is ultimately accountable to the Council of Representatives .  This 
commission has the authority to regulate and license2 communications and the broadcast media .  The 
Government shall respect the independence of this commission and shall not interfere with it or its licensing 
decisions .  A law shall regulate its work .
II . Reasoning
A.	 Freedom	of	Expression
•	 The	legal	test	under	international	law	for	restrictions	on	freedom	of	expression	(i.e.,	that	any	
such restrictions should be expressly set forth in the law and may restrict speech only to the 
extent necessary in a democratic society to advance a legitimate state interest) should be 
incorporated into this section .
•	 The	right	to	freedom	of	expression	should	include	the	right	to	seek	and	receive	information	
as is required by international law .
•	 International	law	provides	that	the	freedom	of	expression	includes	the	right	for	the	public	
to access information held by public bodies, and a provision expressly guaranteeing such 
access should be included .
•	 The	independence	of	the	media	is	a	fundamental	part	of	the	right	to	freedom	of	expression,	
and the constitution should expressly require that the Government respect the independence 
of all media, including publicly funded media .
•	 Although	broadcast	media	may	be	licensed	due	to	the	scarcity	of	radio	frequency	spectrum,	
a system requiring prior permission for print media and the practice of journalism would 
violate international law and should be expressly prohibited .  
B.	 Communications	and	Media	Commission
The CMC’s relationship with the Council of Representatives and the Government should be clear .  The 
CMC should not be too closely connected with any part of the Iraqi government in order to preserve its 
independence .  The Council of Representatives should be responsible only for ultimately holding the CMC 
broadly accountable to the Iraqi public, and the Government should be expressly required to respect the 
independence of the CMC .
2	 	Each	of	 the	 terms	 “regulate”	 and	 “license”	has	 a	 specific	 legal	meaning	 in	 this	 context,	 and	 any	 translation	 should	
attempt	to	capture	these	meanings	as	accurately	as	possible.
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Appendix	C:	 
Model	IECI	Regulation	on	Media	During	Elections
Preamble
[CPA Order number 92 of 31 May 2004] established the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) 
to be the exclusive electoral authority in Iraq .  It is an independent and autonomous, non-partisan, neutral 
and	professional	government	office,	with	the	authority	to	promulgate,	implement,	and	enforce	regulations,	
rules and procedures with the full force of law in connection with elections in Iraq .
This regulation elaborates on the legal framework already in place, and is issued by the IECI in consequence 
of the authorizations given in [CPA Order number 92, 96 and 97] .
Section 1 
Terminology
1.1.	 	“Campaign	Period”	means	the	period	prior	to	an	election,	defined	by	the	IECI	as	the	period	during	
which the Political Entities and Coalitions may conduct their election campaigns .
1.2.	 	“Coalition”	means	a	group	of	Political	Entities	that	has	submitted	a	 joint	 list	of	candidates	for	an	
election .
1 .3 .  “IECI” mean the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, as established by [CPA Order number 
92] .
1 .4 .  “Media” means entities that provide news, information or entertainment to the general public, or 
on	a	subscription	basis,	using	means	including,	but	not	limited	to,	printed	material,	film,	video,	
audio, recordings or communications services .
1 .5 .  “CMC” means the Communications and Media Commission of Iraq, as established by [CPA Order 
number 65];
1 .6 .  “CMC Election Code” means the Code for Media During Elections issued by the CMC on 14 
December 2004 .
1.7.	 	“Political	Entity”	means	any	organisation,	as	defined	under	[CPA	Order	number	97,	section	2	and	
IECI	Regulation	[03/2004]].
Section 2 
Regulation of Media by the 
Communications and Media Commission
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As	is	authorized	and	required	by	[CPA	Order	number	65],	the	CMC	shall	draft	and	publish,	in	consultation	
with the IECI, a code of conduct that will be legally enforceable by the CMC with respect to all Media in 
Iraq during any and all Campaign Periods (the “CMC Election Code”) .  
Section 3 
[Political Advertising]
[All political advertising by Political Entities and Coalitions, and their candidates, shall be accurate and 
fair.		No	Political	Entity	or	Coalition,	nor	any	of	their	candidates,	shall	engage	in	distortion,	falsification	
or misrepresentation with respect to political advertising .]  [Note:  This may be covered elsewhere in IECI 
regulations, and thus may not be necessary here .]
Section 4 
Misuse of Media by Political Entities 
4 .1  Political Entities and Coalitions that, and their candidates who, participate in violations of the 
CMC Election Code shall be subject to sanctions by the IECI .
4 .2  Political Entities and Coalitions, and their candidates, may not circumvent the CMC Election Code 
by using foreign or other Media not under the jurisdiction of the CMC .  Accordingly, Political 
Entities and Coalitions that, and their candidates who, use Media not under the jurisdiction of the 
CMC in a way that would violate the CMC Election Code if such Media were under the jurisdiction 
of the CMC shall be subject to sanctions by the IECI .
Section 5 
Media Presence at IECI Premises
5 .1  Members of the media who wish to enter IECI premises such as the national, regional and 
governorate	elections	offices	must	first	seek	permission	from	the	person	in	that	office	designated	
for media liaison .
5 .2  Members of the media who wish to enter registration centers, polling centers, and counting centers 
must seek IECI media accreditation, which will be issued according to procedures to be developed 
by the IECI . 
5.3	 	No	photographs	or	filming	of	anyone	attending	such	premises	may	be	made	without	the	express	
permission	of	 those	 individuals	being	filmed	or	photographed.	 	Even	with	 the	permission	of	a	
voter,	the	film	or	photograph	may	not	reveal	the	intention	of	a	voter	in	the	polling	booth.
Section 6 
Violations of this Code
6 .1  In case of violation of Sections 3, 4 or 5 of this regulation, the IECI may apply any of the [following 
sanctions:		[______________]/sanctions	available	to	it	under	the	law].
6 .2  Any sanctions applied pursuant to this regulation shall be proportionate to the violation 
committed.
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Section 7 
Entrance in Effect
7.1	 This	regulation	enters	into	force	on	[__].
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Appendix	D:	 
South	African	Media	Development	Fund	(SAMDEF)
Based on SAMDEF’s 2004 annual report, and from video  
and text on the company’s website (www .samdef .com) .
Principal	Activity
SAMDEF	 provides	 development	 finance	 and	 credit	 facility	 lines	 to	 emergent	 independent	 media	 in	
Southern Africa to help them grow and become self-sustaining .
Fundraising
In 2004, SAMDEF negotiated a three-year revolving grant from the Open Society Initiative of Southern 
Africa	(OSISA)	in	the	sum	of	USD$6	million.		It	also	obtains	financial	support	from	the	Communication	
Assistance Foundation (CAF), now known as Free Voice and based in the Netherlands .  SAMDEF’s income 
for 2004 included a USD$1 .4 million grant from OSISA and a USD$61,000 grant from CAF .
Organizational	Structure
SAMDEF was incorporated in the Republic of Botswana on 27 April 2000 as a company limited by guarantee . 
It was previously a company limited by shares .  SAMDEF, which is owned by the Media Institute of 
Southern Africa (MISA) Trust Fund Board, had a twelve-member board of directors and ten employees 
as of 31 March 2004 .  SAMDEF’s cooperating partners include: CAF, OSI, USAID, Interfund, Netherlands 
Institute	of	Southern	Africa	(NIZA),	Media	Development	Loan	Fund	(MDLF)	and	PTA	Bank.
Loan	Management
In March 2004, SAMDEF reported giving USD$1 .3 million in long-term loans to various organizations at 
interests rates of between 10 percent and 16 percent on the outstanding capital balance .  Its gross loans of 
USD$3 .2 million are divided between media outlets in Botswana (the highest concentration of gross loans), 
Zambia,	Zimbabwe,	Tanzania	and	the	rest	of	Southern	Africa	(the	lowest	concentration	of	gross	 loans).	
The loans have varying repayment periods .
Selecting	Loan	Recipients
SAMDEF provides loans to entrepreneurs who wish to create a media start-up or consolidate existing 
media businesses .  Duly registered independent media entities and citizens, residents or partners of 
Southern African developing countries can qualify for loans .  Outside proposals that show prospects for 
viability are also considered . 
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Applicants may receive loans, debentures, equity, quasi-equity preference shares, loan guarantees, 
syndication or co-funding, referrals and investment advice .
The entire loan application process usually takes no longer than three months and involves the following 
steps:
1 .  An initial concept paper detailing the proposed business is sent to SAMDEF investment 
officers.		This	concept	paper	describes	the	type	of	media	business	proposed,	whether	it	is	a	
start-up or expansion project, the location of the investment, the amount of loans sought and 
the backgrounds of the key applicants .
2 .  Upon receipt of the concept paper, the SAMDEF investments team carries out an initial 
appraisal and gives its response to the applicant in seven days .
3.	 	If	the	concept	needs	to	be	pursued	further,	a	business	proposal	is	requested	with	specific	
guidelines, depending on the media sector chosen .  At this stage, the process requires a due 
diligence study, which may call for additional information from the applicant .  Site visits 
referral checks are conducted at this stage .
4 .  A comprehensive internal proposal complied by the SAMDEF investments team is then 
presented	to	the	company’s	Investments	Committee	for	final	approval.		Applicants	may	be	
invited to defend and or explain their proposal .  Appropriate guarantees, collateral securities 
and contributions are usually requested from the applicant to secure the investment .
Examples	of	Supported	Media	Outlets
Mmegi .  Established in 1984, the newspaper purports to be the only daily independent newspaper in 
Botswana .  Over the past ten years, Mmegi (www .mmegi .bw) won the Institute of Bankers’ “Newspaper 
of the year Award” nine times .  With the support of SAMDEF, the newspaper reportedly moved from a 
weekly to a daily and increased its circulation by 25 percent .
Yarona FM .  Yarona 106 .6 FM (www .yaronafm .co .bw) came into the Botswana market in 1999 .  SAMDEF 
invested and bought a 25 percent stake in the radio station .  SAMDEF helped Yarona build its corporate 
structure.		It	is	the	first	privately	owned	commercial	radio	station	to	go	on	air	in	the	country.
SOICO, Lda.	 	Based	 in	Mozambique,	SOICO	is	 the	first	 independent	media	group	in	 the	country.	 	The	
company has invested in television, advertising, radio and a newspaper . SAMDEF has gone where other 
traditional	banks	have	not	by	investing	in	SOICO.		It	has	helped	the	media	group	upgrade	its	software	and	
television studio equipment, which has improved its satellite connection .
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Ethno-Sectarian	Violence,	Political	Islam,	Public	
Advocacy,	and	Globalization
A recurring theme in debates on the future of Iraq is that the state is facing an imminent civil war among ethnic 
Kurds, Turkmens and Arabs, and among the Sunni and Shi’a Muslim sects.  As tensions continue to escalate, 
the Iraqi media will play a crucial role in these developments. The pluralization of a private media sector in post-
Ba’athist Iraq has served as a positive development in Iraq’s post-war transition, yet this has also allowed for the 
emergence of local media that are forming along ethno-sectarian lines. The Iraqi media have evolved to a stage where 
they now have the capability of reinforcing the country’s ethno-sectarian divisions.  This policy paper examines the 
evolution and current state of Iraq’s media and offers recommendations to local Iraqi actors, as well as regional and 
international organizations, as to how the media can counter employment of negative images and stereotypes of other 
ethno-sectarian communities and influence public attitudes in overcoming such tensions in Iraqi society. 
Introduction 
Overview 
Few analyses of the Iraqi media have been conducted despite the emergence of hundreds of newspapers 
and	several	 satellite	 channels	 in	 the	nation,	 in	 stark	 contrast	 to	 the	five	 state	owned	dailies	and	single	
satellite channel that existed during the Ba’ath era . This policy paper addresses the need for a proactive 
analysis	of	the	Iraqi	media	and	their	portrayal	of	ethno-sectarian	differences	in	Iraqi	society.	
Before	offering	policy	recommendations,	 it	 is	 important	to	describe	the	media	scene	itself:	What	media	
outlets	are	owned	by	political	ethno-sectarian	factions?		How	are	ethno-sectarian	differences	and	conflicts,	
both	 rhetorical	 and	 violent,	 represented	 in	 the	 Iraqi	media?	Do	media	 outlets	 exacerbate	 Iraq’s	 ethno-
sectarian	 relations?	 	Are	 there	 any	 Iraqi	media	 outlets	 seeking	 to	 address	 these	 relations	 in	 a	 positive	
manner?		What	kind	of	programs	are	Iraqis	watching?	What	efforts	are	there	to	provide	a	space	for	the	
public	to	communicate	and	express	its	grievances?	Do	the	media	try	to	produce	local	entertainment,	as	
compared to relying on foreign entertainment for Iraqis to “escape” the grim realities of daily life in their 
country?	What	recommendations	can	be	made	to	ensure	that	Iraq’s	media	serve	a	constructive	role	in	its	
post-war	dynamics,	rather	than	exacerbating	the	state’s	current	internal	tensions?	
Observers	of	the	situation	in	Iraq	often	predict	the	nation	faces	an	imminent	civil	war	among	ethnic	Kurds	
and Arabs, and among the Sunni and Shi’a Muslim sects, while others argue this civil war has already 
begun.	 Differences	 between	 various	 ethnic	 and	 sectarian	 groups	 have	 been	 ever-present	 in	 Iraq,	 but	
they	were	rarely	articulated	in	official,	public	debate,	nor	used	as	a	basis	by	politicians	or	religious	and	
community leaders to criticize the others . Even in Ba’athist Iraq, while members of every community may 
have	suffered	discrimination,	at	least	the	media	rarely	employed	the	terms	“Shi’a,”	“Sunni”	and	“Kurd”	
in a negative manner as it would harm national unity . Following the 2003 Iraq war, the emerging media 
mentioned such ethnic and sectarian terms for Iraq’s people, but in the context of calling for national unity . 
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However, the debates prior to the adoption of the Iraqi Constitution in October 2005 and the December 
2005	election	of	a	permanent	Iraqi	Assembly	marked	an	emerging	trend	in	Iraq’s	politics—a	divisive	ethnic	
and sectarian discourse that has now proliferated into the media . 
Following the February 2006 bombing of the revered Shi’a Al-Askariyya shrine in the city of Samarra, 
a spiral of violence consumed the center of Iraq, including Baghdad where sectarian killings between 
Arab Sunni and Arab Shi’a groups have become daily phenomena .  These tensions manifest themselves 
in the political sphere, as certain Arab Shi’a parties have advocated a federal entity in the predominantly 
Shi’a	 south	as	a	means	of	 separating	 themselves	 from	 the	violence-ridden	center.	Another	 conflict	 that	
receives	scant	attention	is	that	of	the	future	of	the	oil-rich	city	of	Kirkuk,	contested	by	Arabs,	Kurds	and	
Turkmens.	This	conflict,	often	marked	by	violent	clashes,	also	represents	itself	in	the	political	sphere,	as	
Kurdish parties have called for placing Kirkuk under their federal jurisdiction, which Arab and Turkmen 
communities oppose .  
In post-war Iraq, private Iraq media, with ownership in the hands of competing political factions, have 
emerged,	 reflecting	 the	 country’s	 conflicting	 ethno-sectarian	 agendas.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 media	 have	
also emerged independent of Iraq’s political mosaic, and seek to provide a public space for education, 
entertainment and cathartic release for the daily violence that dominates Iraqi public life .   
The	media	have	taken	on	a	public	advocacy	role	as	well,	pressing	policy	makers	to	address	deficiencies	and	
shortcomings in providing security and infrastructure needs by highlighting these problems and giving 
Iraqi citizens a platform to express their views . Ethno-sectarian channels conduct public advocacy as well, 
but primarily on behalf of their communities .    
The media in Iraq cannot isolate themselves from global trends in international media, and Iraqis can watch 
media produced outside of the region, ranging from the British series “Mr . Bean” to cartoons, music shows 
and	films	produced	in	the	Arab	World	or	the	United	States.	The	desire	for	Iraqis	to	produce	content	that	
reflects	their	aspirations	has	resulted	in	the	adaptation	of	several	foreign	program	formats,	such	as	reality	
TV, to a local Iraqi context . These Iraqi entertainment programs can provide an alternative to the “Iraq” 
that the Iraqis usually witness on TV; that of the news depicting unrelenting violence in their country . The 
literature	on	conflict	resolution	and	the	media	stresses	that	entertainment	programming	is	one	method	to	
reduce tensions in a deeply divided society . Both state and private media can play important roles in using 
entertainment for this goal .  
Though this study focuses on the content of local Iraqi media, regional channels are also important to 
the story . Although data on the rate of consumption of local Iraqi media or regional channels are not yet 
available, there were general observable trends in how the Iraqis consumed media based on my experience 
in the country .  Satellite dishes were forbidden under the Ba’athist government, and many Iraqis sought to 
purchase	them	after	the	war	ended	in	2003.	At	this	time,	Al-Jazeera	and	Al-Arabiyya	were	the	only	outlets	
for regional news free of state control and ironically, for domestic Iraqi news . Due to Iran’s proximity, the 
Iranian Arabic language Al-Alam was able to broadcast terrestrially into Iraq and could be picked up by 
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television sets without the need for a costly satellite dish . By 2004 and 2005 two trends were emerging 
in Iraq vis-à-vis the regional channels . First, certain Iraqis, including those politicians in the transitional 
government,	were	offended	that	Al-Jazeera	and	Al-Arabiyya	referred	to	the	Iraqi	insurgents	as	the	“Iraqi	
resistance” (al-muqawwama al-‘iraqiyya) thus bestowing on them some sort of regional legitimacy . Second, 
Iraqis	desired	news	and	entertainment	created	by	Iraqis,	reflecting	their	concerns	and	desires.		
Iraqi	channels	proliferated	within	the	period	of	2004	to	2005,	but	were	often	unprofessional	in	terms	of	
news coverage, forcing many Iraqis to continue to depend on the regional channels for news . At the same 
time, a number of Iraqis were also growing tired of the ethno-sectarian nature of the Iraqi media, and 
preferred	getting	 their	 information	 from	 these	Arab	 satellite	 channels,	which	did	not	have	 the	“ethno-
sectarian” commentary that usually accompanied the news on Iraqi channels .  
A professional and independent media that can allow views expressed by all of Iraq’s communities is 
an important step towards establishing a viable democracy . Nevertheless, in a country relatively new to 
independent media, freedom of expression can be abused .1 This paper concludes that Iraq’s ethno-sectarian 
media	are	providing	the	psychological	groundwork	for	bitter	divisiveness	and	conflict,	with	one	channel	
already making direct exhortations for violence against other Iraqi communities . It also concludes that the 
media need to be addressed for the sake of Iraq’s long-term stability . Media divided along ethno-sectarian 
lines have the potential to further the gap between Iraq’s communities and weaken any kind of national 
belonging . Whether the state of Iraq will survive division is debatable, but the nation is already on a course 
of partition in terms of identity, helped by media which encourage this trend . 
It	is	urgent	to	address	these	matters	before	more	political	factions	decide	to	use	their	media	as	mouthpieces	
to	 exacerbate	 the	 conflict,	whipping	up	 ethnic	 and	 sectarian	 feelings	 or	 even	directing	 the	 conflict.	 So	
far, most political factions have used their media to stress unity among Iraq’s communities, but they 
nevertheless	have	the	potential	to	instigate	conflict	with	these	means	if	it	suits	their	interests.	The	ultimate	
aim of this policy paper is to address this growing problem in Iraq: how the media exacerbate cleavages 
in	Iraqi	society,	and	how,	rather,	it	can	be	used	to	facilitate	a	positive	attitude	in	bridging	the	differences	
among its communities .
Methodology 
An	overview	and	assessment	of	the	media	in	Iraq	is	needed,	and	it	is	crucial	to	reflect	the	literature	of	media	
in	other	deeply-divided	societies.	This	policy	paper	will	examine	ownership	and	financing	of	the	various	
media and how this is linked with the ethno-sectarian discourse emerging in Iraq .  It is based on hours of 
viewing the programs of Iraqi satellite channels that are consumed by Iraqi audiences,2 supplemented by 
interviews with Iraqi journalists and questionnaires delivered to the channels .  According to various surveys, 
more than ninety percent of Iraqis receive most of their information, whether it is news or entertainment, 
from satellite TV stations .  In one statement found in a report on the Iraqi media, “Many people do not buy 
newspapers because the satellite channels communicate every single piece of news .”3 The proliferation of 
1	 	An	important	study	in	this	subject	in	the	Balkans	is	Izabella	Karlowicz’s	“The	Difficult	Birth	of	the	Fourth	Estate:	Media	
Development	 and	Democracy	Assistance	 in	 Post-Conflict	 Balkans,”	 in	Miklos	 Sukosd	 and	 Peter	 Bajomi-Lazar	 eds.,	
Reinventing Media: Media Policy Reform in East-Central Europe (Budapest: Central European University Center for 
Policy Studies, 2003) .
2  For those who can read Arabic, a link to all the Iraqi channels (and their programs) discussed in this policy paper can be 
found	on	the	project’s	website	http://www.policy.hu/almarashi/.	Otherwise	detailed	English	summaries	of	these	satellite	
channels and their programs can be obtained via BBC Monitoring or the Open Source Center (OSC) . 
3  International Media Support, “Media Development in Post-War Iraq Report,” April 2003 . 
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Iraqi channels that broadcast by satellite also demonstrates another important factor: media owners are 
sending their messages to local Iraqi audiences, the Arab world and the large Iraqi diaspora, which still 
provides	financial	support	for	many	of	Iraq’s	political	parties.			
 This policy report is based on four sets of data: 
1 .   An investigation of which independent and political factions own the TV media in Iraq 
(with a brief overview of their print and radio media) .   
2 .   Questionnaires distributed to Iraqi media in coordination with the Stanhope Centre for 
Communications Policy Research in London .
3 .   An analysis of programming content dealing with entertainment, locally produced and 
imported .    
4.		 	A	discourse/content	analysis of programming of the stations deemed as having a potential 
for	affecting	ethno-sectarian	tensions.	
The last set of data provides most of the information for this policy paper . Examining the programs and 
their content helps determine the priorities and audiences for these stations .  The analysis examines media 
content	beginning	with	a	national	event	that	had	ramifications	for	all	of	Iraq’s	communities:	the	bombing	
of	the	Shi’a	Muslim	Al-Askariyya	shrine	in	the	city	of	Samarra,	in	February	2006.	Iraqis	attribute	the	spark	
in	intense	inter-communal	conflict	in	Iraq	to	this	event,	and	at	this	juncture	a	sample	of	prominent	Iraqi	
media representing all societal groups had emerged .  
The programming content of various Iraqi satellite channels was analyzed by “frames” the stations used . 
In	the	context	of	this	paper,	I	have	used	Snow	and	Benford’s	definition	of	a	frame:	“an	interpretive	schemata	
that	 simplifies	 and	 condenses	 the	 ‘world	 out	 there’	 by	 selectively	 punctuating	 and	 encoding	 objects,	
situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment .”4 By 
examining satellite media channels in Iraq, the analysis seeks to determine how prominent Iraqi media, 
both political and independent, frame ethno-sectarian violence .      
The Target Audience 
The state of the Iraqi media provides the need for recommendations to address three areas: media 
regulation, media education, and media institutions . The policy recommendations are directed to actors 
on the local and international level .   
On the local level, this report seeks to address the Iraqi regulatory body, the Communications and Media 
Commission of Iraq (CMC), as well as the Iraqi National Assembly and policy makers involved with 
the media . On a societal level, this paper addresses educational facilities, such as Baghdad University’s 
Department of Communications, as well as journalist associations in Iraq . It also addresses international 
donors, including foreign ministries and NGOs who have had experience in providing aid to media in 
post-conflict	societies,	as	well	as	organizations	such	as	UNDP	and	UNESCO,	which	have	experience	with	
the Iraqi media .   
4  D .A . Snow and R . Benford, “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest,” in A .D . Morris and C .M . Mueller, eds ., Frontiers in 
Social Movement Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 137 .  
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This policy paper also targets an audience of policy makers and non-governmental organizations who 
simply seek to gain a broader understanding of the underlying dynamics of the ongoing violence in Iraq . 
To	this	general	audience	interested	in	Iraqi	affairs,	this	report	seeks	to	demonstrate	that	violence	in	Iraq	is	
not simply fought on the streets, but is represented in the tele-visual and thus socio-cultural sphere . In this 
regard, the paper demonstrates how the media’s public advocacy programs serve as an alternative means 
of political participation in Iraq, and how various forms of entertainment serve as alternatives to violent 
media, as well as a possible means of overcoming divisions in Iraqi society .  
Defining	the	Problem	of	Media	and	Conflict		
The	media	have	the	capability	of	affecting	vast	audiences	and	in	a	time	of	conflict	become	important	actors,	
at	 times	 on	 par	with	 the	 actual	 combatants	 themselves.	Media	 often	 serve	 as	 a	means	 of	 transmitting	
hostility, directly or indirectly, whether it is between states or ethnic groups, and can exacerbate tensions 
by	spreading	misperceptions	or	exaggerations.	The	question	that	first	needs	to	be	answered	is	whether	
conflict	media,	or	in	other	words	media	that	engender	conflict,	can	emerge	from	within	the	Iraqi	context.		
According	to	the	conflict	resolution	literature,	the	constructive	transformation	of	a	conflict	can	only	occur	if	
it	affects	the	mentalities	of	either	an	individual	or	a	society.	The	media	have	the	potential	to	play	a	significant	
role	 in	 this	 transformation,	by	building	 confidence	among	 the	parties	 and	 challenging	misperceptions.	
However,	this	is	the	exception	rather	than	the	norm.	While	a	review	of	the	literature	on	media	and	conflict	
resolution (a sample is provided in the “References” section) demonstrates isolated cases where the media 
have	had	a	constructive	role	in	conflicts,	in	most	instances	the	media	have	exacerbated	conflict	rather	than	
resolved it, with the situation in Rwanda illustrating one of the most extreme scenarios .    
Have	the	media	in	Iraq	reached	a	point	where	they	can	be	characterized	as	conflict	media?	To	answer	this	
question I have appropriated a model from the Rwanda context, as that is the case that has most vividly 
demonstrated	the	role	of	media	and	conflict.	In	the	1990s,	Radio	Rwanda,	a	state-controlled	station,	was	used	
by the Hutu-dominated government to mobilize troops and ordinary citizens against the Tutsi Rwandan 
Patriotic Front . At the same time, another radio entity was emerging, backed by the Rwandan President’s 
close circles and extremist Hutu militias and practicing undisguised hate-speech against the Tutsi . Radio 
Télévision Libre des Mille Collines	(RTLM)	emerged	as	a	private	radio	station,	financed	by	individuals	who	
had high level positions in the government before and during the genocide . RTLM played a direct role in 
the killings of moderate Hutus and Tutsis by broadcasting information on where to manage road-blocks; 
identifying individuals who were supposed to be eliminated; providing address and license plate details 
for	these	individuals,	and	asking	listeners	to	give	information	to	help	find	specific	persons;	and	asking	
Hutus to join their militias . The relation between Radio Rwanda, whose owners, editors and journalists 
were	also	involved	in	the	establishment	of	RTLM,	has	some	ramifications	for	the	Iraqi	context.	Extremist	
elements	in	Rwanda	were	able	to	infiltrate	the	official	state	media,	while	keeping	their	own	private	media	
as well .5 I do not want to suggest that a Rwanda-like genocide can occur in Iraq, but rather seek to illustrate 
the structural similarities between the media in both countries . 
5  Mel McNulty, “Media Ethnicization and the International Response to War and Genocide in Rwanda,” in T . Allen and J . 
Seaton, eds ., The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence (New	York:	Zed	Books,	1999),	274-
276 .
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Four factors are developed in an International Media Support (IMS) Report to explain the emergence of a 
conflict	media	in	Rwanda.6	These	four	factors	can	be	adapted	to	any	scenario	where	conflict	and	media	are	
intertwined, and I have adopted the IMS model for Iraq by placing the factors in sequential order . In other 
words,	I	argue	that	a	process	needs	to	occur	for	media	to	evolve	into	conflict	media.	The	four	factors	are:
1 .  A strong ideology  
2.		 Control	over	a	mass	medium/media	 
3 .  Psychological preparation to hate  
4 .  A call to violence 
This policy paper seeks to address where the Iraqi media fall within this framework and what 
recommendations	can	be	made	to	prevent	the	Iraqi	media	from	being	transformed	into	a	conflict	media.
The	first	factor,	a	strong	ideology,	is	propagated	by	prominent	academics,	journalists	or	politicians	who	
develop theories of their ethnic or sectarian group . Such theories in the media portray their group as 
a “stronger race” and “a race with a glorious past,” or as “victims” who have to unite in order to deal 
with a threat posed by other groups so that they will not be “eliminated” from the political process or 
“annihilated”	from	within	the	state	altogether.	 In	the	final	case,	violence	conducted	by	one	community	
against	the	other	is	portrayed	as	a	“matter	of	self-defense.”		
Once an ideology is framed, there is a need to articulate it, which brings in the second factor: control over 
strong	mass	media	to	disseminate	the	message.	According	to	the	conflict	resolution	literature,	differences	
between	ethnic	and	sectarian	groups	are	not	in	themselves	a	precursor	to	conflict.	Rather,	it	is	the	leaders	
or political movements representing the ethnic and sectarian groups who mobilize their communities to 
“gear	up”	for	a	conflict.	 In	conflict	and	post-conflict	environments,	 journalists	and	editors	are	 in	many	
instances non-professionals whose priority is advocating an agenda rather than informing the public . The 
spread	of	a	conflict	media	through	control	over	mass	media	is	a	key	step	in	conflict	escalation.		
The	third	step,	after	a	faction	consolidates	both	an	ideology	and	control	over	a	media	outlet,	is	the	most	
crucial.	 	 It	 is	 this	 step—the	psychological	preparation	 to	hate,	which	seeks	 to	prepare	 the	audience	 for	
a	 violent	 conflict—where	 the	media	 are	 transformed	 into	 a	 tool	 of	 conflict.	 Such	 preparations	 include	
misinformation, as an uninformed audience is easier to manipulate . Usually rumors or conspiracies 
are presented as the opinion of the “ordinary man” of that particular ethnic or sectarian group . This 
preparation also seeks to sow division, by framing peace with other groups as “impossible” and framing 
those who seek reconciliation as “traitors .” This step also seeks to use demonizing frames of the opponent 
by dehumanizing the other group or groups .  
The	fourth	factor	in	the	emergent	conflict	media	begins	when	media	outlets	make	direct	exhortations	to	
violence . The media emerge with the omni-presence of violent frames . “Enemy,” “accomplice,” “traitor,” 
“massacre,” and “murder” are examples of violent frames; lists of killed victims are presented as “victories,” 
while the perpetrators of massacres would be deemed as “heroes,” which would encourage even more 
killings . 
We	now	turn	to	the	Iraq	media	scene	to	analyze	its	evolution	in	terms	of	the	conflict-related	evaluative	
grid . 
6  Monique Alexis and Ines Mpambara, “IMS Assessment Mission: The Rwanda Media Experience from the Genocide,” 
International Media Support Report, 2003 .
 74 
  The Dynamics of Iraq’s Media        
Ownership, Programming and Content in Iraqi Media  
Ethno-sectarian “media empires” have formed in Iraq and are quite a pervasive element in Iraq’s Fourth 
Estate . The extent of these media empires is illustrated in the appendix, to demonstrate how powerful 
media have coalesced around ethno-political groups in Iraq who have print, radio and TV communications 
at their disposal . Ethnic factions among the Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens, and religious-sectarian factions 
among the Sunni, Shi’a and Christians all have their own means of communicating to their ethno-sectarian 
constituencies in Iraq and abroad in the Iraqi diaspora . Independent media, with no ethno-sectarian 
affiliation,	exist,	but	do	not	have	access	to	the	funds	that	the	political	parties	can	provide.			If	Iraq	is	to	truly	
consolidate democratic foundations, its media will need to include objective and independent outlets that 
represent	a	broad	spectrum	of	Iraq’s	society.	By	dividing	Iraq’s	media	into	five	categories,	I	seek	to	assess	
if the Iraqi media are furthering democratic consolidation or becoming an arena for the political ethno-
sectarian divisions in the country .  I categorized the Iraqi media into the following groups:  
1 . Media owned by the Iraqi state  
2.		 Media	owned	by	political	Islamist	groups	(religious/sectarian	factions)	 
3 .  Media owned by ethnic political parties  
4 .  Media owned by entities calling for violence 
5.		 	Media	owned	by	independent	entities	The	findings	of	this	policy	paper	are	based	on	the	
programs and media content of a selection of Iraqi satellite channels that represent each of 
these	five	groups.	For	each	of	these,	the	programming	and	content	of	news,	political,	socio-
cultural, religious and entertainment programs are analyzed . 
In	 each	 of	 these	 five	 categories	 of	media,	 I	 examine	 the	 channel’s	 representation	 of	 issues	 of	 ethnicity	
and	portrayal	 of	 differences	 between	Arabs,	Kurds	 and	Turkmen.	Additionally,	 the	 coverage	 of	 Islam,	
particularly political Islam in Iraq, is examined to determine whether the media’s portrayals exacerbate 
sectarian Shi’a-Sunni divisions . The channels are also analyzed by how they report on violence in Iraq and 
whether the channels encourage violence among Iraq’s various groups, or whether they seek to bridge the 
differences.	
The channels are also examined as to whether they may provide an alternative space for overcoming 
differences	amongst	Iraq’s	divisions.	This	section	examines	how	some	channels	provide	a	space	for	civic	
involvement	in	political	affairs	through	various	talk	shows	and	call-in	programs.	In	this	area,	channels	often	
serve a public advocacy role, by providing a means to present the citizens’ demands to the government . 
Finally, I examine how the channels appropriate foreign genres in a local context and how they contribute 
to democratic consolidation or ethno-sectarian division . It will also examine which channels are resistant 
to foreign programming, and which import foreign programs, both political and entertainment .  
State-Owned Media 
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq established the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) .  In its initial 
phases the Network included a terrestrial TV channel, two radio stations, and the Al-Sabah newspaper . 
The	 IMN	 faced	 two	 challenges.	The	first	was	 to	demonstrate	 that	 it	 could	 function	as	 a	public	 service	
broadcaster, serving as the voice of all Iraqis .  The second was to establish a satellite channel that had the 
broadcast infrastructure and lively and informative programming to compete with the regional satellite 
channels being watched in Iraq, such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyya, and the Iranian-based Arabic language 
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channel, Al-Alam . In this regard, the IMN was restructured into the Al-Iraqiyya network and expanded to 
two terrestrial TV channels and the Al-Iraqiyya satellite channel . The satellite channel began transmissions 
in	May	2003.	While	it	was	first	broadcast	from	the	morning	to	the	evening,	it	now	broadcasts	24	hours	a	
day.	It	is	the	only	national	public	service	channel;	its	financing	comes	from	the	coffers	of	the	Iraqi	state,	and	
the Ministry of Finance approves the channel’s budget .   
The	development	of	Al-Iraqiyya	reflected	the	evolution	of	Iraq’s	post-war	political	process.		In	its	initial	
phases, the channel was used by the CPA as a means to communicate with the Iraqis, and thus considered a 
tool of “American propaganda .” It eventually established itself as a channel free of U .S . editorial interference, 
but	then	began	to	reflect	the	agenda	of	the	interim	Iraqi	government	of	Iyad	Allawi,	who	attempted	to	
co-opt the channel to support his party in the January 2005 election . Given that the current government 
in Iraq is dominated by an alliance of Shi’a Islamist groups, known as the United Iraqi Alliance, and an 
alliance of ethnic Kurdish groups, known as the Kurdish Coalition, according to its critics the station has 
an inherent Shi’a-Kurdish bias . In the past, the station rarely showed news conferences of leading Sunni 
Islamist political parties, and ethnic Turkmen complained of a pro-Kurdish bias . The station has tried to 
address these issues by allowing more of its content to be devoted to Arab Sunni and Turkmen guests, who 
use the channel to express their grievances, if not criticize the government directly . Since Iraq’s majority 
population	is	Shi’a,	the	station	reflects	this	sectarian	group’s	majority	status	by	featuring	the	Shi’a	call	to	
prayer .7  
In	its	depictions	of	violence	in	Iraq,	the	station	reflects	a	pro-government	line.		For	example,	the	content	
of Al-Iraqiyya’s programming tends to feature mostly pro-government frames that stress “optimism” in 
the progress being made in “reconstruction” and “security .” The operations of the Iraqi security forces are 
highlighted, giving viewers the impression that they are taking an active role in quelling insurgent and 
sectarian	violence,	a	key	frame	that	seeks	to	buttress	the	legitimacy	of	the	Iraqi	state	itself.	The	channel	
usually has access to live footage of Iraqi government military campaigns, which serves as an additional 
reminder to Al-Iraqiyya’s audience that the state is in fact taking action against the violence in Iraq .  Members 
of the Iraqi security forces killed in action are referred to as “martyrs” (shuhuda’) .  The international 
(predominantly American) forces in Iraq are usually referred to as “Coalition” or “Multi-national Forces” 
and the insurgents are usually called “terrorists” (irhabiun) .8  Supposedly random interviews with people 
on the street are designed to give the impression of public condemnation of the “terrorists’” activities in 
Iraq . Al-Iraqiyya also seeks to frame state violence as legitimate by featuring public service announcements 
calling upon the Iraqi public to volunteer information on the “terrorists .”   
Al-Iraqiyya’s entertainment programming also seeks to portray the state’s active role in cracking down on 
violence.	The	show	“Terrorism	in	the	Hands	of	Justice,”	is	filmed	live	in	a	courtroom	setting	where	those	
accused of taking part in “acts of terrorism” deliver live confessions . The program shows confessions 
of	 insurgents	who	admit	 that	 they	are	working	for	financial	motives,	 in	other	words	 to	depict	 them	as	
“criminals”	opposed	to	a	“legitimate	national	resistance.”	However	the	show	has	ramifications	for	Iraq’s	
inter-communal violence . One commentator writes about the show, “On one episode an interrogator 
7	 	The	crucial	difference	between	Shi’a	and	Sunni	call	to	prayer	is	the	inclusion	of	an	additional	line	referring	to	Ali	bin	Abi	
Talib,	the	first	Shi’a	Muslim	Imam.			
8  Those taking part in the violence in Iraq against Coalition forces, the Iraqi government and civilians have been referred 
to	as	either	“resistance	fighters,”	“terrorists”	or	“foreign	jihadists.”		For	the	sake	of	this	article,	the	term	used	most	often	
in the media on Iraq, “insurgent” has been employed .  The term is by no means neutral however .  It was the same term 
that British authorities in the twenties used to refer to those Iraqis taking part in the 1920 revolt against the UK’s role in 
the Mandate of Iraq . 
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accused	the	members	of	important	Sunni	tribes—the	Juburi,	Janabi,	and	Duleimi—of	all	being	terrorists.	
The show only heightened Sunni fears that the Shi’a security forces were targeting them en masse .”9
Al-Iraqiyya also accuses its competition, the other regional satellite channels, of stimulating the ongoing 
violence in Iraq, a direct acknowledgement by the state’s public broadcaster of the power of TV to incite 
violence . In January 2006, the channel reported that the “suggestive material” of “certain” satellite channels 
had the potential to incite viewers to “conduct criminal and terrorist acts .” Al-Iraqiyya did not specify 
whether it was referring to pan-Arab channels Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyya, or local channels inside of 
Iraq . The station’s news program interviewed Iraqi psychologists who stated the other channels had the 
capability	of	influencing	its	viewers	to	conduct	violence.			
Although	Al-Iraqiyya	features	the	Shi’a	call	 for	prayer,	 the	station	attempts	to	minimize	the	differences	
between Iraq’s Sunni and Shi’a by broadcasting live coverage of Friday sermons where religious leaders 
from both communities preach against the nation’s sectarian divide and stress “Iraqi unity .” It also holds 
televised meetings between Shi’a and Sunni leaders as a means of inter-sectarian dialogue . Even music 
videos are imbued with lyrics and images with Iraqi nationalist themes .   
Al-Iraqiyya also provides a space for Iraq’s citizens to interact and communicate with politicians and 
the government, providing an alternative for the acts of violence that are in themselves protests against 
the Iraqi state . Shows such as “The Iraqi Podium” have a live call-in segment where viewers can direct 
questions	 about	political	 affairs	 to	 the	guests,	 ranging	 from	various	 civil	 society	 leaders	 to	 journalists,	
academics	 and	 intellectuals.	 The	 program	 “Open	 Encounter”	 hosts	 government	 officials	 and	 political	
leaders to discuss elections, military operations and the agendas of various Iraqi political parties, with 
studio audience participation . Corruption, a topic rarely discussed on state channels in the Arab world, 
is	addressed	on	programs	such	as	“You	and	the	Official.”	Other	programs	deal	with	local	socio-economic	
issues: in “The People’s Concerns,” the viewer can phone in to express opinions on unemployment, as well 
as government corruption . “Al-Iraqiyya with You” serves as a forum for public advocacy where the hosts 
of	the	program	seek	to	capture	on	film	the	poverty	and	unemployment	among	the	Iraqis	and	then	call	
upon the Iraqi government to address these social problems . In contrast with many Arab states, with an 
official	state	channel	owned	by	a	Ministry	of	Information,	Al-Iraqiyya	seems	to	be	moving	toward	a	role	
as public service broadcaster .  
Given Al-Iraqiyya’s role as a public service broadcaster, most of its shows deal with politics, economics, 
social issues or religion . In its beginning phrases, it broadcast older Egyptian dramas, but it does not 
import as much foreign programming as the independent channels or even the more secular Kurdish and 
Turkmen-owned stations . 
Media Owned by Political Islamists 
Arab	Shi’a	Media		
All the Shi’a political parties operate their own radio stations, newspapers and satellite channels . The 
strongest Shi’a parties dealt with in this study are political Islamist groups that seek a greater role for Islam 
in	the	state	and	public	life,	though	they	may	differ	on	how	large	a	role	Islam	should	play	in	Iraq.	The	four	
9	 	Nir	Rosen,	“Anatomy	of	a	Civil	War:	Iraq’s	Descent	into	Chaos,”	Boston	Review,	November/December	2006,	http://www.
bostonreview.net/BR31.6/rosen.html.	
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prominent Shi’a Islamist political factions include the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
(SCIRI), the Al-Da’wa Party, the Sadr Trend of Muqtada Al-Sadr, and the Iraqi Hizbullah .10  
SCIRI	 owns	 and	 finances	 the	 Al-Furat	 satellite	 channel,	 based	 in	 Baghdad.	 Al-Furat,	 which	 began	
broadcasting in November 2004, is run by Ammar Abd Al-Aziz, the son of the party’s leader .  
The dominant frames on Al-Furat are the “progress” SCIRI is making as the largest constituent party 
in the Iraqi government in terms of “reconstruction” and providing “security .” Therefore, the channel’s 
content supports the government, as well as the possibility of a federal Iraq . It marks victimization in 
terms	of	attacks	by	Sunni	Arab	militants	referred	to	as	“takfiri .”  “Takfiri” is a euphemistic term that literally 
means, “those who condemn others as ‘unbelievers,’” and usually refers to members of the Al-Qa’ida 
Organization in Iraq, or in general foreign volunteers from the Arab world who came to Iraq to combat the 
United	States	and	Iraqi	security	forces.	Nevertheless,	Iraqi	Sunni	argue	the	term	is	used	as	a	justification	
for operations against their community for allegedly giving tacit or overt support for their co-religionists 
fighting	in	Iraq.		
Since Al-Furat is owned by SCIRI, a Shi’a political Islamist group, much of its programming is religious, 
but the channel does not focus on issues of ethnicity and avoids direct references to the Shi’a as a distinct 
religious group . Rather, the channel emphasizes Iraqi unity based on an inclusive Iraqi Muslim identity . In 
other	words,	the	channel	tries	to	gloss	over	the	ethnic	differences	between	Arabs	and	Kurds,	and	stresses	
the unity of Islam in Iraq, both Shi’a and Sunni . The news program rarely refers to Iraq as part of the “Arab 
world” as do other Arab Sunni or independent Iraqi satellite channels . 
Religious	programs	include	“The	Talk	of	Friday,”	which	interviews	religious	figures,	and	a	cartoon	show	
with Islamist themes, “The Most Virtuous People on Earth .” The station has coverage of Friday sermons, 
primarily from Shi’a mosques . The channel also prominently features the activities of the leader of SCIRI, 
Abd Al-Aziz Al-Hakim . During the run up to the December 15, 2005 elections for the permanent National 
Assembly, Al-Furat featured campaign ads only for the Shi’a coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance, and not 
for other parties . As part of its religious programming, female presenters on this channel don the Islamic 
headscarf . 
Given that SCIRI is dominant in the government, this channel tends to frame violence in Iraq with a pro-
government stance, just as the Al-Iraqiyya channel does . Since members of SCIRI have a prominent role 
in	the	armed	forces,	the	channel	prominently	features	the	role	of	the	“security	forces”	and	their	efforts	to	
“eliminate	terrorism”	in	Iraq	by	reporting	on	their	activities	in	the	first	few	minutes	of	the	news	programming	
as well as by providing extended coverage of security operations . When some of these security forces were 
implicated in a scandal involving the Ministry of Interior (headed by an SCIRI member) maintaining a 
secret underground prison, these incidents were played down on the Al-Furat channel . The channel has 
also	featured	speakers	who	have	criticized	other	Arab	states	for	failing	to	condemn	the	violence	committed	
by “terrorists” in Iraq . Promotional ads (public service ads paid for by the government) on the channel also 
serve	to	condemn	the	violence.	One	ad	features	what	appears	to	be	a	handwritten	note	by	a	child	in	Arabic,	
with	a	stick	figure	of	a	child	looking	at	another	stick	figure	of	what	appears	to	be	an	angry	insurgent.		The	
text of the note reads: “I wish I could stop you . If I were bigger and stronger, I would not let you destroy 
10  Each of these factions also owns various newspapers, radio stations, and terrestrial TV channels, such as SCIRI’s Ghadir 
TV, the Da’wa Party’s Al-Masar TV, the Sadr Trend’s Al-Salam TV and Ayatullah Sayyid Hadi Al-Mudarissi’s short-lived 
Ahl Al-Bayt TV . 
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my country . I would hand you over to the police because you are bad, and Iraq needs everything you have 
stolen from it .”
Coverage of inter-sectarian violence against Iraqi Shi’a Muslims are prevalent in Al-Furat’s coverage, 
although the station does not advocate revenge but rather patience and obedience to those Shi’a leaders 
who have called for restraint .   
The channel frames a federated Iraq (one of the primary political platforms of SCIRI) as a positive 
development, and calls on all Iraqi communities to unite .
Public advocacy programs include a live call-in program “Al-Furat and the People,” and “Al-Furat Reports,” 
an	investigative	show	which	deals	with	domestic	issues	affecting	the	lives	of	everyday	Iraqis.	“Deported	in	
The	Homeland”	profiles	internally	displaced	families	who	have	relocated	due	to	sectarian	violence.	It	can	
be gleaned from the last names of those interviewed, and the phrases used, that most of the victims in this 
show are Shi’a . While the channel has a distinct Shi’a leaning, songs in between programs support peace 
and unity among Iraq’s various ethnic and sectarian communities .   
 Al-Furat’s programs are mostly religious . It does not feature popular entertainment shows such as Arabic-
dubbed	Latin	American	soap	operas,	Hollywood	films,	or	music	videos	from	Arabic	pop-stars.				
Arab	Sunni	Media	
The Arab Sunni Islamist factions developed political associations relatively later than Shi’a and Kurdish 
groups in Iraq’s post-war dynamics . A mistaken assumption prevalent in external discourses on Iraq is that 
Iraqi Sunni Arabs dominated the Ba’ath Party, even though Kurds and Shi’a made up some of its leadership 
and party cadres . Iraqi Sunni Arabs, however, were also involved in forming exile organizations, such 
as the Islamist Iraqi Islamic Party, and many of them returned to Iraq to represent their constituencies in 
post-war Iraq . Other prominent Sunni groups include the General Dialogue Conference, the Association of 
Muslim	Scholars	(technically	not	a	political	party),	and	the	Unified	National	Movement.		
These parties coalesced into the Al-Tawafuq Front . The satellite channels that represent the Front’s political 
agenda	 are	 the	 Rafidayn	Channel	 and	 the	 Baghdad	 Satellite	 Channel.	 The	 latter	 began	 to	 transmit	 in	
August 2005 and will be the focus here . The channel primarily depends on advertising from the Arab 
Sunni community, but also receives advertising revenues from the Sunni political parties in Iraq .   
A dominant frame on this channel is “resistance” to the U .S . military forces, referred to as “occupation 
forces .” This view of violence in Iraq mirrors the Front’s . Unlike Al-Iraqiyya or Al-Furat, this station refers 
to insurgents as “armed men” rather than “terrorists .” It views a future federated Iraq as a “foreign scheme” 
to	divide	the	nation,	reflecting	Arab	Sunni	fears	of	Kurdish	and	Shi’a	entities	in	the	north	and	south	of	Iraq,	
respectively, that would leave them in a landlocked rump state . Another prominent frame is that of the 
Arab	Sunni	as	the	victims	at	the	hands	of	“militias”	that	are	linked	to	the	government	or	have	“infiltrated”	
the security forces . 
Given the channel’s sympathies to the Al-Tawafuq Front, it only featured campaign advertisements for 
the Front during the Iraqi elections in December 2005, and carries live press conferences of the Front . 
Such sympathies manifest themselves in a news program that features the headlines from various Iraqi 
newspapers with Sunni Arab Islamist tendencies .  Islamist themes are also evidenced by anchorwomen 
who don the head scarf, as in the SCIRI’s Al-Furat channel . Religious programming includes “Explaining 
the	Holy	Quran,”	where	Arab	Sunni	clerics	offer	religious	interpretations	of	the	sacred	text,	“In	the	Shadow	
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of the Shari’a,” discussing topics on Islamic law, and “Fatwas on the Air,” which examines various religious 
rulings.	Political	programs	feature	a	mix	of	guests,	including	government	officials,	but	mostly	feature	Arab	
Sunni politicians . 
The channel also has programs for Iraqis to express themselves, many of whom vent their frustrations 
over unemployment and the lack of basic utilities . “Baghdad Daily” features on-the-street interviews to 
give the “common man” view of current events in Iraq, particularly related to the security situation and 
the	reconstruction	efforts.	“Your	Place	is	Empty”	focuses	on	the	plight	of	Iraqi	prisoners,	a	good	number	
of which happen to be Arab Sunni, showing the circumstances of the prisoner’s arrest by interviewing the 
prisoner’s families .11 
Although the Baghdad Satellite Channel’s shows are mostly religious in nature, some deal with culture, 
the arts and sports . The channel imports other programs that deal with Islam, but does not feature popular 
entertainment	shows	such	as	soap	operas	or	films,	either	imported	from	the	region	or	internationally.			
Media	Owned	by	Ethnic	Parties	
Iraqi Kurds, Turkmen and Christian Assyrians have established their own ethnic media empires, with the 
Kurds having a “head start” as they have enjoyed relative autonomy in the north of Iraq since the end of 
the 1991 Gulf War . A sample of their media outlets is included in Appendix A . 
Kurdish	Media	
The Kurdish satellite channels examined in this policy paper are the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP) 
Kurdistan Satellite Channel, which began broadcasting in 1999, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s 
(PUK)	 satellite	 channel	KurdSat.	Both	channels	are	non-profit	and	financed	by	 their	parties.	While	 the	
directors of both channels stress that their stations have editorial independence from the PUK and KDP 
respectively, the content suggests that both channels serve as mouthpieces for the parties .   
The dominant frames in both channels are the progress of the Kurdish north, the ability of the KDP and 
PUK to provide security, support for Kurdish members of the government, support for a federated Iraq, 
with	a	northern	Kurdish	state	that	includes	the	oil-rich	city	of	Kirkuk,	and	victimization	in	terms	of	attacks	
by Sunni Arab militants referred to as “terrorists .”     
The	content	of	the	two	channels	owned	by	the	Kurdish	parties	are	similar	in	that	they	offer	news	about	their	
political parties, events in the Kurdish areas of Iraq (referred to as the Kurdish Regional Government), and 
political and socio-cultural programs in the Kurdish language . On the KDP’s Kurdistan Satellite Channel, 
programs review the headlines from the Kurdish papers . On the KDP’s Kurdistan Satellite Channel and 
the PUK’s KurdSat, the content of the political programs is primarily devoted to events of the KDP and 
PUK, respectively .
KDP	programs	dealing	with	social	affairs	range	from	“Hello	People,”	a	call-in	show	addressing	social	issues	
in the north of Iraq, to the locally-produced “Kamo,” a children’s show hosted by a puppet . Social-cultural 
11	 	While	most	of	the	prisoners	that	appear	on	this	show	are	Sunni	Arabs,	there	are	no	accurate	figures	on	Iraq’s	prison	
population,	so	it	is	difficult	to	ascertain	whether	the	program	is	accurately	representing	the	prison	population.
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programs on the PUK include shows such as “Kultur we Rawshangari .” An example of programming that 
is	influenced	from	abroad	is	“Star	Kurd,”	an	entertainment	music	show.	
Media	Owned	by	Entities	Calling	for	Violence	
Though the Iraqi media described in the preceding sections belong to ethno-sectarian factions and at times 
expose	sectarian	tensions	and	give	the	impression	that	their	communities	are	under	attack,	they	usually	
call	for	restraint	and	national	unity,	and	do	not	specifically	exhort	viewers	to	engage	in	violence.	However,	
at least one channel has recently emerged that not only calls upon Iraqis to take part in violence, but also 
serve	as	a	means	for	insurgent	groups	to	publicize	their	attacks.			
The	Case	of	Al-Zawra
Al-Zawra	satellite	channel	is	owned	by	the	family	of	Mish’an	Al-Juburi.	The	channel,	which	first	emerged	
as an entertainment channel, later served as a mouthpiece for Mish’an’s December 2005 parliamentary bid . 
With Mish’an’s expulsion from the Iraqi National Assembly, the channel eventually evolved into a platform 
for insurgents .  
Mish’an comes from the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, from the Juburi tribe . He was a member of the 
Ba’ath Party, and became the leader of the post-2003 Arab Front for Reconciliation and Liberation and a 
parliamentarian	in	the	post-war	National	Assembly.	He	later	fled	Iraq	on	charges	of	embezzlement.	His	
son Yazin Al-Juburi is the managing director of the station and has been the target of an assassination 
attempt.	
The	channel’s	slogans	include	“Al-Zawra,	The	Voice	of	the	Excluded	and	Marginalized,”	and	“Al-Zawra,	
Favors	the	Nation,	The	Nation	as	a	Whole.”	The	station	does	not	have	a	fixed	schedule,	but	rather	regularly	
airs	videos	produced	by	the	insurgents,	with	footage	of	attacks	against	multinational	forces.	For	a	period	
following a government crackdown, old footage was looped continuously, 24 hours a day .  
When former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s death sentence was announced on November 5, 2006, 
Al-Zawra	 featured	 videos	 and	 songs	 supportive	 of	 the	 outlawed	 Ba’ath	 party,	 as	well	 as	 exhortations	
for	Iraqis	to	join	groups	fighting	the	US	“occupation	forces”	and	the	Iraqi	government	and	its	“sectarian	
gangs .” The Iraqi government ordered the station to be closed down on charges of “inciting violence .” 
The closure order came from the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, which also ordered the closure of the less 
well	known	Salah	Al-Din	satellite	channel.	The	closure	was	justified	by	the	Ministry,	not	under	regulation	
of the Communications and Media Commission (CMC) but under the Anti-Terrorism Law, a distinction 
which Al-Juburi made clear in an interview with an Arab newspaper: “The decision to close the station 
was issued by the Interior Ministry and not by a relevant body, like the Iraqi Communication and Media 
Commission, which is responsible for granting transmission and frequencies licenses .”12 Al-Sharqiyya (an 
independent channel with Arab Sunni sympathies that will be discussed later) carried footage of Iraqi 
security	forces	allegedly	raiding	the	offices	of	the	two	channels.	
12	 	Ma’ad	Fayyadh,	“Mish’an	Al-Jaburi	lil-Sharq	Al-Awsat:	Sana’ridh	liqitat	yu’akad	tamthil	bijitha	Saddam,”	(We	will	show	
a	video	 to	prove	 that	Saddam’s	body	was	mutilated),	Al-Sharq	Al-Awsat,	 January	14,	2007,	http://www.aawsat.com/
details.asp?section=4&issue=10274&article=401559.
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However, the station has been able to circumvent the closure through its use of transnational satellites . It 
is unclear where its operations are now centered: Mish’an claims that the station still has many centers in 
Iraq,	protected	by	Iraqi	“resistance	groups.”	Other	conflicting	reports	claim	that	the	channel	is	based	in	
Irbil, in the north of Iraq, or in Syria . Both the Kurdish Regional Government and the Syrian government 
deny such claims .  
As	Al-Zawra	has	shifted	its	transmission	tactics,	its	content	has	become	increasingly	incendiary.		After	the	
government’s	closure	of	 the	office	the	channel’s	content	focused	on	footage	of	 insurgent	attacks	against	
U .S . and Iraqi forces . The channel produces its own announcements that directly incite violence by calling 
on	Iraqis	to	join	the	“jihad”	against	“U.S.	and	Iranian	occupation.”		Its	attacks	on	Iran	reflect	a	pro-Iraqi	
Arab Sunni sentiment that alleges Iran is aiding its coreligionists in Iraq . Announcements on the channel 
denounce the “crimes of Muqtada and of the gangs Aziz Al-Hakim,” a reference to Muqtada Al-Sadr, leader 
of the primarily Shi’a Sadr Trend, and Abd Al-Aziz Al-Hakim, leader of the SCIRI group .  The station calls 
upon the “free youth of Iraq” to join the groups that are “defending” the nation to keep “Baghdad free 
from the Safawis,” referring to the 16th to 18th century Safavid Empire of Iran, but meant as a derogatory 
term	against	Iraq’s	Shi’a.	The	channel	also	features	footage	of	what	it	alleges	are	“Sunni	civilians”	attacked	
by Shi’a militias . The channel’s discourse and that of its owner has reached a point where even Iraqis refer 
to a “Mish’an” rhetoric .
Al-Zawra’s	news	anchors,	a	male,	and	a	female	wearing	the	veil,	are	dressed	in	military	uniforms,	and	
regularly read statements delivered by Iraq’s insurgent groups . Most of their news footage is provided 
directly by groups such as the Islamic Army in Iraq, an Islamist organization primarily comprised of 
Iraqis . It also carries relatively sophisticated documentaries produced by the insurgent groups, which 
feature English subtitles and are directed to Western viewers . One documentary claims that an armed 
group “wiped out” an entire American unit; the same documentary claimed that 15,000 Americans had 
been	killed	by	improvised	explosive	devices.	The	station	also	carries	video	footage	of	attacks	carried	out	by	
Nizar Al-Juburi, who achieved notoriety in Iraq as the “Baghdad Sniper .” Foreign reporting of this channel 
has	claimed	that	Al-Zawra	is	an	“Al-Qa’ida	channel.”	However,	though	the	channel	often	features	grisly	
footage of insurgent activity, it has never aired videos produced by the Al-Qa’ida Organization in Iraq and 
its owner has declared that he refuses to do so . 
There	are	no	statistics	about	the	numbers	of	viewers	of	this	channel,	but	there	are	scattered	reports	about	
viewer reactions in Iraq and the Arab world . In Iraq, parliamentary critics of the station have been vocal 
about the station’s content, and death threats have been directed to its owners . At the same time, one 
correspondent in Iraq quoted one of the channel’s young fans as saying, “I watch this channel every night . 
I don’t like encouraging violence, but it is something unusual in the argument against the Americans . I am 
hooked .”13 Another report states how a Saudi cleric has issued fatwas (religious declarations) encouraging 
Saudis to watch “the channel of the Mujahidin”	(religiously	inspired	fighters),	declaring	that,	“it	teaches	the	
art	of	jihad,	a	matter	the	youth	of	our	Umma [religious community] desperately need .”14
In	terms	of	the	effectiveness	of	Iraqi	government	actions,	Mish’an	Al-Juburi	claims	that	the	channel	still	
broadcasts “from underground areas controlled by the Iraqi resistance, especially in northern Baghdad all 
the way to Mosul and Al-Ramadi, using mobile transmission equipment out of fear of the US forces shelling 
13	 	Michael	Howard,	“Insurgent	TV	Channel	Turns	Into	Iraq’s	Newest	Cult	Hit,”	The	Guardian,	January	15,	2007,	http://
www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,1990545,00.html.
14	 	“Media	Aid:	Iraq’s	Al-Zawra	TV	Serves	as	Insurgent	Propaganda	Vehicle,”	Open	Source	Center	(OSC)	Media	Aid,	OSC	
Document: FEA20070202087288, December 17, 2006 to February 1, 2007 .
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them .”  He also claims that “[o]ur six correspondents remain on the run, roaming the Iraqi countryside in a 
satellite truck, from which they beam their programming to an Egyptian satellite distributor called Nilesat, 
which then retransmits the channel across the Middle East .”15 Lawrence Pintak interviewed Mish’an and 
described how his channel continued to operate: 
… his teams in Iraq have sporadically managed to feed video to Cairo “through SNG [satellite news 
gathering],” which apparently refers to the same kind of portable satellite dishes used by television 
news	teams	to	transmit	their	material	from	the	field.		He	says	the	material	is	recorded	on	a	“server”	
in	Cairo,	then	forwarded	to	Nilesat.	“And	it	keeps	transmitting	even	if	we	are	not	transmitting	from	
Iraq,” he adds . Much of the footage is shot on inexpensive video cameras and cell phones .16
In	February	2007,	Al-Zawra	also	began	transmission	on	the	Saudi-based	regional	satellite	system	Arabsat,	
on the BADR-4 satellite .17  This means that audiences in Iraq as well as the greater Arab world can watch 
its contents . Mish’an Al-Juburi has sought to broadcast the channel via European carriers such as Eutelsat 
in France .18  
The	Iraqi	and	U.S.	governments	have	made	efforts	to	have	the	Egyptian	satellite	provider,	Nilesat,	shut	
down	the	channel’s	satellite	 transmission	over	 its	 transponders.	More	than	a	month	after	the	closure	of	
its	terrestrial	operations	and	offices	in	Iraq—in	late	December	2006—Al-Zawra	began	to	broadcast	what	
it claimed was new footage of “Iraqi resistance” activities over its satellite channel . In January 2007, Al-
Zawra	was	broadcasting	continuous	footage	of	old	jihadist	videos,	a	trend	which	continued	until	the	end	
of	February.	This	 suggested	 that	Nilesat,	bowing	 to	pressure,	had	 stopped	 transmitting	new	Al-Zawra	
broadcasts that it sent from undisclosed locations in Iraq .19
Mish’an has claimed that the Egyptian government caved under U .S . pressure and prevented Nilesat from 
broadcasting	any	new	material:	“The	Egyptians	confirmed	that	they	came	under	U.S.	pressure.	Anas	Al-Fiqi,	
the	Egyptian	Minister	of	Information,	admitted	this,	and	Anas	Basyuni,	chairman	of	Nilesat	directorate,	
agreed that U .S . Ambassador in Cairo, Ricciardoni exerted pressure on them to stop the transmission of 
Al-Zawra.”20  
The Egyptian Culture Minister challenged this claim, stating “it is none of our business what the channel 
airs once it has booked its share in the satellite and has paid all fees due .”21  The chief engineer of Nilesat 
said	that	 it	was	Al-Zawra	which	asked	the	satellite	carrier	to	continue	transmitting	old	material:	“They	
asked	us—please,	when	we	don’t	send,	loop	for	us	what	you	have.”		In	regards	to	the	issue	of	diplomatic	
pressure, the chairman of Nilesat denied ever receiving an Egyptian government request or an American 
or Iraqi government request to cut the channel’s transmission .  
Egypt’s Information Minister stated that Iraqis had threatened the Egyptian diplomatic mission in 
Baghdad	if	Nilesat	continued	carrying	Al-Zawra.		Some	Egyptian	sources	claimed	that	these	threats	came	
15 Ibid .
16  Lawrence Pintak, “War Of Ideas: Insurgent Channel Coming To A Satellite Near You,”  January 10, 2007, 
	 	http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/pdblog_detail/070110_war_of_ideas_insurgent_channel_
coming_to_a_satellite_near_you/	.
17 BBC Monitoring, World Media, February 1, 2007, 27 .
18 Fayyadh, op . cit .
19  Marc Santora and Damien Cave, “Banned Station Beams Voice of Iraq Insurgency,” The New York Times, January 21, 2007: 
A8 .
20	 	“Israr	Al-Zawra	wa	 ‘Alaqatha	biharith	al-dhari	wal-musalihin	wal-jaysh	al-islami,”	 (The	 secrets	of	Al-Zawra	and	 its	
relations	with	Harith	Al-Dhari	and	the	Armed	Men	and	the	Islamic	Army),	Al-Arabiyya	Net,	January	29,	2007,	http://
www.alarabiya.net/Articles/2007/01/29/31185.htm
21 Pintak, op cit .
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from Muqtada Al-Sadr’s militia, the Mahdi Army, which led to the decision to stop broadcasting new 
material.	This	 explanation	does	not	 explain	why	Nilesat	 continues	 to	 loop	Al-Zawra’s	 jihadist	 footage,	
which	the	Iraqi	government	and	Sadr’s	militia	would	most	likely	still	find	offensive.		
The	case	of	Al-Zawra,	an	entertainment	channel	 that	evolved	 into	an	 insurgency	channel,	 represents	a	
worse	case	scenario	for	the	Iraqi	media,	demonstrating	the	ineffectiveness	of	punitive	measures,	such	as	the	
closure	of	its	Baghdad	office,	in	the	face	of	new	transnational	transmission	technologies.	It	is	plausible	that	a	
channel owned by other political, ethno-sectarian factions, or even an independent channel, could undergo 
a similar transformation . Punitive legislation and action against media that incite violence is only a partial 
solution.		Even	the	speaker	of	Iraq’s	parliament	declared	that	the	Al-Zawra	channel	incident	demonstrated	
the	dangers	of	shutting	down	a	channel	and	called	for	media	responsibility.	The	recommendation	section	
in this paper suggests that one of the solutions to this dilemma rests in creating alternative media that can 
attract	audiences	through	creative	means	of	communicating	national	reconciliation.		
Independently-Owned	Media	
There are several channels that do not receive funding from any political or religious groups, depending on 
advertising	revenues	and	financing	by	wealthy	Iraqi	or	Arab	investors,	as	well	as	by	foreign	governments,	
and primarily broadcast entertainment programs . The independent satellite channels examined in this 
policy paper are Al-Baghdadiyya, Al-Diyar, Al-Fayha, Al-Sharqiyya and Al-Sumariyya . While the content 
of Al-Baghdadiyya, Al-Fayha and Al-Sumariyya are directed towards an Iraqi audience, the channels are 
based in Cairo, Dubai and Beirut respectively, due to the security situation in Baghdad . These channels are 
independent, but critics argue that due to sectarian ownership, Al-Baghdadiyya and Al-Sharqiyya have an 
Arab	Sunni	bias,	while	Al-Fayha	has	an	Arab	Shi’a	bias.	Al-Baghadadiyya’s	director	is	Arshad	Tawfiq,	a	
former	Ba’athist	diplomat,	who	has	stated	that	the	station	is	financed	by	Iraqis.	Al-Sharqiyya	is	owned	by	
Sa’ad Al-Bazzaz, the former editor of the newspaper Al-Jumhuriyya in Ba’athist Iraq . Al-Diyar is directed 
by	Faysal	Al-Yasiri,	a	former	media	figure	in	Ba’athist	Iraq,	and	the	channel	is	partly	owned	by	a	group	
of Iraqis and the regional Arab Radio and Television (ART) company . Al-Fayha is an independent Iraqi 
channel owned by an Iraqi Shi’a businessman . Al-Sumariyya is owned by a group of Iraqis under the 
rubric of CET (Communication Entertainment and Television), and depends on advertising revenues from 
both Iraqi and Arab companies .  
Ethno-sectarianism	and	Islam		
The	aforementioned	channels	claim	to	be	independent	in	both	financing	and	content	of	any	ethno-sectarian	
or political Islamist faction . In surveys distributed to these channels, when asked if they refuse to air any 
material, they indicated a refusal to air programming that incites ethnic or sectarian divisions . The stations 
seek to reduce tensions among Iraq’s ethno-sectarian political factions in various ways . For example, 
Al-Sumariyya does not carry live statements or press conferences of any Iraqi politicians, indicating the 
station’s	effort	to	maintain	its	neutrality,	and	claims	non-affiliation	with	any	sectarian,	ethnic	or	political	
party.		It	stays	clear	of	the	Arab-Kurdish-Turkmen	conflict	as	well	as	the	inter-sectarian	Shi’a-Sunni	conflicts.	
The channel does not carry religious programs; rather it usually gives summaries of statements of religious 
figures	during	its	news	broadcasts.		While	other	channels	carry	state-run	public	service	announcements	
calling for national unity, Al-Sumariyya produces its own announcements that call for peace among Iraq’s 
communities .  The station also features on-the-street interviews with the Iraqi public, and interviews with 
program guests, who stress unity among Sunni and Shi’a . 
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Al-Sharqiyya claims that it has no connections with any political, ethnic, or religious faction, and refuses to 
air any programming that encourages sectarianism . However, it openly supported Iyad Allawi, a secular 
Iraqi politician, during the electoral campaign in December 2005 . The channel has minimal religious 
programming, and airs programs such as the “The Horoscope,” an entertainment program that deals with 
astrology, which is considered a taboo in Islam .   
Al-Baghdadiyya stresses that it seeks to promote Iraqi culture and “the unity of Iraq” and it refuses to air 
any content that is “against” this unity . 22 The channel urges Iraqis “to unite” through various advertisements 
and music clips and ensures that its guests include Arab Shi’a and Sunni, Kurds, and Christians . The 
channel has minimal religious content . In its responses to the questionnaire, the channel claims to have 
sought to increase entertainment programs such as music shows and drama series that are not usually 
found on channels owned by Islamist parties . In fact, the popular show “Other Eye” brings in guests to 
discuss topics considered taboo from an Islamic perspective, such as local Iraqi superstitions, magic in 
Iraqi folklore, and hypnosis and exorcisms . Other programs that demonstrate the secular nature of this 
channel include “Shahrazad’s World” which deals with current fashion trends and beauty tips . 
Televised	Violence	
Independent	channels	deal	with	violence	in	Iraq	in	different	ways,	with	some	highlighting	ethno-sectarian	
fighting	 and	attacks	 against	U.S./Coalition	 forces,	while	others	 following	a	policy	of	not	 airing	violent	
scenes.	For	example,	Al-Diyar	 rarely	shows	 live	 footage	of	 the	aftermath	of	 insurgent	attacks.	 Its	news	
programs	usually	focus	on	domestic	news,	with	an	emphasis	on	social	affairs	rather	than	violence.			
Al-Sumariyya describes itself as “an independent satellite television which aims at showing the world the 
true face of Iraq, and not only images of violence .”23 While the channel depends on advertising revenues, 
other	sources	of	financing	come	from	Iraqi	shareholders	who	insist	that	news	programming	not	just	focus	
on the violence, and support the station for its emphasis on entertainment as a means to take the public’s 
mind	off	of	the	bloodshed	in	Iraq.	Lead	news	items	on	Al-Sumariyya	include	events	occurring	in	Iraq,	but	
the	channel,	like	Al-Diyar,	does	not	show	live	coverage	of	the	aftermath	of	insurgent	attacks.	
In contrast, Al-Fahya’s news programs deal primarily with the security situation . Like Al-Iraqiyya and Al-
Furat, Al-Fahya runs public service announcements highlighting anti-terrorist measures .    
Of the independent channels, Al-Sumariyya employs the most neutral and objective language in its news 
programs . When presenting casualties among the Iraqi security forces, Al-Sumariyya uses the term “killed” 
as opposed to “martyred,” the term employed by Al-Fahya as well as by Al-Iraqiyya and Al-Furat . While 
Al-Sumariyya refers to the insurgents as “gunmen” and U .S . forces as “Coalition forces,” Al-Baghdadiyya 
uses the terms “armed men” and “occupation forces,” respectively, and Al-Fayha presents the insurgents 
as “terrorists .” 
Themes of violence and post-war instability are also prevalent in entertainment programs on these channels, 
including satirical comedies, dramas and even music clips, discussed in the section below .   
22 “Media Aid: Survey of Al-Baghdadiyah Television,” Open Source Center, October 5, 2005 .
23	 	Described	on	Al-Sumariyya’s	website,	http://www.alsumaria.tv/en/about_us.html.
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Public	Advocacy		
All	the	independent	channels	feature	public	advocacy	programs.	These	programs	offer	the	Iraqi	citizen	
a chance to address constructive criticisms to the Iraqi government through studio interviews or on-
the-street	interviews	or	viewer	call-ins.		For	example,	Al-Sumariyya’s	“Who	is	Responsible?”	interviews	
Iraqi citizens on the hardships they face in Iraqi society, and then allows the invited guest on the show, 
usually	a	government	official,	to	discuss	how	he	is	dealing	with	these	problems.	“Files”	deals	with	lack	of	
infrastructure	and	basic	utilities,	and	questions	both	the	national	and	state	officials	about	these	problems.	
“Behind You, Behind You” also highlights particular social problems faced by individual Iraqis .   
Al-Diyar	also	offers	programming	that	deals	with	the	daily	hardships	faced	by	Iraqis,	such	as	lack	of	basic	
utilities and insecurity . Iraqis can voice their concerns on the news program “The Screen is Yours,” which 
interviews random citizens on social and political issues that concern them .   
Al-Fayha’s “Hand in Hand We Build Up Our Homeland” is a news program dedicated to the reconstruction 
efforts	and	“What	If	You	Were…?”	features	comments	by	ordinary	Iraqis	expressing	what	they	would	do	
if they were head of a government ministry .  This program deals with the shortcomings of the various 
ministries that deal with reconstruction and unemployment . The shows “Iraqi Testimonies” and “Bars” 
deal with the political conditions of Ba’athist Iraq and allows those Iraqis who were victimized during this 
period to relate their experiences . 
Al-Sharqiyya features programs that seek to aid Iraqis in need . “Materials and Labor” is a reality TV-
type	show	where	the	station	finances	the	repair	of	homes	destroyed	by	violence.	“Blessed	Wedding”	is	
another	reality	program	that	finds	a	young	couple	in	need	of	funds	to	hold	a	wedding.	The	station	then	
finances	the	ceremony	and	films	the	festivities.	“The	Ration	Card”	is	similar	to	a	lottery	program	where	
prizes are given out to the numbers associated with a family’s ration card, a system initiated during the 
UN sanctions period .  This channel uses sarcasm to poke fun at political life in Iraq, and such satirical 
programs,	often	banned	in	the	region,	are	quite	popular	in	Iraq.	One	of	the	most	well-known	shows	in	this	
genre	is	“Karikatira,”	a	comedy	skit	program	that	finds	humor	in	scenarios	of	post-war	Iraq.					
Al-Baghdadiyya also uses the station’s resources to aid Iraqis . “A Drop of Hope” is a reality show where 
Iraqis	with	medical	conditions	are	financed	by	the	station	for	 treatment	abroad.	“Youth	Chat”	 is	a	 talk	
show	which	allows	teenagers	and	college	level	students	to	discuss	issues	of	popular	culture	such	as	film	
and television, and social issues that are of concern to them . It takes various issues such as fuel, electricity 
and	water	shortages	and	frames	them	in	a	comic	matter.	“The	Dialogue	of	the	Deaf”	is	a	critique	of	Iraq’s	
social problems, with skits similar to Al-Shariqyya’s “Karikatira” that mock the political establishment .   
Global	and	Regional	Influences	and	Local	Reactions	
Al-Sumariyya’s programming is primarily dedicated to entertainment, including music videos and soap 
operas . Other series are imported from Egypt, Latin America and the United States, for example dubbed 
Disney programming such as the “Lion King” and “Aladdin, and Warner Brothers shows such as the young 
Superman	series	“Smallville.”	One	of	the	effects	of	globalization	is	evident	in	the	show	“Iraqi	Star,”	the	
local	equivalent	of	“American	Idol.”	The	advertising	during	this	program	generates	significant	revenues	for	
the channel .  Programs in a similar format include “Stars of Poetry,” a contest for aspiring Arabic poets .   
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Al-Diyar is also primarily an entertainment channel (entertainment constitutes approximately 80 percent 
of	its	content).	It	imports	foreign	films	and	comedy	series,	both	American	and	Egyptian.	Nevertheless,	the	
majority of its programs, including local soap operas, are produced in Iraq .24
Al-Sharqiyya	was	the	first	to	respond	to	Iraqis’	desire	for	entertainment	that	related	to	their	daily	lives,	and	
is an indirect acknowledgement that some were growing tired of imported series dramas from Egypt or 
Latin	America.	Most	of	its	Arabic	drama	shows	are	produced	locally	and	filmed	in	the	Iraqi	dialect.	One	
of the most popular series it produced was “Love and War,” a soap opera detailing the lives of Fawzi and 
Fatin, a couple who lives through the March 2003 Iraq War and the ensuing post-war chaos . 
Like	Al-Sharqiyya,	Al-Baghdadiyya	 claims	 to	be	an	“Iraqi	 channel	 for	 Iraqis.”	 It	has	made	an	effort	 to	
increase the number of Iraqi-produced programs and estimates that 90 percent of its programming is 
produced inside of Iraq .25  
Iraq’s Media and the Regional Satellite Environment
While this study focuses on the dangers posed by ethno-sectarianism in the Iraqi media, ethno-sectarian 
tensions in Iraq can also be heightened by regional channels .  
This policy report does not provide a program analysis of Middle Eastern regional satellite channels 
broadcast into Iraq, such as the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera, the UAE-based Al-Arabiyya or the Iran-based 
Arabic language Al-Alam . While they have large audiences in Iraq, this report seeks to analyze those 
media	that	serve	as	a	reflection	of	the	factions	and	communities	in	Iraq	itself.	Nevertheless,	the	regional	
satellite channels do play a role in ethno-sectarian tensions in Iraq, and media policy will have to consider 
how	to	deal	with	the	ramifications	of	ethno-sectarianism	and	its	portrayal	in	the	regional	media	outlets	as	
well as the Iraqi media .
The	influence	of	regional	satellite	channels	in	ethno-sectarian	tensions	in	Iraq	was	amply	demonstrated	
in January 2007 during a heated exchange on an Al-Jazeera political debate program between an Iraqi 
Shi’a,	Sadiq	Al-Musawi,	and	the	owner	of	the	Al-Zawra	channel,	Mish’an	Al-Jaburi.	The	tensions	began	at	
the	opening	of	the	show	when	Mish’an	offered	a	prayer	for	“the	soul	of	the	martyred	President	Saddam	
Hussein.”	Al-Musawi	was	immediately	offended	by	this	action	and	replied	that	Saddam,	whom	he	referred	
to as Mish’an’s “father,” “had killed Kurds .” Mish’an responded on numerous occasions “You are a Persian 
shoe!” (qundara),	a	deeply	offensive	reference	in	the	Iraqi	culture;	he	also	alleged	that	Al-Musawi’s	loyalties	
lay with Shi’a Iran .26 In this case, not only did a regional channel potentially exacerbate tensions in Iraq, but 
also highlighted regional sectarian tensions .
There are no statistics for the rate of consumption of channels like Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiyya or Al-Alam 
in	Iraq.	The	studies	that	have	been	conducted	have	been	by	private	firms	for	various	clients.	One	of	the	
recommendations in this study calls for a publicly-released media consumption survey, so that one can 
better	grasp	how	the	Iraqis	are	consuming	media	in	a	time	of	bitter	conflict.		
24	 Stanhope	Centre	for	Media	Research	Questionnaire,	Aug.	2006	(on	file	with	author).
25 Ibid .
26 Karen DeYoung, “Sunni-Shiite Fight Flares in Broadcasts,” The Washington Post, January 21, 2007: A18 .
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The Future of Iraq’s Media 
The Iraqi media have expanded since the end of the 2003 Iraq war . Citizens have various outlets, such as 
talk shows, call-in programs and man-on-the-street interviews to express their desires, complaints and 
frustrations . Additionally, news makers and prominent members of civil society can use televised panel 
discussions to give their opinions about salient issues in the nation’s development . While most media in 
the Middle East serve as tools to legitimize the state, in Iraq, various media outlets have assumed their 
Fourth	Estate	role	by	challenging	the	incumbent	government	for	its	shortcomings.	Specific	programs	often	
carry	out	this	role	by	highlighting	the	daily	difficulties	faced	by	the	average	Iraqi,	with	channels	calling	on	
the government to address their needs . Issues such as government corruption, poverty and unemployment 
may be taboo subjects in Middle Eastern countries with only a handful of state-owned channels; in Iraq, 
various media address these challenges directly . Additionally, some Iraqi channels feature entertainment 
(either locally-produced or imported), particularly humor, music and drama, to relieve the stresses of 
Iraq’s post-war society . All of these developments are positive indications for the future of Iraq’s media and 
for its civil society . Nevertheless, there are some disturbing trends emerging as well .  
Well before the 2003 Iraq war, the Iraqis were viewed by foreign media through a “tri-ethnic prism” 
focusing on divisions between Shi’a, Sunni and Kurds, while ignoring Turkmens, Assyrian and Chaldean 
Christians, Yazidis and Sabaens, as well as the country’s more traditional fault lines, such as class, rural-
urban, religious-secular and tribal divisions within the three communities . It has been a fashion in the 
foreign media to essentialize Iraqis into three “ethnic” categories, leading to erroneous notions such as 
viewing Iraq’s Shi’a as an “ethnic” group or neglecting that the majority of Kurds are also Sunni .
Nevertheless, an examination of the media sphere in Iraq suggests that past misguided observations have 
unfortunately become reality . Indeed, Iraq’s media are increasingly divided along ethno-sectarian lines, 
with an independent media competing for audiences that have grown weary of ethno-sectarian media . One 
article refers to this situation as the “Lebanonization” of the Iraqi media: “With Iraq’s TV menu growing 
increasingly sectarian, it is possible to draw a parallel with Lebanon’s highly sectarianized hodgepodge of 
channels—linked	directly	or	loosely	with	political	parties—which	regularly	report	sect-specific	news.”27 
The Iraqi media scene is pluralistic, but also fragmented . This plurality can be positive: the Iraqi media 
serve as outlets for all of Iraq’s ethno-sectarian communities, regardless of political persuasion, profession 
or	gender.	Such	developments	are	beneficial	for	Iraq’s	painful	transition	to	democracy.	Marginalized	groups	
who otherwise would have had no means to communicate their desires in Ba’athist Iraq theoretically now 
have the means to do so .  
However, there are negative aspects of pluralism when it emerges as a result of chaos . Media pluralism 
in Iraq allows for ethnic and sectarian political groups to consolidate powerful media empires, including 
print, radio and TV, and broadcast in Iraq and internationally . While there is freedom of the press, the 
freedom of journalists to cover a story or have access to information is severely restricted . Certain political 
parties are content when their political platform is expressed, but will violently target journalists and 
media professionals who may report on news in a way that displeases them . Pluralism, without regulation, 
can also lead to the rise of media that can be abused as a means of encouraging violence .   
27  Paul Cochrane, “The ‘Lebanonization’ of the Iraqi Media: An Overview of Iraq’s Television Landscape” Transnational 
Broadcasting Studies, June-December 2006 .
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The	ethno-sectarian	control	of	Iraq’s	media	landscape	reveals	another	trend	in	Iraq’s	political	dynamics—
the lack of political parties running on non-ethno-sectarian platforms that can transcend Iraq’s divisions . 
Secular parties, such as the Iraqi National Accord, the Iraqi Communist Party, the United Nation Party, or 
the Independent Democrats Grouping, own newspapers but not satellite TV stations, the most widely-
consumed media in Iraq .  These parties have not been able to rally enough followers and have faired 
poorly in Iraq’s elections . These parties simply do not have access to the funds that the ethno-sectarian 
political parties have . 
At	the	beginning	of	this	paper,	four	phases	were	identified	as	necessary	for	the	emergence	of	a	conflict	
media: 1) a strong ideology, 2) control over a mass media, 3) psychological preparation to hate, and 4) a 
call to violence . I would argue that Iraq’s ethno-sectarian media has entered phase three .  This policy paper 
(and the appendix which outlines the reach of the faction in Iraq’s politics) demonstrate that the sectarian 
Islamist groups as well as ethnic parties are dominant in the Iraqi media .  Following the bombing of the 
Shi’a Al-Askariyya shrine in the city of Samarra in February 2006, the various sectarian and ethnic media 
outlets escalated tensions but eventually called for restraint among Iraq’s communities .   
The	content	analysis	of	the	various	ethno-sectarian	channels	did	not	find	that	coverage	directly	demonized	
the other communities . However, each sectarian and ethnic group uses their media to demonstrate that 
they are the victims in Iraq’s ongoing violence . While they do not explicitly exhort violence against other 
communities, as would happen in phase four, their continued portrayal of respective victimization serves 
as	a	means	of	encouraging	Shi’a	and	Sunni	to	“defend”	themselves	in	the	ensuing	sectarian	violence.	After	
the 2006 bombing, for example, the Arab Sunni-oriented Baghdad Satellite Channel focused its coverage on 
the Arab Sunni killed in retaliation, while the Arab Shi’a-oriented Al-Furat focused on the actual damage to 
their sacred structure . According to one account, “Al-Furat was even more aggressive, encouraging Shi’a to 
‘stand up for their rights .’ On a Shi’a radio station’s talk show, one caller announced that those responsible 
for	the	attack	were	Abu	Bakr,	Omar,	and	Othman,	the	three	first	caliphs	whom	Sunni	venerate	and	whom	
Shi’a reject as usurpers of the position that rightfully belonged to Imam Ali, the prophet Muhammad’s 
cousin and son-in-law .”28   
When a particular channel reports a violent incident in Iraq, as, for example, an Arab Shi’a militia killing an 
Arab Sunni family in their home, or when another channel reports on Arab Shi’a killed in a marketplace by 
Arab Sunni suicide bombers, neither channel directly calls for revenge against the other . In these cases, the 
channels may not even invoke the term “Shi’a” or “Sunni .” Usually viewers can identity the victims by the 
location	of	the	attack,	or	the	perpetrators	by	the	method	of	attack	used.	A	Shi’a	channel	will	not	specifically	
mention that they were the victims of “Sunni aggression” and vice versa, though that association is strongly 
implied.		For	example,	if	Baghdad	Satellite	Channel	states	that	the	Abu	Hanifa	Mosque	was	attacked	by	
mortar rounds, an Arab Sunni viewer will most likely infer that the rounds were launched by the Shi’a 
Mahdi Army from the adjacent neighborhoods . The respective audience members who feel victimized 
may	take	matters	into	their	own	hand	in	“self-defense,”	which	in	most	cases	manifests	itself	in	revenge	
attacks.	Even	if	the	“victimized”	fail	to	act,	the	worsening	security	situation	may	generate	support	for	the	
respective militias, and not the state, to provide protection .    
The biases and victimization in Shi’a and Sunni reporting was expressed by Ahmed Rikabi, an Iraqi 
journalist who has had extensive experience in post-war media . On the CNN program “International 
Correspondents,” in reference to the Iraqi media, Rikabi stated:   
28 Rosen, op . cit .
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Well, the sectarian tension is so strong in Iraq today . And I think this guy whose name is Omar, it’s 
clearly that this is a Sunni guy, when he goes and tries to cover an incident in a Shi’ite area, he feels like 
one of the victims . He doesn’t go and feel like a neutral person covering this . And so is the case for the 
Shi’ite Ali, who goes to that Sunni area and trying to cover . You also feel the fear . He feels that those 
people	standing	there,	they	might	kill	him	as	well.	So	that	probably	also	affects	him	somehow.	I	mean,	
whether he is very objective or whether he is very normal or neutral or unbiased, but he can’t help it 
that	he’s	got	a	certain	name.	And	that	name	might	get	him	killed.	And	that	will	influence	his	way	of	
thinking or approaching the subject .29
A	month	later,	Al-Rikabi	stated	explicitly	that	the	media	in	Iraqi	have	emerged	as	a	tool	of	conflict:	“We	are	
witnessing	a	civil	war.	And	this	civil	war	is	conducted	by	different	religious	groups	and	different	political	
groups . And of course, the media is an extension of this sectarian violence we are witnessing today .”30
If Iraqi ethno-sectarian media have reached stage three, they are laying the psychological groundwork for 
hating the other . To reach stage four, these factions would need to make direct exhortations to violence . If 
the security situation were to worsen, the other political factions would have the option of using their media 
as	mouthpieces	to	exacerbate	the	conflict,	by	whipping	up	ethnic	and	sectarian	feelings	or	even	directing	
the	conflict.	So	far,	these	other	factions	have	used	their	media	to	stress	unity	among	Iraq’s	communities,	but	
they	nevertheless	have	the	potential	to	instigate	conflict	with	these	means	if	it	suits	their	interests.			
According	to	my	fieldwork	on	the	media	in	Iraq,	a	common	perception	held	amongst	the	Iraqi	public,	and	
even	journalists	themselves,	is	that	different	factions	have	used	the	newspapers,	radio	and	TV	as	“tools	of	
war .” As the Iraqi political parties rarely communicate directly with each other, they have expressed their 
grievances through the media, with some media discreetly encouraging violence against the incumbent 
government . While observers of the situation in Iraq argue whether a “civil war” has emerged in Iraq, 
a “civil war of words” has at least emerged in the Iraqi media according to some Iraqi journalists that I 
interviewed .  
Most, but not all, of the journalists I spoke to were hesitant to be quoted by name . One, Saleh Al-Shibani, 
stated in regards to political factions who own newspapers, “Every party, every party leader, basically 
everyone	who	 can	 afford	 it	 has	 launched	 a	 newspaper.	And	 each	 newspaper	 speaks	 for	 the	 entity	 it	
represents, makes a claim to the truth, assuming the right not only to criticize but to insult its adversaries; 
this is particularly easy in the light of the legal void .”31 Another Iraqi journalist, Muhammad Sahi, wrote a 
critical essay in the Al-Zawra Newspaper, a weekly published by the Iraqi Journalists Association, unrelated 
to	the	Al-Zawra	satellite	channel.	His	article	serves	as	a	lament	of	the	state	of	the	Iraqi	media.	He	writes	of	
the media: “They not only increased sectarianism and deepened ethnicity in society, but also are responsible 
for the fading of the concept of nationalism and patriotism and their actual dimensions .”32 He cites a list of 
the vast array of media aligned to political factions, which he argues are “mere fronts, whose main goal is 
to	promote	the	ideologies	and	ideas	of	their	affiliated	political	parties	and	forces,”	and	“have	confused	the	
Iraqi citizens and created a psychological barrier, in one way or another, between them .” According to Sahi, 
the	pluralism	in	the	Iraqi	media,	which	often	results	in	conflicting	news	reports	about	the	same	event	on	
different	satellite	channels,	depending	on	affiliation,	has	divided,	confused	and	enraged	the	Iraqi	viewer.	
Sahi admits that some channels are trying to avoid promoting sectarianism, but they do cover statements 
29 International Correspondents, Cable News Network, 14:00 EST, October 13, 2006 .
30 International Correspondents, Cable News Network, 14:00 EST, November 17, 2006 .
31	 Nermeen	Al-Mufti,	“Can	You	Help	Me	Not	Miss	Them?”	Al-Ahram Weekly, March 23-29, 2006 .
32  Muhammad Sahi, Television Map in Iraq; Iraqi Satellite Television Channels Between Politics and Promotion of 
Sectarianism,	Al-Zawra,	March	27,	2006,	2.
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made by Iraqi politicians who he states are divided by “sectarian inclination that escalate sectarian tension 
and crisis .”33	Sahi’s	final	assessment	of	the	Iraqi	media	is	as	follows:	
Accordingly, the Iraqi street and viewers are being divided with regard to their favored channels and 
news coverage based on their political loyalties and inclinations . Hence, it is inevitable for them to 
adopt the political discourse of their favored television channels and to act in accordance with the 
statements made by political leaders .  The Iraqis have found themselves to be indirectly involved and 
supporting some political leaders or perhaps even among their followers .34   
Conclusion
Most	of	the	plans	to	stabilize	Iraq,	such	as	that	of	the	Iraq	Study	Group	released	in	late	2006,	suffer	from	
one	 inherent	weakness:	 they	view	the	conflict	 in	Iraq	by	primarily	focusing	on	“hard	power”	or	“hard	
conflict.”35	The	purpose	of	this	assessment	has	been	to	illustrate	media’s	potential	as	a	tool	of	soft	power,	
and	to	demonstrate	that	the	pattern	of	Iraqi	media	development	should	be	viewed	as	a	matter	of	concern	
for	Iraq’s	long	term	stability.	While	attention	on	Iraq’s	situation	focuses	on	actual	acts	of	insurgent	groups	
or sectarian militias, one has to also realize that ethno-sectarian divisions, even if they are opaque, have 
proliferated in the tele-visual and print spheres as well, and have the potential of exacerbating tensions .   
This potential was demonstrated in the light of events that occurred in Sadr City in late November 2006, 
when multiple car bombs caused the highest amount of casualties in a single incident since the cessation 
of	the	war.	The	Iraqi	government	accused	various	networks,	both	Arab	and	Iraqi,	of	inflaming	the	conflict	
through their coverage, and threatened to prosecute these channels . The President of Iraq, Jalal Talibani, 
went	as	far	as	blaming	the	media	for	inciting	the	violence.	The	fact	that	government	officials	have	been	so	
vehement in their criticisms of various television channels and newspapers is an indirect acknowledgement 
of the power of the media . Their criticisms also reveal the challenge of dealing with the violence in Iraq 
that is fought not only on the streets, but also in the tele-visual sphere . The government sought to make 
an	example	of	the	Al-Zawra	station	in	November	by	closing	down	its	office.	However,	satellite	television	
and	the	Internet	have	proven	that	strict	punitive	measures	are	ineffective	in	dealing	with	media	that	can	
be	transmitted	trans-nationally.								
Events in Iraq could stabilize and as a result the Iraqi media may not proceed beyond stage three . 
Nevertheless, in the long term, various ethno-sectarian media outlets in Iraq still could prove problematic 
in another fashion . Rather than a media sphere, Iraq has ethno-sectarian media “spherecules” that have 
the potential to further the gap between Iraq’s communities, developing identities along ethno-sectarian 
lines and weakening any kind of national belonging . Additionally, these media “spherecules” owned by 
Islamist groups have the potential to increase sectarian nationalism in the guise of political Islam in Iraq . 
At the same time, independent media are trying to provide an alternative to the ethno-sectarian media . The 
recommendations below are directed to internal as well as external actors as to how to prevent the Iraqi 
media	from	developing	into	a	tool	that	can	enhance	conflict.			
33 Ibid .
34 Ibid .
35	 	Iraq	Study	Group	Report	can	be	found	at	the	website	of	the	United	States	Institute	for	Peace,	http://www.usip.org/isg/
iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/index.html.
 91 
  The Dynamics of Iraq’s Media        
Recommendations 
In	Izabella	Karlowicz’s	work	on	media	development	in	post-conflict	Balkans	she	offers	recommendations	
over three phases: set up, implementation and capacity building .  This framework can also be applied to 
the Iraqi situation . While the post-war Iraqi media have passed the “set up phase,” there are still some 
important	recommendations	that	can	be	made	that	were	ignored	in	the	first	phase.	In	the	case	of	the	Balkans,	
Karlowicz’s recommendations are designed to highlight “the dangers of poorly planned assistance to the 
development	of	the	Fourth	Estate	in	post-conflict	areas,	which	may	cause	an	outburst	of	ethnic	conflict	
rather than fostering peaceful cohabitation .”36	An	“outburst	of	ethnic	conflict,”	or	in	the	Iraqi	case,	“ethno-
sectarian	conflict,”	has	become	a	reality.	The	media	should	emerge	as	a	“safety	valve”	for	the	nation	by	
ensuring	that	these	differences	are	debated	on	the	airwaves,	rather	than	in	the	streets.	The	key	for	the	future	
of Iraq’s stability is using the media to address the grievances of all of Iraq’s ethno-sectarian communities, 
thus transforming this debate into a constructive one . 
1.	 Assess	the	Iraqi	Media	Landscape	
Any	 attempt	 at	 making	 recommendations	 should	 first	 begin	 with	 an	 assessment	 of	 the	 Iraqi	 media	
landscape for local and international organizations .   
A)  Create a National Media Directory  
An Iraqi or international organization should compile a comprehensive national directory of all local 
media (radios, newspapers, terrestrial TV stations) . This step is crucial as most media in Iraq developed in 
the post-war chaos, before the establishment of any regulatory or licensing body . Such a directory should 
provide an assessment of which media have a proven record of promoting ethno-sectarian tensions, and 
will be a useful guide for international donors . This policy report concludes that the only satellite channel 
that can be considered entirely non-partisan and non-sectarian is the Al-Sumariyya channel, and local Iraqi 
media specialists and journalists have echoed this statement .  
B)  Conduct a Media Consumption Assessment 
The Iraqi media landscape is changing quite dramatically . A second assessment needs to be conducted 
of	Iraq’s	media	consumption	in	Iraq,	including	how	many	people	watch	a	particular	channel	or	specific	
programs on a channel, as well as channels from foreign countries . A local Iraqi body or international 
organization should take the initiative in commissioning a survey of Iraqi media consumption . While 
such surveys are costly, a set of regularly updated surveys should be available publicly as a common 
database	for	Iraqi	actors,	regional	media	organizations	and	international	donors	to	better	assess	the	media	
environment.		Reputable	agencies	such	as	InterMedia	have	conducted	media	surveys	for	specific	clients.	
One of the weaknesses of this paper is that while various private surveys, as well as interviews with local 
journalists, indicate that consumption of ethno-sectarian media is on the rise in Iraq, reliable statistics 
on Iraqi audience preferences and media consumption are lacking . Such trends need to be documented 
in a proper survey to help both local and international actors and policymakers in devising the most 
36 Karlowicz, op . cit ., 127 .
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effective	strategy	to	prevent	the	emergence	of	media	that	encourage	violence	or	at	least	provide	a	viable	
alternative .  
C) Conduct an Audience Research Survey  
There are no reliable statistics of audiences in Iraq . Audience research can determine how age, location and 
income	affect	media	consumption.	Such	information	will	be	valuable	to	advertisers	and	boost	the	revenues	
of independent media in Iraq, thus strengthening an alternative to media dominated by political factions .  
2.		 Improve	and	Implement	Media	Regulation	
The principal media regulatory body in Iraq is the Communications and Media Commission of Iraq 
(CMC), formed in 2004 . The function of the CMC is similar to the American Federal Communications 
Commission	(FCC)	or	the	UK’s	Office	of	Communication	(OfCom).	The	CMC	is	a	body	designed	as	an	
independent regulatory authority for Iraqi communication industries, including television (both satellite 
and terrestial), radio, telecommunications and wireless communications such as Internet . According to 
the 2005 Constitution, the CMC falls under the jurisdiction of the Iraqi parliament . In terms of this policy 
paper, the CMC is important as it is charged with establishing the framework and editorial guidelines for 
the content of TV and radio programs . In the past, these functions were controlled by the Iraqi Ministry 
of Information, with the Ministry essentially using the media to disseminate Ba’athist propaganda, so the 
establishment	of	the	CMC	is	a	positive	step.	(The	Ministry	was	abolished	after	the	2003	Iraq	war.)			
Several recommendations can be made to the CMC and other Iraqi governmental entities . Karlowicz’s 
study notes: 
In	some	countries	where	conflict	was	fuelled	by	ethnic	hatred	(e.g.	Rwanda,	Burundi,	Bosnia,	Kosovo)	
an initial “hard hand” on the media may be necessary to stop further incitement of violence .  Temporary 
and emergency measures such as a hate speech regulation, applicable to both the print press and 
broadcast media, may be necessary to keep the fragile peace under control .  However, such measures 
should only be implemented at the very initial phase of the mission when journalistic self-regulation 
is largely absent .37
The	interim	administration	of	Iyad	Allawi	demonstrated	its	“hard	hand”	when	it	closed	the	offices	of	the	
pan-Arab channels Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyya in August 2004 for “incitement to hatred .” It charged that 
these channels bestowed regional legitimacy upon the insurgents by framing them as an “Iraqi resistance .” 
Now, the Commission will also have to deal with the local Iraqi channels as well . 
A)  Increase Awareness of Media Regulation in Iraq  
The	CMC	needs	to	increase	its	profile	among	journalists.	I	realize	that	many	of	the	journalists	I	interviewed	
had not even heard of the body . Other journalists have expressed critiques of the Commission, arguing it 
has not done enough . Sa’ad Al-Saraf of the Star TV Network stated in regards to the CMC: “Indeed, there 
seems to be a sort of ‘look the other way’ approach to enforcing the commission’s rules, such as the ban on 
‘spreading sectarian, racial and religious sedition and strife .’”38
37 Karlowicz, op . cit ., 131 .
38 Cochrane, op . cit .
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B)   Enhance the Existing Broadcasting Code of Practice, Create a Code for Reporting Ethno-Sectarian 
Issues and Further Fund the Monitoring Body
The CMC operates under an Interim Broadcasting Program Code of Practice that was inherited from 
former CPA Order 65, which restricts media messages that “incite violence .”  The second recommendation 
calls	upon	the	Iraqi	National	Assembly	to	urgently	deal	with	a	draft	law	introduced	by	the	CMC	to	replace	
the CPA Order . The CPA Order has a stigma in Iraq, as many would point out that it was those CPA Orders 
that called for the closure of Muqtada Al-Sadr’s outspoken Al-Hawza newspaper, which ultimately ended 
up inciting violence between his forces and the U .S . military . Passing this law will give both the CMC and 
its codes more legitimacy in the Iraqi media environment .  
If this legislation passes, the “Interim” Broadcasting Program Code of Practice would presumably become 
“permanent .” The Code, as is, seeks to protect freedom of speech, as long as that freedom is not abused by 
inciting	violence	or	upsetting	ethno-religious	dynamics	in	Iraq.	However,	this	Code	will	need	to	be	more	
specific	in	defining	what	constitutes	“incitement	to	violence.”	Agreeing	on	this	matter	should	be	done	with	
the CMC and with a body of Iraqi journalists so that such a code can be based on consensus .  Such a Code 
must give concrete examples of how tele-visual media in the past have “incited violence .” Second, such a 
Code should specify the punishments that will be meted out to channels that intentionally incite violence . 
Additionally this Code should acknowledge, with concrete examples, how ethno-sectarian violence may 
be encouraged indirectly by the media, and indicate that equal punishments will be incurred for such 
infractions .  The court system in Iraq is inundated with cases, so a special body for media arbitration 
should	be	created	for	the	media	outlets	to	settle	media	related	disputes.				
While enhancing the existing Code of Practice will be a positive step, this policy paper recommends 
creating	a	specific	Code	for	Media	Reporting	on	Ethno-Sectarian	Issues. This recommendation is based on 
a past precedent where the CMC created a Code for Media During Elections, which laid out rules on how 
the Iraqi media should cover the 2005 electoral campaigns . Creating a separate Code for Ethno-Sectarian 
Issues will demonstrate that the CMC acknowledges the problem and is serious about resolving it . 
The question remains as to how to prevent ethno-sectarianism in the Iraqi media, while still allowing 
for	free	speech.	The	first	step	is	for	the	CMC	to	elaborate	on	a	code	of	ethical	journalistic	practices	when	
reporting on ethno-sectarian issues . Such a code will demonstrate to all Iraqi media outlets that the CMC’s 
actions are based on a set of values reached by consensus, rather than arbitrary sanctions imposed by an 
organization akin to the former Ministry of Information .  
In order to ensure that stations comply with this code, the CMC will have to ensure continuous monitoring 
of the Iraq media . The CMC has an established Monitoring and Research Department which surveyed the 
media during the elections to ensure compliance with their elections reporting code . The relevant entities 
in the Iraqi legislature should increase funding to the CMC so it can expand this Department to carry out 
this	monitoring	task.	In	the	long	term,	this	Department	should	make	public	the	findings	of	this	body,	with	
regards to the media’s incitement of ethno-sectarian tensions, as well as issue a report of media seeking to 
defuse tensions .   
C) Apply Specific Measures to Deal with Ethno-Sectarian Media 
The government and the CMC should adopt measures making special provisions for political, sectarian 
and religious broadcasters . License renewal can be connected to requirements that these channels have 
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a	board	or	staff	 that	are	heterogeneous.	These	stations	could	be	required	 to	 include	programming	that	
reflects	Iraq’s	ethno-sectarian	mix	in	a	positive	manner
3.	 Increase	International	Assistance	
A) Create an Iraqi Media Loan Fund 
International donors and NGOs have aided with media development projects and this trend should 
continue . A loan fund should be established to develop support, capacity building and training for non-
partisan media in Iraq . An example of such an initiative includes the South African Media Development 
Fund, which was developed in conjunction with the Free Voice of the Netherlands and Open Society 
Initiative of Southern Africa (OSISA) .
B) Create an Iraqi Media Development Network 
International actors have made positive contributions to the Iraqi media . Various ministries of the 
governments	of	the	UK,	Germany	and	the	Czech	Republic	have	offered	assistance	to	the	developing	media	
in Iraq . Al-Mirbad Radio and TV in the south of Iraq was established with a grant from the UK Department 
for International Development, with the BBC World Service Trust providing training and infrastructure 
needs . The German Foreign Ministry sponsored Telephone FM, a youth program produced in Germany 
and then broadcast by FM stations in Iraq . The independent news outlet Aswat Al-Iraq was established 
with aid from the Reuters Foundation and UNDP . The Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) and 
International Media Support (IMS) have been active in developing the Iraqi media . Other NGOs have had 
experiences in training Iraqi practitioners in Jordan, while still others are seeking to develop Iraq’s cultural, 
entertainment	and	film	media.	These	various	actors	should	“pool”	their	expertise	together	in	a	common	
network	so	that	each	party	benefits	from	the	others’	experiences	with	the	Iraqi	media.		
4.		 Improve	Media	Education		
The solutions to the status quo in the Iraqi media landscape cannot solely rest with legislation against 
media outlets that incite hatred . Media regulation does not solve the problem of educating journalists on 
social	responsibility	and	reporting	during	times	of	conflict.	One	of	the	problems	in	Iraq	is	that	professional	
standards and practical training for journalists are relatively new in a society that repressed its media in 
the past . Though journalism schools existed during the Ba’athist era, instruction focused on promotion of 
the views of the Ba’ath Party . Under the circumstances of ethno-sectarian reporting in Iraq, international 
media organizations should raise awareness of international standards in journalism to local media 
practitioners .   
A)  Improve Training for Iraqi Media Practitioners 
In a survey distributed to the Iraqi radio and TV channels, the most common request was the need for 
“technical	 training	 of	 their	 staff.”	 Often	 media	 stations	 in	 Iraq	 would	 receive	 donations	 of	 high-tech	
equipment	 that	 their	staff	did	not	know	how	to	use.	Granted,	 the	security	situation	makes	such	future	
cooperation	 difficult	 in	 the	 country	 itself,	 as	 foreign	 trainers	 may	 be	 hesitant	 to	 travel	 to	 Iraq.	 Such	
difficulties	can	be	overcome	by	holding	workshops	abroad	to	train	Iraqis	to	serve	as	media	trainers	once	
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they	have	returned	to	Iraq.	International	assistance	should	be	dedicated	to	financing	Iraqis	to	take	part	
in	these	training	sessions	abroad.	Training	should	include	technical	matters	and	issues	of	media	law	and	
ethics,	such	as	those	offered	at	the	Program	for	Comparative	Media	Law	and	Policy	at	Oxford	University	
(http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/	).	
B)  Improve Local Media Educational Institutions 
International assistance should also be directed towards developing the institutional capacity of Iraqi 
media . Education in these institutions could focus on how journalists can conduct balanced reporting 
at a time when their nation is on the brink of a “civil war,” and thus create an alternative to an ethno-
sectarian media . Baghdad University’s College of Mass Communications, as well as other Iraqi universities 
with Communications departments, is in desperate need of updated technical equipment . Faculty at these 
universities	can	benefit	from	intellectual	development	by	revising	their	syllabi	and	curricula;	this	process	
can be facilitated by hosting Iraqi media professors in foreign universities .    
Outside of the university system, most media practitioners agree that an independent institute should 
be	 created	 to	 offer	 professional	 and	 mid-level	 training	 to	 Iraqi	 media	 practitioners.	 In	 this	 capacity,	
international	donors	can	offer	financial	and	technical	expertise	for	establishing	such	an	institution.	
5.		 Protect	Iraqi	Journalists		
A free and pluralistic media cannot emerge when the journalists are themselves targets of the violence they 
seek to cover . Improving education for Iraqi journalists may seem like a moot point, when once they have 
acquired their skills they could be targeted in Iraq’s ensuing violence . Protecting Iraqi journalists would 
seem to be crucial, yet it is most complex, as it involves security organizations not necessarily involved 
with	media.	The	plight	of	the	independent	journalist	in	Iraq	in	between	conflicting	ethno-sectarian	media	
should be emphasized . Refusing to comply with pressures from competing political factions to portray a 
party	in	a	positive	or	negative	light	can	result	in	significant	dangers.	Organizations	such	as	the	International	
Federation of Journalists have called on the Iraqi and U .S . governments to make a commitment to protecting 
journalists	and	freedom	of	the	press,	as	well	to	bring	to	justice	those	who	target	journalists	in	violent	attacks.	
Yet	the	question	is,	how	to	protect	journalists,	if	the	Iraqi	security	forces	can	barely	protect	themselves?	
Iraqi	journalists	could	embed	with	Iraqi	security	forces,	but	that	may	also	make	them	a	target,	or	influence	
their reporting .  Given the current security situation in Iraq, an independent NGO or other international 
organization	should	develop	a	standardized	program	that	deals	with	reporting	in	conflict	zones	and	offers	
training	 for	 Iraqi	 journalists	 to	 learn	 to	better	protect	 themselves	while	covering	potentially	dangerous	
topics or areas .   
6.		 Create	a	“Peace	Media”	Alternative	
While this policy paper has highlighted how media have emerged as powerful tools in increasing awareness 
of ethno-sectarian divisions in a deeply-divided society, it has also shown that they have the potential 
to	shape	and	influence	public	attitudes	in	overcoming	tensions.	The	media	can	channel	communication	
between	parties	and	serve	a	dialogical	role	in	the	ethno-political	context,	ultimately	building	confidence	
between	parties.	The	cases	of	 such	a	“peace	media”	are	 rare,	yet	 there	are	organizations	 that	 can	offer	
advice to Iraqi journalists on how to create such a media .     
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A)  Learn From Other Applied Experiences in Peace Media  
The NGO Search for Common Ground (SFCG) has had extensive experience in creating “peace media” 
and	offers	three	strategies	for	transforming	the	media	in	areas	of	conflict.		First,	they	advocate	the	media	
playing	a	role	where	they	deliver	a	free	flow	of	accurate	and	constructive	information	and	counteracting	
misperceptions.	Second,	they	suggest	that	the	media	can	build	confidence	and	mediate	between	conflicting	
parties by fostering dialogue and communication between the parties . Finally, they state that the media can 
serve	a	“watchdog”	role,	or	as	instruments	of	early	warning	for	the	potential	escalation	of	a	conflict.		
SFCG	advocates	a	holistic	approach	to	societies	where	conflict	has	occurred	or	has	the	potential	to	break	
out . In their opinion, addressing only media institutions fails to bring in other actors who have a role in 
the	conflict.	They	stress	that	a	sustained	effort	to	transform	a	conflict	has	to	involve	efforts	to	change	the	
mentalities of individuals as well as societies, and thus they seek to involve governmental organizations, 
non-governmental organizations, businesses (including media owners), public opinion leaders, academics 
and marginalized sections of society into their programs .39  
The Search for Common Ground techniques include training workshops for media practitioners in African 
countries such as Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone; 
the Balkans in Macedonia and Albania; as well as the Middle East, Sri Lanka, Cyprus and its Greek-Turkish 
project.	 Their	 assistance	 focuses	 on	 three	 different	 aspects	 of	 local	 media	 structures	 in	 conflict	 zones	
that seek to create a media culture that allows for a variety of opinion, provide professional training for 
journalists and provide equipment to local media .  
B)  Develop a Peace Media Strategy  
The following techniques adopted by Search for Common Ground should be applied inside of Iraq:
•	 Workshops	on	dialogue	facilitation	and	collaboration	for	Iraqi	media	practitioners	
•	 Workshops	 to	 educate	 journalists,	 station	 owners	 and	 producers	 on	 how	 to	 defuse	
inflammatory	coverage		
•	 Training	local	journalists	and	students	in	conflict	resolution	skills	using	various	media	and	
materials   
•	 Joint	media	projects	between	the	various	ethno-sectarian	groups					
•	 Facilitating	meetings	between	owners	of	independent	and	ethno-sectarian	media	
•	 TV	 and	 Radio	 programs	 fostering	 dialogue	 and	 cooperation	 between	 journalists	 from	
different	ethno-sectarian	groups	
•	 Documentaries	about	initiatives	that	bring	ethno-sectarian	groups	together	
•	 Drama	series	that	use	entertainment	to	convey	themes	of	ethno-sectarian	cooperation	
•	 Programming	for	children	that	deals	with	these	themes		
C)  Focus Attention on the Entertainment
Peace	media	strategies	should	focus	on	entertainment,	such	as	films,	drama	series	and	comedies,	as	these	
programs can reach wider audiences and provide a release from the daily violence in Iraq . Entertainment 
39	 		Sandra	D.	Melone,,	Georgios	Terzis,	and	Ozsei	Beteli,	“Using	the	Media	for	Conflict	Transformation,”	Berghof	Research	
Center	for	Constructive	Conflict	Management,	April	2002,	10.
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that	can	include	fictional	characters	representing	all	of	Iraq’s	communities,	as	well	as	actors	from	Iraq’s	
ethno-sectarian mosaic, can provide a tele-visual alternative for the Iraqi public to the news of continued 
inter-ethnic and inter-sectarian strife .   
D)  Provide Literature on Peace Media
Existing material on peace media and journalism is primarily in English . Useful articles and handbooks 
should be translated into Arabic, Kurdish and Turkish to be distributed at media institutions and educational 
facilities .  
This paper demonstrates that the media landscape in Iraq is at a juncture where it has the potential to 
exacerbate the ethno-sectarian tensions that already exist . Rather than waiting for the media to turn into 
instruments of hate and further distancing these communities, the policy recommendations in this report 
are essentially proactive measures to ensure that the media can serve as tools of reconciliation, if not 
cohesion .
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Appendix	A:	 
Sample	of	Ethno-Sectarian	Media	in	Iraq	
Political Islamist Media 
Arab Shi’a Media  
SCIRI 
Al-Adala (Justice) daily paper 
Al-Wahdah (Unity) weekly paper 
Al-Ghadir radio station  
Al-Furat (The Euphrates) satellite channel 
The Da’wa Party  
Al-Da’wa (The Call) daily paper 
Al-Bayan (Announcement) weekly paper   
Al-Masar radio station  
Al-Masar TV channel 
Sadr Trend 
Ishraqat Al-Sadr daily paper 
Al-Hawza Al-Natiqa (The Active Hawza) weekly paper 
Al-Salam radio station 
Al-Salam TV station 
Iraqi Hizbullah 
Al-Bayyinah (Evidence) paper 
Arab Sunni Media 
Iraqi Islamic Party  
Dar Al-Salam (House of Peace) radio station 
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Dar Al-Salam (The House of Peace) newspaper daily paper 
General Dialogue Conference 
Al-‘Itisam (The Guardian) daily newspaper 
The	Unified	National	Movement 
Al-Sa’ah (The Hour) biweekly newspaper 
The Association of Muslim Scholars 
Al-Basa’ir (Insights) daily newspaper  
Ethnic Based Media 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)  
Khabat daily newspaper in Kurdish  
Al-Ta’akhi (Brotherhood) daily newspaper in Arabic 
Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan radio station 
Kurdistan Satellite Channel 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 
Al-Ittihad	(The	Union)	daily	newspaper	in	Arabic		
Kurdistan Nuwe daily newspaper in Kurdish 
Al-Hurriyya (Freedom) radio station 
Al-Hurriyya (Freedom) terrestrial Arabic TV station in Sulaymaniyya  
Voice of the People of Kurdistan radio station 
KurdSat satellite channel 
Iraqi Turkmen Front 
Turkmenelli (The Turkmen Nation) daily newspaper in Turkish 
Turkmenelli (The Turkmen Nation) radio station in Kirkuk, Tal Afar and Mosul 
Turkmenelli (The Turkmen Nation) terrestrial TV in Kirkuk 
Assyrian Democratic Movement 
Bahra Al-Diya (The Light) newspaper   
Ashur (Assyria) terrestrial Arabic TV station in Sulaymaniyya in Mosul 
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